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ABSTRACT 
Most policy analyses aimed at deterring complicity in securities law 
violations implicitly assume that a standards-based regime (such as 
liability standards for aiding and abetting) represents the best strategy for 
accomplishing that objective.  Moreover, many commentators regard the 
restoration of private damage remedies against complicit secondary actors 
as essential to the success of any anti-complicity regime.  These concerns 
are linked to the Supreme Court’s Central Bank trilogy—Central Bank, 
Stoneridge Investment Partners, and Janus Capital Group—decisions that 
mechanically constrain a principled understanding of the relationship 
between primary and secondary liability standards.  This article offers a 
fundamentally different policy approach in thinking about the problem of 
complicity in securities violations.  It uses the concept of anti-complicity 
policies—i.e., policies designed to deter secondary participants from 
providing assistance to, or to make such participants accountable in 
monitoring or preventing, more fundamental forms of misconduct—as a 
rubric to compare the effectiveness of two different classes of strategies:  
standards-based policies and rules-based policies.  The article then argues 
that enforcement objectives would be better served by refocusing anti-
complicity policies on a rules-based regime.  First, a rules-based regime 
may be more effective in a wide variety of contexts than a standards-based 
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regime.  Second, while a rules-based regime is not inconsistent with private 
liability for aiding and abetting, the combination of publicly-enforced 
standards and robust anti-complicity rules may be more socially efficient 
than a regime that relies almost exclusively on public sanctions and private 
remedies for aiding and abetting.  Third, a rules-based regime (even if not 
explicitly conceived of as such) has already begun taking shape within 
federal securities law on an ad hoc basis that gives some sense of the 
potential feasibility of a more robust rules-based approach.  This article 
acknowledges two significant caveats.  It does not recommend eliminating 
anti-complicity standards (such as aiding and abetting principles) because 
such standards provide a powerful and necessary backstop to the inevitable 
gaps and interstices of a rules-based regime.  Furthermore, the article does 
not argue that the emerging use of rules-based strategies has produced a 
fully adequate anti-complicity regime.  Instead, the article urges continued 
movement toward a more robust rules-based anti-complicity regime, a 
result that at a minimum would require a much broader grant of 
rulemaking authority to the SEC. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Legal strategies designed to curb complicit assistance to another 
person engaged in unlawful conduct have a critical role in deterring 
securities law violations, especially securities fraud.  Under federal law, 
aiding and abetting standards are the most prominent example of such 
principles, and in recent years the concept of aiding and abetting liability 
has been the focal point for significant legislative and judicial policy 
skirmishes.  Most notably, in Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank,
1
 the 
Supreme Court revoked the longstanding judicial recognition of private 
rights of action for aiding and abetting under Rule 10b-5.  The decision 
represents a watershed in judicial thinking about complicity under federal 
securities law.  In two subsequent decisions involving private securities 
actions, the Supreme Court further limited the liability of secondary actors 
whose conduct arguably rose to the level of primary liability.  In Stoneridge 
Investment Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.,
2
 the Court held that Central 
Bank’s prohibition on private rights of action for aiding and abetting 
extended even to actions against secondary participants who engaged in 
acts of fraud in furtherance of a fraudulent scheme.
3
  In its most recent 
term, the Supreme Court went even further, holding that secondary parties 
are immune from private damages actions under the Central Bank 
principle, even if they draft fraudulent disclosures disseminated to investors 
relating to matters within the secondary party’s exclusive knowledge, 
provided the statements are never specifically attributed to  the secondary 
party, and another party retained ultimate authority over the decision to 
release the statements.
4
 
Legislatively, Congress has declined to restore private actions against 
parties based on complicity,
5
 but has consistently acted to extend aiding 
and abetting liability in SEC enforcement actions.
6
  Following Central 
Bank, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
7
 (the “PSLRA”) 
 
        1.  Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 
164 (1994). 
 2. Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008). 
 3. Id. at 159–61. 
 4. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011).  While 
limiting primary liability for secondary actors and thus any liability for damages to injured 
investors, the decision did not purport to foreclose the secondary actor’s liability for 
complicity in SEC law enforcement actions, provided a claim for primary liability remained 
viable against one or more other actors. 
 5. See infra note 191 and accompanying text (noting Congress’s failure to restore such 
implied private cause of action, along with Section 20(e) of the Exchange Act’s 
instructiveness on this decision). 
 6. See infra Section III.A (discussing the evolution of federal securities law in terms of 
anti-complicity standards, and the SEC’s current enforcement power thereunder). 
 7. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
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restored the SEC’s ability to seek sanctions against aiders and abettors in 
civil actions, a legislative judgment that Central Bank had gone too far in 
casting doubt on such liability in law enforcement actions.  In the Dodd-
Frank Act,
8
 Congress made explicit that in civil enforcement actions, a 
lower scienter standard based on recklessness was appropriate for 
establishing aiding and abetting liability.
9
 
While these twists and turns offer opportunity for debate and indeed 
have been much debated,
10
 an unarticulated assumption in these discussions 
is the centrality (and even exclusive utility) of aiding and abetting standards 
in regulating complicity under federal securities law.  This article 
challenges that assumption.  Instead of asking how aiding and abetting 
principles might be better refined or whether the remedies and sanctions for 
aiding and abetting liability should be reconfigured, this article explores the 
more fundamental question of whether there are more effective strategies 
for deterring complicity than primarily relying on a standards-based regime 
built around aiding and abetting standards.  This article does not advocate 
doing away with aiding and abetting standards, but rather urges the 
adoption of rules-based strategies as the primary focus for anti-complicity 
policy. 
In order to make the case for greater reliance on rules-based strategies, 
I will make various references to anti-complicity policies, strategies, 
principles, and measures.  While aiding and abetting standards are easily 
the most discussed forms of anti-complicity measure, in fact, there exists a 
vast range of measures properly viewed as anti-complicity devices.  As I 
am using the term, anti-complicity policies refer to regulatory features that 
expand the zone of unlawful behavior for secondary actors in providing 
assistance to others engaged in securities law violations.  Expanding the 
zone of a secondary party’s legal obligations makes it more likely that the 
secondary party will act in ways that impede the primary actor’s ability to 
engage in more fundamental securities law violations.
11
  In this sense, anti-
 
(1995) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77–78(2006)) [hereinafter PSLRA]. 
 8. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act]; see infra Section II.A.2 
(describing these changes). 
 9. See infra Section III.C (examining further this lower scienter standard). 
 10. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-664, SECURITIES 
FRAUD LIABILITY OF SECONDARY ACTORS (2011) (summarizing the history and conflicting 
policy proposals relating to secondary liability for securities fraud). 
 11. This vaguely echoes Professor Kraakman, who broadly defined gatekeepers as 
“private parties who are able to disrupt misconduct by withholding their cooperation from 
wrongdoers.”  Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party 
Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 53 (1986).  While gatekeeping undoubtedly 
represents an anti-complicity mechanism, anti-complicity policies encompass a broader 
range of policies directed at persons whose cooperation has in the “but for” sense combined 
with the conduct of a primary violator in bringing about a violation.  This term encompasses 
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complicity policies go beyond merely proscribing knowing assistance of 
one sort or another and refer to a whole range of legal rules and standards 
designed not only to cause secondary persons to withhold assistance for, 
but also to ferret out and prevent conduct and practices that would violate 
fundamental securities law prohibitions. 
This article contends that a rules-based approach with respect to 
secondary parties would be generally preferable to exclusive reliance on a 
standards-based regime.  Rules provide direct prospective guidance to 
potential secondary actors.  For example, requiring certain conduct, such as 
certification from a secondary actor, removes any ambiguity as to the 
responsibility of that person.  Second, rules mitigate the potential of 
secondary actors to rationalize acts of assistance to a primary actor.  By 
putting the secondary actor on notice of societal expectations, the rules 
ensure that a secondary actor cannot ignore the potential enforcement 
concerns inherent in particular situations. 
The rules-based approach to secondary liability differs from a 
standards-based approach in two important respects.  The rules-based 
approach promotes prospective clarity regarding the secondary party’s 
obligations.  In addition, it substantially modifies the conventional 
approach where primary liability is a predicate for secondary liability (i.e., 
there can be no secondary liability absent primary liability).  A rules-based 
regime need not be tethered to a finding of primary liability in this fashion.  
As a result, the secondary actor’s duties are defined with greater precision 
at the outset and the secondary actor is less likely to discount his potential 
liability by contingencies concerning whether the primary actor is in fact 
engaged in unlawful conduct or the probability that the secondary party’s 
role is likely to evade detection even if the primary actor’s unlawful 
conduct is subsequently detected. 
There is another area of potential difference between rules-based and 
standards-based anti-complicity regimes.  The standards-based regime has 
triggered an enormous policy debate regarding whether injured investors 
should enjoy a remedy for damages against established aiders and abettors 
comparable to any damages remedy afforded against primary actors (i.e., in 
fraud actions).
12
  After Central Bank, of course, federal policy has 
 
many classes of potential participants, such as fellow employees and transaction 
counterparties, and a wide range of cooperative activities.  Anti-complicity policies in this 
sense go beyond regulating acts of deliberate and active cooperation, and are not limited to 
conventional gatekeepers, but rather extend to all persons whose conduct or responsibilities 
are proximately connected to misconduct of a primary violator. 
 12. That is not to say that all standards-based sanctions entail liability for damages.  
Clearly, liability for damages is not available where the primary violation itself does not 
afford a remedy in damages, or where sanctions are based on violations that do not rise to 
the level of aiding and abetting such as a “causing violation.” 
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foreclosed liability for damages against complicit secondary actors,
13
 but 
this is a contested area that is subject to legislative revision.  Rules-based 
anti-complicity strategies, in contrast, tend to cut against recognition of 
private damage remedies.
14
  Because of the prospective preventative 
rationale underlying a rules-based anti-complicity regime, there would be a 
strong presumption against any corresponding damages remedy since rule 
violations will not necessary result in injured investors.  Moreover, the 
existence of effective rules-based anti-complicity strategies would actually 
weigh against policy arguments for providing a damages remedy for 
standards-based aiding and abetting by diminishing the need for additional 
forms of deterrence.  The existence of an effective alternative rules-based 
scheme would militate against expanding liability under a standards-based 
regime. 
The challenge presented by this topic lies in deriving meaningful 
generalizations from a myriad of anecdotal situations involving secondary 
actors.  How can we ever know whether rules-based strategies might be 
more effective in general than standards-based strategies?  This article 
constructs an argument for greater reliance on a rules-based regime based 
on an analysis of key structural features in understanding anti-complicity 
strategies in the securities law context.  In Section I, the article begins with 
several illustrations of securities law violations that raise recurring issues of 
complicity so that readers have a concrete idea of the underlying context.  
Section II examines the economic and behavioral logic underlying anti-
complicity policies and recurrent contextual features of complicity 
problems arising in the securities law context to gauge the feasibility of a 
rules-based regime and to assess the relative strengths and weaknesses of 
rules- and standards-based regimes.  Section III discusses the structure and 
analyzes the relative success of aiding and abetting standards (and quasi-
aiding and abetting standards) as a strategy for deterring complicity, while 
Section IV argues, in light of this analysis, that reliance on aiding and 
abetting standards as the principal regulatory anti-complicity strategy in the 
securities law area is unsound. 
Section V of the article briefly surveys use of rules-based strategies 
that have been introduced on an ad hoc basis in specific securities contexts.  
The article’s concluding section, Section VI, makes the general argument 
that a more comprehensive and systematic approach to rules-based anti-
complicity strategies is both desirable and feasible, and then offers a 
proposal that would enable the SEC, by regulatory initiative, to expand 
reliance on rules-based anti-complicity strategies.  As explained below, a 
 
 13. See infra Section III.C (examining current federal policy and consequences flowing 
for secondary actors). 
 14. See infra Section IV (analyzing the standards-based anti-complicity strategy and its 
shortcomings). 
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regime of explicit contextualized bright-line rules that varies across types 
of transactions and types of secondary actors (e.g., gatekeepers, 
transactional counterparties, and employees) is likely to be effective in 
eliciting the type of behavior from secondary parties that would be most 
useful in impeding primary violations.  These standards should be 
formulated by the SEC, given the SEC’s relative institutional competency 
and rulemaking capacity, rather than by courts. 
I. SOME EXAMPLES TO THINK ABOUT 
Comparing the relative merits of rules-based and standards-based 
regimes obviously involves a fair degree of abstraction.  Therefore, it is 
perhaps useful to begin with some simple, recent, concrete examples of 
conduct—raising questions of complicity that show how problematic 
liability determinations can be in the securities law context.  The examples 
will be useful later on to show how a rules-based regime might be more 
effective than a standards-based regime in changing the behavior of 
secondary actors.   
A.   Affirmatively Accommodating Confederates   
Let’s begin with an SEC matter involving Delphi Corporation, nine 
executives, and four third parties.
15
  The enforcement matter arose out of 
several commercial transactions structured to enable Delphi to report false 
financial results based on improper accounting treatment of the transactions 
at the end of Delphi’s 2000 fiscal year.  Delphi consented to judgment with 
respect to the alleged securities law violations involving fraud, improper 
reporting, and improper accounting books and records.
16
  Three instances of 
fraudulent accounting practices by Delphi required knowing assistance 
from employees of three outside firms, but the three different transactions 
triggered significantly different outcomes for the complicit parties. 
In one transaction, Delphi received a sham lump sum $20 million 
payment from a friendly “IT service provider” and then treated the payment 
as a reduction in current expenses (in the form of a non-refundable 
 
 15. The matter resulted in an enforcement action and several related administrative 
proceedings.  Delphi Corp., Litigation Release No. 19,891, 2006 WL 3068567 (Oct. 30, 
2006) [hereinafter Delphi Litigation Release]; Complaint at 2–12, Delphi Corp., Civil 
Action No. 2:06-cv-14891 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 30, 2006) [hereinafter Delphi Complaint]. 
 16. Subsequently, two audit partners with Deloitte & Touche LLP were sanctioned in 
connection with the audit opinions rendered by the outside auditor, barring the two from 
practicing before the Commission.  In re Higgins, Exchange Act Release No. 57,380, 2008 
WL 508173 (Feb. 26, 2008), In re DiFazio, Exchange Act Release No. 57,381, 2008 WL 
508174 (Feb. 26, 2008). 
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rebate).
17
  In a side arrangement, Delphi agreed to repay the lump sum over 
a five-year period with interest, and the repayments were disguised through 
the IT company’s inflated service invoices (on a roughly $200 million 
contract) and a factoring arrangement with another third party finance 
company that accelerated certain payments to the IT company.
18
  As a 
result, Delphi improperly reduced its current expenses (in the form of a 
non-refundable rebate), thereby inflating its reported net income in 2000.  It 
deferred recognition of the offsetting liability into subsequent accounting 
periods.  
Delphi’s fraudulent accounting required the complicity of the IT 
company and its employees.  The IT company employees provided an 
intentionally vague side letter and inaccurate work orders to Delphi to 
conceal the economic substance of the arrangement.
19
  As to the complicit 
parties’ liability, two client executives for the IT company, who completed 
false documentation, settled cease-and-desist (C&D) proceedings for 
causing Delphi’s violations of reporting and books and records 
provisions.
20
  A senior accounting officer of the IT company—indeed the 
officer responsible for the IT company’s own generally accepted 
accounting principles (“GAAP”) compliance—who allegedly had reviewed 
and discussed the arrangement and contracts providing the $20 million 
payment, was charged with aiding and abetting Delphi’s misconduct in the 
injunctive action.
21
  He contested the charges and they were eventually 
voluntarily dismissed.
22
  The IT company was never charged.
23
 
In another transaction, Delphi employees arranged to sell $70 million 
in generator cores and battery inventory to a privately-owned consulting 
company (with an ongoing consulting relationship with Delphi) and agreed 
to repurchase the inventory the next quarter, in return for which the 
consulting company received a fee for its assistance.
24
  The transaction 
involved a number of suspicious circumstances.  The inventory always 
remained in Delphi’s possession.
25
  Delphi arranged for the consulting 
company’s financing of the transaction and its payment was not received 
 
 17. Delphi Complaint, supra note 15, ¶¶ 71–87. 
 18. Id. at ¶¶ 72–73. 
 19. Id. at ¶¶ 77, 79–80, 84, 86. 
 20. In re Curry, Exchange Act Release No. 54,668, 2006 WL 3068566 (Oct. 30, 2006); 
In re Doyle, Exchange Act Release No. 54,666, 2006 WL 3068564 (Oct. 30, 2006). 
 21. Delphi Complaint, supra note 15, at ¶¶ 80–81, 87. 
 22. Delphi Corp., No. 2:06-cv-14891-AC-SDP, 2009 WL 3395583 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 3, 
2009) . 
 23. See generally Delphi Complaint, supra note 15 (listing the SEC’s charges against 
Delphi Corporation). 
 24. Id. at ¶¶ 55–67. 
 25. Id. at ¶ 62. 
FRANCO_FINALIZED_ONE (DO NOT DELETE)   
2011] OF COMPLICITY AND COMPLIANCE 11 
 
before the end of the last quarter in 2000.
26
  The consulting company had 
never engaged in such a transaction and had no business relevant to the 
transaction.
27
  The chief executive officer of the consulting company 
overruled his outside counsel who had advised that any contract should 
reflect the purchase and repurchase agreement in a single written 
document.
28
  Instead, the repurchase arrangement was left in the form of an 
oral agreement.
29
 
Delphi’s disclosure and the financial results in its Form 10-K were 
materially misleading as they related to the transaction.  There was no true 
sale of inventory:  rather, Delphi had sold inventory to itself to remove 
inventory from its balance sheet and recognize income on its income 
statement.  The chief executive officer and sole owner of the consulting 
company, the complicit party in the transaction, consented to a cease-and-
desist order for “causing” the fraud, reporting, books and records 
violations, settling a civil action seeking civil penalties and disgorgement, 
and alleging that he had aided and abetted Delphi’s violations.
30
 
In a third transaction, Delphi once again entered into a precious metals 
transaction with a bank.
31
  Delphi sold roughly $200 million in precious 
metals from Delphi to a large commercial bank in an end-of-quarter 
transaction,
32
 and simultaneously entered into a forward agreement to 
repurchase the identical metals from the bank.
33
  The price differential in 
the two contracts reflected the bank’s fees and costs for executing a loan 
transaction.
34
  The prices did not appear to correspond to the market value 
of the metals inventory.
35
  Delphi recognized immediate income from the 
first leg of the transaction and deferred costs into a later accounting 
period.
36
  Although the bank was arguably complicit in that the bank was 
aware that Delphi was engaged in an accounting transaction to remove the 
inventory from its books, the bank did not appear to provide any false 
documents to facilitate the transaction.
37
  Although Delphi and its 
employees were sanctioned, the bank and its employees were not.
38
 
 
 26. Id. at ¶ 60. 
 27. Id. at ¶ 57. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. In re Bahadur, Exchange Act Release No. 54,665, 2006 WL 3068563 (Oct. 30, 
2006).  Bahadur separately consented to disgorge the payments his company had received 
from Delphi and pay a civil penalty. 
 31. Delphi Complaint, supra note 15, ¶¶ 46–54. 
 32. Id. at ¶¶ 46, 51. 
 33. Id. at ¶ 51. 
 34. Id. at ¶¶ 53–54. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at ¶¶ 46, 54. 
 37. Id. at ¶¶ 46–54. 
 38. Delphi Litigation Release, supra note 15. 
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These proceedings raise several illustrative kinds of considerations 
regarding complicity.  All three transactions clearly entailed the complicity 
of counterparties, but the dispositions widely varied:  firms were generally 
not held liable and individuals were; and in some cases, neither individuals 
nor firms were regarded as legally complicit, though the circumstances 
strongly suggested both awareness and assistance (e.g., the bank).  
Although the evidentiary record as to actual knowledge by the outside 
parties is uneven (and probably accounts for the disparity in outcomes), in 
each case, the details of the transaction alone were sufficiently suspect to 
raise questions of complicity.  As a policy matter, one would hope that 
complicit assistance could be discouraged in all three transactions.  The 
question posed in the remainder of this article is whether rules-based or 
standards-based strategies are better suited to achieving anti-complicity 
outcomes in similar situations. 
B.   The Disengaged Employee   
Nicolas Howard was a senior executive in the American broker-dealer 
subsidiary of a U.K. brokerage firm.
39
  He was the lead executive for the 
broker-dealer in placing into the U.S. the shares of a foreign hotel company 
on whose board he sat.
40
  The offering was a conditional best efforts 
offering which required the American broker-dealer to sell a minimum 
number of shares as set forth in the offering by a stated date, or return 
funds raised from U.S. investors who purchased shares in the offering.
41
  
The offering did not conform to the regulatory requirements governing 
such offerings because it counted shares sold to affiliated parties toward the 
minimum and failed to actually collect nearly one-third of the funds raised 
in the offering by the stated date.
42
  Both the court and the parties appeared 
to agree that the American broker-dealer had violated the SEC regulations 
governing conditional offerings.
43
  The SEC had also concluded that 
Howard had aided and abetted his firm’s violation of U.S. regulations 
because of his central role in overseeing the offering, his active 
 
 39. Howard v. SEC, 376 F.3d 1136, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
 40. Id. at 1138–39. 
 41. Id. at 1140 
 42. Id. at 1140–41. 
 43. Id. at 1146 n.17.  One issue glossed over in the text of the opinion is whether Rule 
10b-9 is a scienter-based offense.  If viewed as an antifraud rule, then it is scienter-based.  
Cf. Fred N. Gerard & Michael L. Hirschfeld, The Scienter Requirement Under Rule 10b-6, 
46 BUS. LAW. 777 (1991) (arguing that all Section 10(b) rules implicitly require scienter).  
The firm can only be liable if someone in the firm had the requisite mental state.  At the 
same time, a reading of the rule and its administration suggest a prescriptive regulation.  The 
opinion does not resolve the tension between holding a firm complicit for liability under 
Rule 10b-9, but seemingly forecloses that result as to individuals. 
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involvement in marketing the shares, and his efforts to collect overdue 
payments from clients after the stated date.
44
  The court of appeals 
overturned the finding as to Howard because there was no showing that he 
actually was aware of any “illegalities,” and his conduct, contrary to the 
SEC’s finding, should not have been regarded as reckless.
45
  Although the 
facts showed that the first offering had not been completed in compliance 
with the SEC regulations or the placement documents, the court noted that 
the record showed that Howard had not involved himself in the drafting of 
the documents and had only skimmed them, choosing to rely on the firm’s 
outside counsel and firm employees to ensure compliance.
46
  He seemed to 
have received oral assurances to that effect from an employee and did not 
raise questions about the transactions that did not qualify toward the 
minimum because he was unfamiliar with the SEC regulations.
47
 
What is undeniable in this matter is that Howard was the senior 
executive in charge and actively assisted in completing the offering.  He 
never took it upon himself, however, to consult directly with outside 
counsel or ensure compliance with the relevant requirements.  His firm 
could be held liable but, according to the court, Howard could not be held 
liable for complicity, even if he was the employee most responsible for his 
firm’s actions, because he failed to meet the requisite culpability standard.  
If society’s interest lies in preventing violative conduct by firms in similar 
circumstances, then surely insulating responsible employees for complicity 
in assisting their own firm’s misconduct, based on a high culpability 
threshold for personal culpability, undermines anti-complicity policies.  
The question posed in this illustration, as above, concerns whether rules-
based or standards-based strategies are better suited for achieving anti-
complicity outcomes in similar situations. 
C.   The Willingly Acquiescent Confederate   
In a recent injunctive action, the SEC unsuccessfully sought injunctive 
relief against the complicit chief financial officer, Joseph Apuzzo, of a 
counterparty to a public company that engaged in fraudulent financial 
reporting.
48
  Apuzzo, acting for his company, allegedly agreed to a request 
from the chief financial officer of United Rentals, a public company, to re-
characterize various aspects of the two companies’ transactions and to use 
side agreements to keep material elements out of the principal underlying 
 
 44. Howard, 376 F.3d at 1137. 
 45. Id. at 1142–47. 
 46. Id. at 1139. 
 47. Id. at 1140–41. 
 48. SEC v. Apuzzo, 758 F. Supp. 2d 136, 138–44 (D. Conn. 2010), appeal docketed, 
No. 11-696 (2d Cir. 2011). 
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intercompany agreements.
49
  Apuzzo specifically offered to provide a letter 
in the case of one transaction that verified an inflated appraisal, knowing 
that it would be inaccurate.
50
  Apuzzo was willing to do so to complete the 
transaction and because United Rentals had agreed to indemnify his 
company for losses resulting from the misvaluation.
51
 The misleading 
appraisal letter, however, was never ultimately prepared and delivered to 
the independent auditor.  The SEC alleged that Apuzzo’s actions 
collectively, including executing the relevant agreements, amounted to 
substantial assistance in United Rentals’ fraudulent financial reporting.
52
 
Although finding that the SEC had sufficiently alleged Apuzzo’s 
actual knowledge of the public company’s fraudulent reporting,
53
 the 
district court nevertheless dismissed the aiding and abetting action against 
Apuzzo on the grounds that Apuzzo’s conduct had no more than a “‘but 
for’ causal relationship” to the fraud and therefore did not constitute the 
requisite substantial assistance.
54
  According to the district court, 
willingness to deliver a misleading appraisal letter or to execute documents 
designed to conceal the true nature of the transactions “[did] not support a 
conclusion that Apuzzo’s conduct proximately caused the primary 
violation.”
55
 
 This case bears some similarity to the first example where some 
counterparties were sanctioned and others were not, but differs in one key 
respect.  Apuzzo’s conduct in going along with the primary violator’s 
scheme (by offering to sign a false appraisal letter and agreeing to execute 
documents that disguised the true nature of the transaction) was deemed 
legally insufficient to show complicity.
56
  One possibility is that the case 
will be reversed on appeal.  Even if it is not, however, it is apparent that the 
standards-based approach does not reach a result consistent with sound 
policy.  The goal of anti-complicity policies should be to deter acts of 
acquiescence that  serve to advance another’s violations of law, even if 
only to disrupt the primary violator’s confidence in proceeding in an 
 
 49. Id. at 138–44. 
 50. Id. at 142. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 140. 
 53. Id. at 146–50. 
 54. Id. at 149–53. 
 55. Id. at 152. 
 56. Apuzzo, as a non-employee is not subject to the direct legal obligations applicable 
to United Rentals’ own corporate officers where express prohibitions affect the latter 
individuals’ accountability for the company’s financial reporting under rules such as 
Exchange Act Rule 13b2-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2 (2011), a rule directly aimed at officers 
and directors of the reporting company, but not third parties.  Not surprisingly, the SEC 
obtained sanctions against United Rentals’ senior officers involved in the transactions.  
Milne, Litigation Release No. 20,518, 2008 WL 926256 (Apr. 7, 2008); Nolan, Litigation 
Release No. 20,396, 2007 WL 4335549 (Dec. 12, 2007).  
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unlawful manner.  Had Apuzzo declined to sign agreements that were 
designed to mislead the auditors, it seems plausible that the primary 
violator would have abandoned its efforts to use the transactions to 
manipulate its reported financial results.  Once again, it is reasonable to ask 
whether policy is best served by standards that require the relevant tribunal 
to determine after the fact what constitutes substantial assistance or rules 
designed to curb obvious forms of socially disfavored cooperative conduct 
at the outset. 
D.   Institutional Complicity in Facially Lawful Transactions   
As noted in the first example, an outside institution whose employees 
facilitate a primary violator’s scheme, as in Delphi’s case, may escape 
liability.  The IT company was never charged, even though its employees 
were, and neither the outside bank nor its employees were charged, even 
though it was reasonably apparent to the bank that the transaction, which 
lacked any economic substance, was being used to alter Delphi’s reported 
financial results.  In certain circumstances, however, the SEC has 
proceeded against institutions as aiders and abettors.
57
  A good example is 
the agency’s action against J.P. Morgan in the Enron investigation.
58
  In 
that matter, the SEC sanctioned J.P. Morgan, but ironically no individual 
employees of J.P. Morgan, for sponsoring sham structured transactions.
59
  
The transactions on their face did not entail any illegality, but inside J.P. 
 
 57. See, e.g., Veritas Software Corp., Litigation Release No. 20,008, 2007 WL 528458 
(Feb. 21, 2007) (settling an aiding and abetting charge where software company agreed to 
purchase online advertising from large public internet company and others, and in return the 
sellers agreed to buy software at compensating inflated prices from the software company); 
In re Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 55,954, 2007 WL 1827181 (June 
25, 2007) (finding in settled administrative proceeding that IBM was a cause of fraudulent 
accounting and reporting violations at public company by buying old cash registers at an 
inflated price and selling new electronic cash registers at a corresponding inflated price).     
 58. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., Litigation Release No. 18,252, 2003 WL 21738802 (July 
28, 2003); Complaint, SEC v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., (No. H-03-28-77), 2003 WL 
25575256 (S.D. Tex. July 25, 2003) [hereinafter J.P. Morgan Complaint].  A private 
securities law action for primary liability brought by J.P. Morgan’s shareholders against J.P. 
Morgan arising out of the same facts was dismissed because plaintiffs failed to meet the 
PSLRA’s pleading standard for scienter.  ECA v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 553 F.3d 187 
(2d Cir. 2009). 
 59. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., Litigation Release, supra note 58.  In the derivatives 
transactions, Enron entered into prepaid forward transactions with a shell company 
controlled by J.P. Morgan, which in turn entered into a mirror transaction of the first leg 
with J.P. Morgan and then J.P. Morgan would enter into its own mirror transaction of the 
second leg with Enron.  When the parties’ economic positions in the transaction were netted, 
Enron had received a fixed payment and J.P. Morgan, after netting out the repayment of the 
loan, was left with an amount that corresponded to the imputed interest on the loan.  J.P. 
Morgan Complaint, supra note 58, ¶¶ 12–29. 
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Morgan, employees recognized that the transactions had no economic 
substance and appeared to be used by Enron to disguise its receipt of loans 
in financing its business operations.
60
  As Enron illustrates, transactions 
that may be facially lawful can be used to advance fraudulent accounting 
schemes.  Society has an interest in discouraging complicity by institutional 
third parties (e.g., investment banks) in these nominally lawful transactions, 
but there is little guidance regarding when institutions, institution 
employees, or both, will be liable under a standards-based scheme.
61
  
Again, it is worth asking whether anti-complicity objectives in such 
situations are best served by a standards-based regime or a rules-based 
regime. 
II. RETHINKING THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATING 
COMPLICITY UNDER FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW 
Much of the academic debate regarding complicity under the 
securities laws has taken place within very narrow bounds.  Typically, the 
debate focuses on specific problems arising in the case law relating to 
aiding and abetting and its elements.  The resulting analysis then uses either 
policy considerations to expand or contract the zone of liability, or case law 
to show pernicious policy effects arising from the particular standard 
applied.  This form of debate obscures structural issues relating to the 
economic and behavioral realities underlying legal policies aimed at 
deterring complicity, and largely preempts any consideration of alternative 
anti-complicity strategies in relation to aiding and abetting standards.  
This section instead refocuses the discussion relating to anti-
complicity initiatives on first principles in terms of methods and objectives.  
There is a substantial legal literature concerning the economic logic of 
gatekeeping,
62
 which can be generalized to provide useful insights into the 
 
 60. J.P. Morgan Complaint, supra note 58, ¶¶ 33–37. 
 61. This uncertainty did not exist in pre-Central Bank private litigation.  Private 
litigants sought the deepest pockets and routinely sought to hold the institutional employer 
liable, rather than the employee, on a respondeat superior theory.  The SEC has not followed 
a consistent approach.  In Delphi, as discussed above with respect to the IT Company and 
the bank, and in other cases, the SEC has declined to proceed against institutions.  See e.g., 
In re NutraCea, Litigation Release No. 21,819, 2011 WL 194505 (Jan. 20, 2011) (electing 
not to proceed against company that putatively “purchased” millions in product from public 
company in a fraudulent accounting scheme); In re Orr, Litigation Release No. 18,989, 2004 
WL 2785506 (Dec. 2, 2004) (sanctioning corporate officers from vendors such as Kodak, 
Coca-Cola, Pepsi-Cola, and Frito-Lay for aiding and abetting fraud and reporting violations 
by K-Mart, but declining to bring actions against corporate vendors). 
 62. See, e.g., Andrew F. Tuch, Multiple Gatekeepers, 96 VA. L. REV. 1583 (2010) 
(analyzing gatekeeper liability, particularly in business transactions, as a phenomenon to 
which multiple gatekeepers contribute, rather than one in which individuals independently 
operate); Assaf Hamdani, Gatekeeper Liability, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 53 (2003) (discussing the 
FRANCO_FINALIZED_ONE (DO NOT DELETE)   
2011] OF COMPLICITY AND COMPLIANCE 17 
 
economic logic of complicity.  The gatekeeping literature has resulted in 
many policy prescriptions in the securities law area, especially in the area 
of private liability standards.
63
  This section attempts to motivate the 
economic and behavioral understanding of anti-complicity policy in the 
securities law context, and the relationship of those standards to a broader 
range of anti-complicity policies.  Unlike other analyses, this section also 
develops a contextual taxonomy for complicity that identifies recurrent 
patterns of conduct by secondary actors that contribute to securities law 
violations.  The combination of factors—identifiable recurrent patterns of 
complicit conduct, behavioral factors that lead to complicit conduct, and 
the economic logic of anti-complicity strategies—are used to support the 
article’s central contention that rules-based anti-complicity strategies in the 
securities context are an effective alternative to exclusive reliance on 
standards-based strategies. 
A. The Economic and Behavioral Logic of Regulating Complicity 
Simplified economic models of human and firm behavior provide a 
framework for understanding the rationale for anti-complicity policies.  
The focus of these models is to evaluate whether market (or private) 
incentives alone are likely to lead optimizing agents to adopt socially 
optimal behaviors when interacting with other persons who may be 
engaged in unlawful conduct.  Anti-complicity policies are desirable if they 
induce conduct that leads to more socially efficient outcomes than would 
occur in their absence.  Thus, in order to prevent fraudulent 
 
policy implications of enhancing gatekeeper liability); Kraakman, supra note 11 (examining 
the economic ramifications of imposing gatekeeper liability).  Though somewhat less 
theoretical, Professor Coffee provides a comprehensive examination of the connection 
between theory and application in this area.  JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS:  THE 
PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2006) [hereinafter COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS]. 
 63. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform:  The Challenge of 
Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301 (2004) (suggesting that the 2001–2002 
uptick in financial reporting and accounting irregularities resulted from professionals failing 
to perform their gatekeeping duties); John C. Coffee, Jr., Partnoy’s Complaint:  A Response, 
84 B.U. L. REV. 377 (2004) (challenging the strict liability approach to gatekeeper liability 
theory which Partnoy suggests); Frank Partnoy, Strict Liability for Gatekeepers:  A Reply to 
Professor Coffee, 84 B.U. L. REV. 365 (2004) (defending Partnoy’s strict liability theory in 
response to Coffee’s paper by discussing contact rights versus regulation, and potential 
damages in gatekeeper liability); Frank Partnoy, Barbarians at the Gatekeepers?:  A 
Proposal for a Modified Strict Liability Regime, 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 491, 492 (2001) 
(proposing a “modified strict liability regime that would avoid many of the problems and 
costs associated with the current due diligence-based approaches”).  For an interesting 
alternative to liability, based on rewards, see Lawrence A. Cunningham, Beyond Liability:  
Rewarding Effective Gatekeepers, 92 MINN. L. REV. 323 (2007) (offering the theory that a 
rewards-based initiative may overcome shortcomings of a deterrence-based gatekeeper 
liability system). 
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misrepresentations that affect securities transactions, society can choose 
whether to simply prohibit material misrepresentations and impose liability 
on only those persons making such misstatements, or to implement a mix 
of regulatory requirements that are directed not only at the person making 
the misstatement, but other persons whose conduct contributes to the 
primary actor’s willingness and ability to make misstatements.  Framing 
the issue of anti-complicity in the latter way necessarily imports underlying 
assumptions.  Most importantly, it assumes the validity of regulating the 
conduct of the primary actor.  For example, in the context of securities 
regulation, there is a need for antifraud prohibitions and mandatory 
disclosure by public companies.
64
  This simplifies the question of anti-
complicity regulation to one of whether anti-complicity policies in 
combination with regulation of primary actors may lead to more efficient 
regulation than relying solely on regulation of primary actors.
65
 
The purpose of sanctioning secondary participants is to create indirect 
obstacles for primary violators in accomplishing unlawful activities.
66
  
Many types of securities law violations occur within factual contexts where 
there is a significant degree of interaction and coordination in terms of 
infrastructure and participants, and thus many opportunities to create 
additional safeguards.  While anti-complicity policies may not result in 
revelation of unlawful schemes generally, they may nevertheless lead to 
greater compliance by causing secondary actors to deny primary violators 
necessary assistance for their unlawful conduct. 
In a similar vein, even where a primary violator is ultimately able to 
secure the requisite complicit assistance, anti-complicity policies will 
nevertheless have a specific cost-deterrent effect at the margin.  Anti-
complicity policies increase the costs of coordinated activity for the 
primary violator.  Secondary participants are less willing to participate or 
“look the other way” when a regime sanctions complicit behavior.  Thus, 
the cost of mustering resources for primary participants will increase in 
terms of search, compensation, and concealment.  Finally, anti-complicity 
policies may increase the likelihood of primary violation detection after the 
fact, as compliance systems of secondary participants identify anomalies in 
prior transactions.  Increased likelihood of detection will enhance the 
deterrent effect of primary sanctions. 
 
 64. See generally Joseph A. Franco, Why Antifraud Prohibitions Are Not Enough:  The 
Significance of Opportunism, Candor and Signaling in the Economic Case for Mandatory 
Securities Disclosure, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 223 (discussing the justifications for 
antifraud prohibitions and mandatory securities disclosure). 
 65. Professor Hamdani approaches this inquiry from a different direction.  He assumes 
primary actors are judgment-proof, and then proceeds to ask what damage liability regime 
would be most appropriately applied to gatekeepers.  Hamdani, supra note 62, at 65. 
 66. Id. (arguing that policies favoring gatekeeper liability are strongest when the 
gatekeeper is in a position to monitor the primary actor and is able to prevent wrongdoing). 
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In addition, primary and secondary actors face different incentives in 
connection with unlawful behavior.  Primary actors may be relatively 
insensitive to civil sanctions if the rewards from unlawful conduct are 
great, particularly if the risk of detection is low or monetary sanctions are 
inadequate.  This may be especially true where the unlawful conduct is 
relatively small in magnitude and hard to distinguish from lawful conduct.  
In contrast, secondary participants may profit very little from the primary 
violator’s unlawful conduct and may be more sensitive to sanctions at the 
margin.  Although society may be able achieve the same level of overall 
compliance with primary liability standards, presumably such a result 
would require far more significant sanctions for primary violators.  Indeed, 
primary-only sanctions might need to be unusually punitive to bring about 
the desired level of deterrence.  If so, such sanctions could have potentially 
adverse social consequences either by causing law-abiding participants to 
bear excessive precautionary costs or by causing them not to engage in 
economically desirable activities. 
By making secondary actors accountable, anti-complicity policies may 
permit the imposition of a less draconian regulatory regime directed 
exclusively at primary actors.  More moderate forms of threatened 
sanctions on both primary and secondary actors may prove sufficient to 
bring about the same level of compliance, but could have less distortive 
effects on legitimate business activities than exclusive reliance on sanctions 
directed exclusively at primary actors.  Of course, imposing liability on 
secondary actors will, in addition to making them marginally more cautious 
in their dealings, impose added costs on the services rendered by such 
actors (reflecting the added precautionary costs and the greater potential for 
regulatory penalties and legal fees).  The challenge of a two-tiered 
enforcement strategy is to achieve a more efficient enforcement policy mix:  
one that produces optimal levels of enforcement and compliance at lower 
costs. 
Complicity also has a strong behavioral component
67
 and thus 
behavioral considerations are potentially instructive about anti-complicity 
strategies.
68
  Complicit participants will exhibit a spectrum of motivations, 
 
 67. Cf. Donald C. Langevoort, The Social Construction of Sarbanes-Oxley, 105 MICH. 
L. REV. 1817, 1818 (2007) (examining the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s social “diffusion” to gauge 
its effect on corporate practices).   
Socio-legal researchers tell us . . . that even the coupling between official legal 
interpretations and social behavior is fairly loose—that absent unusually high 
rates of detection and prosecution, compliance decisions are based at least as 
much on the perceived legitimacy of the law and prevailing norms in local 
context as any deliberate risk calculation. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 68. See, e.g., Sung Hui Kim, Gatekeepers Inside Out, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 411, 
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ranging from the virtually conspiratorial to the passively acquiescent.  The 
vast behavioral literature emphasizes that it is unreasonable to assume that 
individuals are rational optimizers, but rather that they are easily self-
deceived and disposed to cognitive errors.
69
  Given these predispositions 
and the central role of coordination and collaboration in any complicit 
arrangement, it is plausible to believe that certain (and possibly multi-
faceted) strategies may be more effective than others in disrupting and 
combating particular patterns of complicit behavior. 
Complicity commonly involves situations where the primary violator 
corrupts, manipulates, or induces the secondary actor to behave 
complicitly.  Economic pressure provides the most obvious means for 
influencing the behavior of secondary actors.  Frequently, fees or 
compensation are implicitly conditioned on rendering assistance to the 
primary violator, or at least on being acquiescent to the primary actor’s 
conduct, even in the face of concerns. 
Even absent economic coercion, the social dimension of the 
relationship between primary and secondary actors may be sufficient to 
cause the secondary actor to behave imprudently in his or her dealings with 
the primary actor.
70
  This risk is obviously greatest where primary and 
secondary actors have had continuous dealings over an extended period of 
time.  Professor Donald Langevoort has persuasively argued that 
behavioral factors, such as motivated inference (the psychological 
discomfort that pushes actors to make benign inferences), status quo bias 
(the tendency to interpret data in terms of pre-existing frames of reference 
such as when conduct seemed entirely legitimate), attribution bias (the 
tendency for observers and actors to experience the same situational facts 
from different perspectives), and rationalization (the tendency to resolve 
the cognitive dissonance created when firmly held norms of behavior 
conflict with actual behavior) are critical to understanding compliance 
patterns and practices within business organizations.
71
  These same 
behavioral attitudes shape the interactions between primary and secondary 
 
418–21, 436–46 (2008) (applying behavioral realist assessment of psychological factors 
affecting gatekeeping roles of inside and outside counsel). 
 69. For a useful introduction to the legal literature on behavioral economics, see 
generally Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to 
Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998) (analyzing the intersection of behavioral 
economics and legal economic analysis); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and 
Behavioral Science:  Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 
CALIF. L. REV. 1051 (2000) (analyzing how law and economic policy may stand to benefit 
from policymakers implementing a more behavioral science approach). 
 70. Cf. Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring:  The Behavioral Economics of Corporate 
Compliance with Law, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 71 (2002) (examining how knowledge of 
behavioral predispositions should inform the design of internal corporate compliance 
systems). 
 71. Id. at 84–95. 
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participants more generally.  What is common to these instances of 
behavioral corruption or assimilation is that behavioral attitudes make non-
deliberate forms of complicity more likely over time as a secondary actor 
becomes more conditioned in his or her relationship with the primary 
violator.
72
  Given this behavioral context, it is necessary to consider 
whether a rules-based or standards-based regime might be more successful 
in counteracting these tendencies.
73
 
B. Recurring Contextual Schema for Complicity in Securities Law 
Violations 
Securities law violations frequently involve cooperative behavior 
among several participants.  The cooperative behavior, especially in cases 
of systematic fraud or abuse, may involve the willing participation, 
acquiescence, or indifference of at least several persons, and more likely 
many people in one or more organizations.  In many securities contexts, 
primary violations must pass under the eyes of many before causing injury 
to the investing public.  For example, the massive financial reporting fraud 
involving Enron involved law enforcement actions against many 
individuals, and journalistic accounts indicate that many within Enron 
suspected or were alerted to improprieties.
74
  Many employees of mutual 
funds must have been aware of the late trading and market timing problems 
encountered by firms.
75
  The Madoff debacle provides ample evidence that 
multi-billion dollar ponzi schemes simply do not happen without a lot of 
assistance or, at least, raised eyebrows.
76
  Organizations are by their very 
 
 72. This tendency is likely exaggerated in reality by the fact that, over time, the primary 
violator’s selection bias will skew toward secondary actors that are the most pliable. 
 73. See generally Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form:  Rules vs. 
Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23 (2000) (analyzing the costs and benefits of rules-
based and standards-based regimes using both behavioral and economic analysis). 
 74. The SEC ultimately concluded proceedings against roughly two dozen Enron 
employees and another dozen third-parties.  The orders are collected on the SEC’s website 
at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/enron.htm.  Among the numerous journalistic accounts 
relating to Enron, all substantiate the existence of a culture of complicity.  See, e.g., KURT 
EICHENWALD, CONSPIRACY OF FOOLS (2005) (supporting the theory that such a culture of 
complicity existed at Enron). 
 75. In a widely repeated pattern, many mutual funds allowed preferred investors to 
advantageously make trades after closing based on former, rather than future, closing prices 
(late trading) or to systematically exploit anomalies in the pricing of portfolio securities by 
accepting large trades near the end of the close (market timing).  This kind of trading 
activity was plainly evident to many employees of the fund adviser, such as portfolio 
managers.  See, e.g., In re Invesco Funds Group, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 50,506, 
Investment Company Act Release No. 26,629, 2004 WL 2270297 (Oct. 8, 2004) (describing 
internal awareness at one fund group regarding such improper trading transactions). 
 76. A ponzi scheme of the magnitude underlying the Madoff fraud required enormous 
coordination among subordinates to operate.  See In re DiPascali, Jr., Exchange Act Release 
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nature beehives of cooperative activity, both within and outside the firm, 
and require significant amounts of teamwork, procedures, and feedback 
mechanisms in order to function in an orderly fashion. 
As discussed below, many forms of complicit conduct in securities 
law violations seem to adhere to recurring patterns of observed conduct or 
interaction within organizations and among organizations.  This fact is 
arguably significant in formulating policy.  The existence of recurring 
patterns of complicit conduct may well support an argument for particular 
kinds of anti-complicity strategies, whereas highly unique forms of 
complicit behavior may require entirely different anti-complicity strategies.  
At least three broad patterns of complicit behavior are identifiable in the 
securities context:  gatekeeper complicity, transactional counterparty 
complicity, and employee complicity. 
Gatekeepers are perhaps the most well-known category of persons 
whose assistance may entail culpable complicity.  The extensive literature 
on gatekeeping liability primarily focuses on reputational intermediaries; 
that is, firms that provide gatekeeping services on a professional basis, such 
as an independent auditor, underwriter, or outside counsel.
77
  Although 
such firms may act in the narrow interests of clients, the services they 
render are of a professional nature, and the firms rendering the services 
provide them to multiple clients (and hence, they have a high concern 
regarding professional reputation).
78
  While self-interest may act to check 
conduct assisting a primary actor, it is clearly not foolproof, and is arguably 
insufficient given flagrant examples of misconduct by reputational 
gatekeepers.
79
 
 
No. 60787, 2009 WL 3172846 (Oct. 5, 2009) (ordering sanctions against Frank DiPascali, 
Jr., a broker-dealer, investment adviser employee at Bernard L. Madoff Securities LLC); 
Complaint, SEC v. DiPascali, No. Civ. 09-CV 7085 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2009) (describing 
the role of a Madoff operations lieutenant in orchestrating the production of false 
confirmations involving millions of pages of documentation and computer programming).  
The special bankruptcy trustee in the Madoff case has brought numerous lawsuits that 
contain allegations of knowledge that went beyond Madoff and his lieutenants, including an 
allegation directed at J.P. Morgan.  See Michael Rothfeld, Trustee:  J.P. Morgan Abetted 
Madoff, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 2011, at A1 (“‘While numerous financial institutions enabled 
Madoff’s fraud, JPMC was at the very center of that fraud, and thoroughly complicit in it,’ 
according to the 115-page lawsuit, filed under seal . . . by the trustee recovering money for 
Mr. Madoff’s victims . . . .”). 
 77. COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 62, at 2–5; Kraakman, supra note 11, at 62, 70. 
 78. COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 62, at 5; Tuch, supra note 62, at 1595. 
 79. In egregious instances, auditors have been charged with fraudulent conduct in 
connection with clients’ misconduct.  See David Duncan, Litigation Release No. 20,441,  
2008 WL 220063 (Jan. 28, 2008) (announcing defendant independent auditing partner’s 
consent to securities fraud injunction for recklessly signing “unqualified audit reports [that] . 
. . were materially false and misleading” relating to Arthur Andersen’s audit of Enron); 
KPMG, LLP, Litigation Release No. 19,573, 2006 WL 407506 (Feb. 22, 2006) (settling 
claims against four current and former KPMG partners, three of whom consented to 
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Some professional gatekeepers have explicitly defined regulatory 
roles, such as auditors
80
 or transfer agents.
81
  In order to complete securities 
transactions for illicit purposes, primary violators have engaged other 
professional gatekeepers who are not independent by nature and may seek 
to advance the interests of clients, while remaining subject to professional 
standards or customs,
82
 such as attorneys
83
 or broker-dealers.
84
  As noted 
 
injunctions; a fifth partner has previously consented to an injunction); KPMG, LLP, 
Litigation Release No. 19,191, 2005 WL 913469 (Apr. 19, 2005) (describing how KPMG 
knowingly facilitated Xerox’s use of artificial accounting adjustments designed to disguise 
performance from investors and allow the company’s performance to artificially exceed 
Wall Street expectations); Arthur Andersen LLP, Litigation Release No. 17,039, 2001 WL 
687562 (June 19, 2001) (detailing the auditor’s knowing complicity in use of accounting 
manipulations of Waste Management’s actual results to attain predetermined earnings 
targets).  Securities firms and securities analysts have also faced allegations of impropriety.  
See Federal Court Approves Global Research Analyst Settlement, Litigation Release No. 
18,438, 2003 WL 22467373 (Oct. 31, 2003) (announcing approval of a $1.4 billion final 
settlement with ten securities firms and two individual securities analysts relating to 
misconduct under exchange rules—and in some cases statutory requirements—in permitting 
investment banking interests to influence securities research). 
 80. Issuers and reporting companies must file audited financials, requiring the services 
of an independent auditor.  17 C.F.R. § 210.1-02(d) (2011) (defining audit to require an 
examination by an independent accountant for purposes of audited financial statements 
required in registrations statements under the Securities Act of 1933 and periodic reports 
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).  Auditors have specific statutory reporting 
obligations.  15 U.S.C. § 78j–1 (2006).  In addition, independent auditors must be registered 
with and are subject to rules and sanction by the Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board.  See generally 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (2006) (outlining basic definitions and requirements 
for independent auditors, and establishing the enforcement authority of the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board).  As noted in the preceding footnote, auditors may be subject 
as primary violators, but are typically subject to lighter sanctions in connection with 
professional failings, such as a C&D order.  See, e.g., Ponce v. SEC, 345 F.3d 722 (9th Cir. 
2003) (finding reckless certification of fraudulent financials and aiding and abetting the 
filing of false financial reports); KPMG, LLP v. SEC, 289 F.3d 109 (D.C. Cir. 2002) 
(negligently compromising independence in connection with contingency fee arrangement); 
In re Grant Thornton, LLP, Exchange Act Release No. 50,148, 2004 WL 1750732 (Aug. 5, 
2004) (issuing C&D order for causing and aiding and abetting  violations of the reporting 
provisions of the federal securities laws).  For a discussion of standards-based sanctions 
relating to practice and appearance before the Commission, see infra notes  139–145   and 
accompanying text (discussing the SEC’s enforcement authority over professionals 
engaging in misconduct). 
 81. See 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1(c), (d), (f) (2006) (describing the rules for registration of 
transfer agents, activities of transfer agents and their enforcement and the rules regarding the 
transfer of securities, respectively).  A transfer agent’s disregard of regulatory 
responsibilities can lead to liability for aiding and abetting securities law violations by 
others.  See In re Holladay Stock Transfer Inc., Securities Act Release No. 7,519, Exchange 
Act Release No. 39,797, 1998 WL 130854 (Mar. 25, 1998) (sanctioning the transfer agent 
for removing restrictive stock legends, thereby aiding and abetting sale of unregistered 
securities in violations of Section 5 of the Securities Act). 
 82. Professor Laby labels this type of gatekeeper as a “dependent” gatekeeper to 
differentiate it from the “independent” gatekeeper model exemplified by auditors, securities 
analysts, and credit rating agencies.  Arthur B. Laby, Differentiating Gatekeepers, 1 BROOK. 
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above, enforcement proceedings and journalistic accounts involving 
egregious frauds provide a disturbing window to the involvement of 
gatekeepers whose conduct ranges from direct participation in primary 
violations to various lesser forms of complicity, such as aiding and abetting 
or causing violations or professional deficiencies, which can be evidence of 
awareness or suspicions of improprieties even though the gatekeeper does 
 
J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 119, 127 (2006). 
 83. As with other gatekeepers, attorneys may engage in conduct that directly violates 
securities law.  See, e.g., Olesnyckyj, Litigation Release No. 20,056, 2007 WL 908009 
(March 27, 2007) (settling a securities fraud injunctive action by former general counsel of 
Monster Worldwide for secretly backdating company stock options of other executives).  In 
addition, providing legal advice and opinions may lead to sanctions for complicity.  See 
Weiss v. SEC, 468 F.3d 849 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (affirming imposition of C&D against 
municipal bond counsel for negligently rendering unqualified opinion that interest on notes 
issued by school district would be exempt from federal income taxation); SEC v. Fehn, 97 
F.3d 1276, 1289 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming imposition of permanent injunction against an 
attorney for substantially assisting in primary violation of disclosure requirements by failing 
to advise client on material omissions in quarterly report); In re Costanza, Securities Act 
Release No. 7,621 (Jan. 6, 1999) (consenting to C&D order in connection with outside bond 
counsel’s negligence in note offerings by Orange County where disclosure documents 
contained misleading omissions).  In-house attorneys are especially susceptible to complicit 
conduct in connection with corporate transactions.  See SEC Obtains Judgments Against 
One AIG and Four Gen Re Former Executives for Aiding in AIG Securities Fraud, 
Litigation Release No. 21,235, 2009 WL 3151070 (Oct. 1, 2009) (enjoining in-house 
attorney for aiding and abetting securities violations by drafting documents memorializing 
sham transactions between his company and AIG, a public insurance company, enabling 
AIG to make fraudulently misleading financial disclosures); SEC Charges Two Former 
Enron In-House Lawyers With Securities Fraud And Related Violations, Litigation Release 
No. 20,058, 2007 WL 923623 (Jan. 26, 2009) (settling fraud action against Enron in-house 
attorneys charged with omitting disclosure of Enron’s related-party transactions with entities 
controlled by the company’s chief financial officer); SEC Charges Two Former Enron 
Employees with Violating Federal Securities Laws, Litigation Release No. 19,623, 2006 
WL 778713 (Mar. 27, 2006) (settling fraud action in which in-house attorney for Enron 
affiliate drafted transactional documents and concealed side agreements which resulted in 
Enron’s filing material misleading annual financial statements); In re Google, Inc., 
Securities Act Release No. 8523, 2005 WL 82435 (Jan. 13, 2005) (issuing C&D to general 
counsel based on his failure to tell board of risk that unregistered (and subsequently 
determined non-exempt) offerings were not exempt from registration or to alert board of 
disclosure obligations in connection with other unregistered offering of securities to 
employees).  Unlike with auditors, the SEC typically refrains from bringing Rule 102(e) 
proceedings against attorneys unless the action is based on a settled or adjudicated 
proceeding or action.  See Simon M. Lorne & W. Hardy Callcott, Administrative Actions 
Against Lawyers Before the SEC, 50 BUS. LAW. 1293 (1995) (discussing the origins of SEC 
policy regarding sanctioning attorneys under the predecessor to Rule 102(e), the so-called 
Rule 2(e)); see also infra notes 136, 196 (discussing further the SEC’s enforcement 
authority over professionals, including attorneys). 
 84. See Graham v. SEC, 222 F.3d 994 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (sustaining administrative 
sanctions for associated person who aided and abetted a customer’s fraudulent trading); 
Wonsover v. SEC, 205 F.3d 408 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (sustaining administrative sanctions for 
associated person who facilitated sale of unregistered securities in violation of the 
registration provisions of the Securities Act). 
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not share directly in any illicit profits.
85
  One suspects (but cannot prove) 
that there exists a larger number of unreported “fellow traveler” incidents.
86
 
While reputational gatekeepers represent an important category of 
secondary participants, transactional counterparties represent another 
category.  Transactional counterparties do not render gatekeeping services 
in the sense of professional gatekeepers, but rather engage in business 
transactions on a principal-to-principal basis directly with a primary actor’s 
firm.  Transactional counterparties are in a position to disrupt the unlawful 
activity of primary violators by withholding assistance in the 
accomplishment of the primary violator’s scheme.  The willingness of 
transactional counterparties, such as vendors of products or services, to 
document transactions in a misleading fashion or to provide false 
information to auditors is a recurrent situation.
87
  In the case of Enron, 
investment bankers devised customized transactions—so-called 
“financially engineered” transactions—to meet financial reporting 
objectives that should have raised questions.
88
  Indeed, underlying 
 
 85. See supra notes 79–84 for various examples of enforcement proceedings involving 
the issue of gatekeeper liability. 
 86. Numerous instances of potential complicity by gatekeepers likely are never made 
public because the primary violation is never discovered, the evidence connecting the third 
party to the underlying violation is undiscovered, or the third party’s conduct manifests 
itself in the form of neglect or indifference rather than any form of affirmative assistance.  
The metaphoric use of the pejorative term “fellow-traveler,” is not entirely faithful to its use 
in political context, but captures some sense of more subtle forms of complicity that are 
untouched by the current standards-based regime.  See WILLIAM SAFIRE, SAFIRE’S POLITICAL 
DICTIONARY 240 (2008) (defining a fellow traveler as “one who agrees with a philosophy or 
group but does not publicly work for it”). 
 87. The facts underlying Stoneridge or in the Delphi matter illustrate this problem, but 
the circumstances are hardly unusual.  Stoneridge, supra note 2; Delphi Litigation Release, 
supra note 15; see also supra notes 51–52 (providing further examples of cases regarding 
misrepresentation of transactional counterparties); Constance M. Boland & Lauren M. 
Sobel, Holding Customers Liable for Their Suppliers’ Fraud:  Should Customers Be Left 
Holding the Bag?, 18 INSIGHTS 13, 17 n.4 (2004) (noting a then-emerging enforcement 
practice of naming “customers, vendors and suppliers” of public companies and asserting 
that the practice “constitutes a significant expansion of the SEC’s exercise of its 
enforcement authority”). 
 88. See Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, Litigation Release No. 18,517, 2003 
WL 22996745 (Dec. 22, 2003) (charging Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce and three 
of its executives with aiding and abetting Enron's securities fraud); J.P. Morgan Chase & 
Co., Litigation Release No. 18,252, 2003 WL 21738802 (July 28, 2003) (alleging J.P. 
Morgan Chase as connected with accounting fraud in the Enron matter); In re Citigroup, 
Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 48,230, 2003 WL 21738911 (July 28, 2003) (finding that 
Citigroup arranged prepay transactions—unrelated to those arranged by Chase—Involving 
two issuers, including Enron); Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., Litigation Release No. 18,038, 
2003 WL 1193551 (Mar. 17, 2003) (providing an example of one such institution in which 
bankers engineered such customized transactions); Complaint, SEC v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 
Inc., Civ. Action No. H-03-0946, (S.D. Tex. 2003) (alleging fraud in connection with its 
activities as a counterparty in putative asset sale and derivatives transactions).  In another 
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allegations in the SEC’s complaints revealed internal awareness by the 
counterparty of the questionable business purposes of the transactions.
89
 
Yet a third category of potential complicit participants is an artifact of 
statute, namely officers and employees of business entities that have 
obligations under the securities laws.  Because some statutes and rules are 
specifically directed at the registered entities, such as reporting companies 
or broker-dealers, employees cannot directly violate the provisions; only 
entities can (albeit through the acts or omissions of officers and employees 
who themselves cannot be charged as primary violators).
90
  Officers and 
employees, however, may be charged as aiders and abettors for active 
conduct that produces the violation,
91
 but only if their conduct can be 
shown to satisfy the relatively high standard of recklessness.
92
  In many 
circumstances, this standard can be difficult to meet.  As a result, in a 
number of financial reporting cases, the entity may be liable even when no 
 
case, the SEC found that an insurance company had engaged in securities fraud by devising 
non-traditional insurance policies that enabled an issuer to manipulate earnings reported in 
its financial statements.  See also In re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 
48,477, 2003 WL 22110366 (Sept. 11, 2003). 
 89. Allegations contained in the SEC’s complaint in settled actions illustrate the explicit 
awareness of investment bank employees regarding the questionable nature of some of the 
Enron transactions at the time the transactions were undertaken.  For example, in Merrill 
Lynch, members of an internal bank committee openly questioned the legitimacy of 
transactions.  Complaint, SEC v. Merrill Lynch, supra note 88, ¶ 25 (expressing concerns 
“whether Merrill Lynch could be viewed as aiding and abetting Enron’s fraudulent 
manipulation of its income statement”).  Similarly, e-mails and phone calls among J.P. 
Morgan employees evidenced recognition of the problematic nature of certain transactions.  
See J.P. Morgan Complaint, supra note 58, ¶ 27 (quoting written communication  of a bank 
officer stating, “We are making disguised loans, usually buried in commodities or equities 
derivatives (and I’m sure in other areas).  With a few [sic] exceptions, they are understood 
to be disguised loans and approved as such.”). 
 90. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-1 (2011) (outlining the annual reporting requirement:    
“Every issuer having securities registered pursuant to section 12 of the Act shall file an 
annual report . . . .”); see also 17 C.F.R. §240.13a-13 (2011) (requiring that such issuers, 
with some exceptions, must file semi-annual reports). 
 91. Where the reporting company is guilty of fraud, the SEC has obtained injunctive 
relief against responsible officers for the fraud violations.  See McConville v. SEC, 465 F.3d 
780 (7th Cir. 2006) (charging the CFO with violating Rule 10b-5 in connection with 
drafting and reviewing (but not signing) core financial statements that overstated profits); 
Rand, Litigation Release No. 21,114, 2009 WL 1884088 (July 1, 2009) (charging the CFO 
with fraud in orchestrating ongoing pattern of misstatements in company’s public disclosure 
as part of an effort to manage earnings).  In other cases, however, officers are charged with 
merely aiding and abetting or causing the company’s non-fraudulent disclosure.  (e.g.,  In re 
Crittenden, Exchange Act Release No. 62,593, 2010 WL 2992474 (July 29, 2010) (charging 
the CFO with causing misstatements in Citigroup’s Form 8-K filing which reproduced 
misleading public communications previously made by the CFO)). 
 92. SEC v. Steadman, 967 F.2d 636, 647–48 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Investors Research Corp. 
v. SEC, 628 F.2d 168, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 919 (1980). 
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employee is ever charged with a violation.
93
  In other cases, an employee’s 
purported ignorance of affirmative securities law requirements may 
constitute a defense against (or at least preclude) charges of complicity in 
the violation.
94
 
C. Standards versus Rules 
The classification of legal norms into standards and rules provides a 
useful perspective for evaluating aiding and abetting liability relative to 
other forms of anti-complicity strategies.
95
  Standards embody legal norms 
that require a high degree of judgment and discretion in relating a particular 
 
 93. This kind of situation is common where a reporting company is charged with a non-
fraudulent reporting violation in a cease-and-desist proceeding and complicit individuals—
even though corporate employees are actually responsible for the accounting and financial 
disclosure function—are not charged.  See, e.g., In re Gen. Elec. Co., Litigation Release No. 
21,166, 2009 WL 2398241 (Aug. 4, 2009) (alleging financial reporting and fraudulent 
accounting misstatements arising from use of improper accounting methods based on 
judgments of “high-level GE accounting executives”); In re Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 
Exchange Act Release No. 50,233, 2004 WL 1883964 (Aug. 24, 2004) (charging the 
company for material misstatements relating to proved oil reserves); In re Microsoft Corp., 
Exchange Act Release No. 46,017, 2002 WL 1159487 (June 3, 2002) (claiming materially 
inaccurate financial reporting arising from unsupported and undisclosed accounting 
reserves); In re AOL Online, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 42,781, 2000 WL 576215 
(May 15, 2000) (discussing accounting misstatements arising from improper capitalized 
costs of acquiring new subscribers).  There are some examples of the SEC bringing an 
action against complicit individuals for causing reporting violations where a reporting 
company is charged with a non-fraudulent reporting violation in a cease-and-desist 
proceeding.  See, e.g., In re Canepa, Exchange Act Release No. 48,224, 2003 WL 23850249 
(July 24, 2003) (sanctioning Arthur Andersen engagement partner in the Anika Therapeutics 
matter for causing reporting company’s reporting violations in connection with improper 
revenue recognition on bill-and-hold transactions and improper accounting restatements 
after the original problem came to light); In re Anika Therapeutics, Inc., Exchange Act 
Release No. 47,167, 2003 WL 103216 (Jan. 13, 2003) (sanctioning a reporting company, 
CEO, and CFO for causing company’s reporting violations in connection with improper 
revenue recognition on bill-and-hold transactions and improper accounting restatements 
after the original problem came to light). 
 94. Monetta Fin. Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 390 F.3d 952 (7th Cir. 2004); Howard v. SEC, 
376 F.3d 1136 (D.C. Cir. 2004); see infra note 253. 
 95. The literature on standards versus rules is copious.  See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules 
Versus Standards:  An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992) (offering a functional 
perspective in understanding rules and standards); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 
UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985) (offering a nominalist perspective in suggesting distinction is 
illusory); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. 
REV. 1685 (1976) (analyzing normative implications of formulating legal directives as rule 
or standard); Korobkin, supra note 73 (comparing the rules- and standards-based approaches 
through a law and economics lens).  See also Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property 
Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988) (noting doctrinal ebb and flow between rules and 
standards in property law as the law has reflected pragmatic exigencies in its application). 
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legal directive to a particular factual context.
96
  They tend to proscribe 
conduct in terms of purpose or effect, which does not alone lend itself to 
easy, bright-line determinations.  The general prohibition on securities 
fraud found in Exchange Act Rule 10b-5 is a good example of a norm 
embodied as a standard.  Securities fraud at a minimum requires deception 
relating to a material fact made with an intent to deceive in connection with 
a securities transaction.
97
  The existence of a violation is determined not 
merely from objective facts but also from inferences relating to observable 
facts.  Whether a person has been deceived, whether the person making a 
misrepresentation intended to deceive, or whether the misrepresentation 
involved a material fact, are all matters that require inferential judgments 
that will govern the application of the prohibition on fraud. 
Rules, in contrast, are legal norms that are formulated in terms of 
bright-line requirements that are readily applied to known objective facts.
98
  
Traffic regulations, such as obeying speed limits or traffic signals, are 
obvious examples of legal rules.
99
  Although rules and standards as types of 
legal norms lie on a continuum, the boundaries that separate these two 
categories are not relevant to this discussion.  Needless to say, some legal 
requirements fall closer to the rule side of the continuum while others 
toward the standard side of the continuum.
100
 
While rules or standards offer different ways to bring about 
compliance with desired social policies, these categories clearly have 
attributes that may determine their effectiveness as legal norms in 
particular contexts.  Rules are ideally suited for situations where the 
regulated conduct is easily described and the legal objective maps directly 
and unambiguously onto that conduct (e.g., society does not want drivers to 
go through red lights).
101
  Rules typically are more easily applied by an 
adjudicator after the fact than standards, but more importantly, they can be 
applied by the actor subject to the requirement ex ante with relative ease.
102
  
 
 96. See Korobkin, supra note 73, at 27 (a standard “is a legal pronouncement that 
specifies no triggering facts that have defined legal consequences”). 
 97. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION §12.4 478 
(6th ed. 2006). 
 98. Korobkin, supra note 73, at 25 (“Rules establish legal boundaries based on the 
presence or absence of well-specified triggering facts.”). 
 99. Id. at 27. 
 100. See Kaplow, supra note 95, at 561–62 (analyzing speeding as both a rule and a 
standard); see also, Korobkin, supra note 73, at 29 (noting that a pure rule can become 
standard-like under certain circumstances, just as a pure standard can become rule-like 
through judicial reliance on precedent). 
 101. See Kaplow, supra note 95, at 586–90 (distinguishing between use of simple rules 
and complex standards). 
 102. Korobkin, supra note 73, at 25–26; see also Kaplow, supra note 95, at 560, 562–63 
(distinguishing rules and standards in terms of “extent to which efforts to give content to the 
law are undertaken before [rule] or after individuals act [standard],” and noting rules 
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In this way, rules provide actors with greater clarity and guidance than 
standards regarding their legal obligations when confronted with a 
particular situation. 
Although standards may provide fewer determinate outcomes ex ante, 
they may provide more relevant legal directives in difficult to anticipate 
circumstances.  Complex conduct is more difficult to control or to cabin 
with a simple rule.  Fraud can take many forms and thus a norm designed 
to prohibit such conduct must be expressed in terms of a standard.  The rule 
of reason drawn from antitrust, which prohibits unreasonable restraints of 
trade, is another example where the legal norm is expressed as a standard 
rather than a rule.  Standards are also particularly useful in addressing 
conduct that should be proscribed, but that can be deliberately tailored in 
ways to avoid application of a narrow rule.
103
  In other words, standards 
generally are more successful in dealing with situations where 
circumvention of a rule is a genuine risk. 
Liability for aiding and abetting conforms to the classic form of a 
“standards” approach, in that it requires an evaluative judgment relating to 
existing facts and facts that are to transpire.  As discussed in the next 
section, conventional formulations of aiding and abetting require a finding 
of a requisite degree of culpability by the third-party in assisting another 
person to violate the law.
104
  The standard evaluates whether a secondary 
participant acted culpably under the facts and circumstances.  Such a 
standard does not proscribe conduct with bright-line precision, as in the 
case of a rules-based norm, but rather calls for judgment in its application 
regarding the degree of culpability and the significance of the assistance.
105
 
An aiding and abetting standard entails only conditional liability:  the 
secondary actor is only liable if there is a primary violation of law by 
another—the so-called primary actor.
106
  As a result, the correct application 
of aiding and abetting standards is largely retrospective.  The assistance or 
complicity that is being discouraged becomes unlawful only after the 
primary violation occurs.  The conditional nature of secondary liability 
detracts from the deterrence value of standards because the rational third 
party, in addition to assessing whether its own conduct would likely be 
viewed as assisting in another’s unlawful activity, will discount that 
 
favored when there is “frequency of application in recurring fact scenarios” and utility 
associated with low “cost of learning the law”). 
 103. Schlag, supra note 95, at 385 (“Because the distinction between permissible and 
impermissible conduct is not fixed, but is case-specific, persons will be deterred from 
engaging in borderline conduct and encouraged to substitute less offensive types of 
conduct.”). 
 104. See supra Section II.A (discussing elements for aiding and abetting). 
 105. Id.  As explained above, culpability and substantial assistance are required elements 
for establishing aiding and abetting liability. 
 106. Id. 
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assessment by both the probability of whether a violation will in fact occur 
(i.e., the primary actor will commit a violation) and whether the violation is 
likely to be detected (i.e., whether the primary actor’s misconduct be 
detected and successfully prosecuted).
107
 
It is also possible to conceive of rules-based anti-complicity measures.  
Certification requirements are a good example.  Such a requirement does 
not prohibit complicity per se, but rather imposes a direct obligation on a 
signatory that may be inconsistent with specific acts of complicity.  For 
example, the signatory attests to having read the document and disclaims 
knowledge of facts that would lead you to believe that what is said in the 
document is not true.
108
  Certification prevents someone after the fact from 
making the types of excuses complicit parties might be tempted to make:  
“I did not think it was my responsibility” or “I never bothered to share the 
information with others.” 
Several points can be made about this type of anti-complicity measure.  
A rules-based anti-complicity measure can indirectly arrest the potential for 
complicity by removing opportunities for deniability.  Second, rather than 
being primarily retrospective in assessing conduct, rules are more likely to 
have a prospective effect in preventing conduct.  A rule provides clear 
notice to an actor that certain conduct that might be highly correlated with 
unlawful conduct is itself prohibited, absent safeguards, regardless of 
whether some other actor’s conduct is known to be unlawful.  Finally, 
norms framed as rules that seek to deter complicity may cut more broadly 
than merely impeding complicit conduct.  Rules may be formulated to 
diminish the risk of deliberate complicity as well as promote affirmative 
obligations that have the effect of impeding violations.  Thus, anti-
complicity rules may affirmatively contribute to compliance not only in 
terms of deterring complicity but in promoting compliance (i.e., encourage 
persons to act in a way that makes it harder for others to violate the law).  
In this sense, rules-based norms are far more likely to build a culture of 
compliance and accountability than standards alone, the application of 
which may be uncertain and cannot be fully evaluated except in hindsight. 
These considerations are directly relevant in understanding the 
economics and behavioral logic of complicity.  The economics of 
 
 107. The conditional nature of the standards-based approach to secondary liabilityl 
diminishes its deterrent effect and this consequence is enhanced by behavioral 
considerations.  If secondary parties systematically underestimate the likelihood of detection 
relating to their own assistance (over-optimism bias coupled with rationalization), the 
effectiveness of an aiding and abetting standard will be substantially weakened. 
 108. See 15 U.S.C. §7241 (2006) (requiring that principal officers certify each report 
filed under § 78m(a) or 78o(d) of Title 15); 17 CFR §240.13a-14 (2011) (for reports under § 
13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); see also 18 U.S.C. §1350 (2006) (requiring 
corporate officers to file a statement certifying that a report under this section fully complies 
with SEC requirements and that the information contained therein is accurate). 
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complicity is built around an understanding that regulating the conduct of 
third parties may be the most socially efficient means for achieving 
regulatory goals with respect to primary parties (i.e., primary parties such 
as reporting companies are more efficiently regulated through measures 
directed at third parties such as auditors and other gatekeepers and 
transactional counterparties).  Although economics alone does not dictate 
whether rules or standards a priori are likely to be more successful as anti-
complicity strategies, some factors might lead one to favor rules in some 
circumstances and standards in others.
109
 
Behavioral considerations are particularly relevant in understanding 
whether rules or standards are likely to be more effective in a given 
situation.  If third parties are not terribly rational, suffer from bounded 
rationality, or are subject to any of a variety of behavioral biases in 
evaluating how their own conduct may contribute to the likelihood of 
violations by others, then rules rather than standards are likely more 
effective.
110
  Standards are most useful in preventing deliberate assistance 
to a primary violator (as opposed to assistance through acquiescence, 
indifference, or behavioral obtuseness) because this raises the specter of 
opportunistic circumvention of specific rules formulated to prevent specific 
activity by the secondary party. 
III. THE EMERGENCE OF STANDARDS-BASED ANTI-COMPLICITY POLICIES 
AND CENTRAL BANK’S SHADOW 
Make no mistake:  the current anti-complicity standards regime 
administered by the SEC is functional; secondary actors are sanctioned 
with some frequency.
111
  However, the question posed in this article is 
whether primarily relying on aiding and abetting liability standards, or 
variants thereof, is an optimal or even superior anti-complicity strategy in 
the securities law context.
112
  As described in this section, the anti-
complicity regime (grounded in aiding and abetting principles) is a 
 
 109. Korobkin, supra note 73, at 58 (“Under either approach, an honest analyst without 
preconceived conclusions must ultimately say that multiple considerations favor each type 
of legal form [rule or standard], and which form is most desirable will depend on which set 
of competing costs dominate in a particular fact-specific situation.”); accord Kaplow, supra 
note 95, at 562 (examining the desirability of each legal form by considering their legal 
costs). 
 110. Cf. Korobkin, supra note 73, at 56 (stating that “rules are . . . more likely to have a 
dynamic effect on social norms by encouraging people to behave in a socially desirable 
way”). 
 111. See supra Section II.B (exploring the liability of gatekeepers as secondary actors). 
 112. This section shows problems in applying standards built on elements relating to 
mental state and substantial assistance.  These problems also serve to highlight that there are 
many kinds of complicity, whether by action or inaction, that are not subject to sanction but 
that could, if curbed, promote compliance with the law by others. 
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cumbersome system of many overlapping legal distinctions with uncertain 
application and somewhat arbitrary results.  As in any fault-based standards 
system, each case entails a fact-intensive inquiry.  A realistic assessment of 
the effectiveness of a standards-based regime as a source of deterrence rests 
not only on its successful application in particular cases, but more 
importantly, on its predictable application in a great range of cases in a way 
that affects the behavior of secondary actors.  The discussion below 
identifies three basic reasons the current system may not be effective:  (1) 
current doctrines regarding aiding and abetting standards do not capture 
significant forms of complicit conduct; (2) the Central Bank trilogy of 
Supreme Court decisions has made a muddle of the difference between 
primary and secondary liability; and (3) legislative fixes to securities 
statutes after Central Bank, though making the existing standards scheme 
more workable, have not fundamentally addressed the deficiencies of a 
standards-based approach.   
This section begins with a brief overview of how the structure of 
complicity standards took shape under the securities laws.  It then turns to 
the Supreme Court’s watershed Central Bank decision and the eventual 
trilogy of cases that explore the relationship between complicity and 
damage remedies.  While there may be sound policy considerations for 
questioning the utility of private damages actions based on complicity 
alone, the Supreme Court’s result-oriented decisions do little to bring any 
principled understanding of anti-complicity policies.  The section 
concludes with a brief discussion of post-Central Bank statutory reforms to 
show that the reforms, while correcting some problems, do not overcome 
the basic obstacles to the efficacy of placing undue reliance on standards 
alone as an anti-complicity strategy. 
A.  The Evolution of Anti-Complicity Standards under Federal Securities 
Law   
The SEC is currently authorized to bring four different types of 
standards-based claims that can be used in combination for sanctioning 
secondary complicit conduct (i.e., conduct that is not itself an independent 
securities law violation), three of which entail some form of administrative 
proceeding.
113
  The fourth is a civil enforcement action, such as provided 
 
 113. The administrative proceedings that provide explicitly for aiding and abetting 
liability are the Securities Exchange Act § 15(a)(4)(E), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(4)(E) (2006) 
(defining roles of broker-dealers and their associated persons), and the Investment Advisers 
Act § 203(e)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(e)(6) (2006) (describing investment advisers and their 
employees).  The SEC’s authority to bring cease-and-desist proceedings against any person 
under § 21C of the Exchange Act extends to aiding and abetting securities law violations by 
any person as someone “that is, was, or would be a cause of the violation, due to an act or 
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under Section 20(e) of the Exchange Act, which may be brought in federal 
court against any person.
114
 
At the outset, it is important to correct a misimpression about 
legislative policy relating to complicity arising from Central Bank.  While 
Congress did not create an express general civil (private damage or law 
enforcement) cause of action for aiding and abetting securities fraud 
violations,
115
 the statutory “omission” did not evidence a longstanding 
legislative policy disfavoring sanctioning persons complicit in securities 
law violations.  Quite the opposite is true.  Congress has consistently 
expanded policies favoring use of anti-complicity standards to discourage 
complicit conduct by third parties.  Most of these provisions involved 
expanding liability in the administrative context and these developments 
occurred against a judicial landscape that already recognized private and 
government enforcement actions for aiding and abetting.  The creation of 
express anti-complicity administrative remedies, as described below, 
evidences an unwavering trend in favor of expanded liability for 
complicity, a narrative quite different from that projected by the majority in 
Central Bank.
116
 
Not surprisingly, standards were historically the preferred policy 
means for regulating complicity under federal securities law.  Such an 
approach had well-developed criminal law antecedents
117
 and the 
alternative discussed here, namely a rules-based approach, did not exist as 
an established model.  The original statutory provisions of the Securities 
Act and the Exchange Act contained limited anti-complicity provisions.  
Under the Securities Act, secondary parties, ranging from officers and 
directors to underwriters and accountants, are strictly liable (subject to due 
diligence defenses) under Section 11
118
 for material misstatements in 
registration statements.  The Exchange Act involved a more conventional 
 
omission the person knew or should have known would contribute to such violation . . . .”  
15 U.S.C. § 78u-3(a) (2006). 
 114. Securities Exchange Act § 20(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (Supp. IV 2010).  The SEC 
may also bring direct claims that impose liability for deficient supervision by registered 
securities professionals, which is also standards-based. 
 115. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 
164–65 (1994).  This fact was hardly surprising.  Because Congress did not create an 
express private cause of action for fraud under Exchange Act Section 10, it necessarily 
never considered doing so for aiding and abetting. 
 116. See infra text accompanying notes 122–41. 
 117. The general criminal law aiding and abetting violation was introduced into the U.S. 
Criminal Code in 1909.  Act of Mar. 4, 1909 ch. 321, § 332, 35 Stat. 1152 (1909) (current 
version at 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2006)).  See generally Baruch Weiss, What Were They Thinking?:  
The Mental States of the Aider and Abettor and the Causer under Federal Law, 70 FORD. L. 
REV. 1341, 1344–48 (2002) (discussing the historical implementation of aiding and abetting 
doctrine). 
   118.  15 U.S.C. §77k (2006).  
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invocation of liability standards under both Sections 9
119
 and 18
120
 for those 
causing violations, which differs only slightly from formulations based on 
aiding and abetting. 
Civil aiding and abetting under the securities laws had its foundation 
in judicial reasoning rather than in express legislative language.  The SEC’s 
ability to proceed against aiders and abettors civilly was recognized fairly 
early and long before Central Bank.
121
  Recognition of private actions for 
aiding and abetting securities fraud followed closely on the heels of the 
recognition of the implied private right of action under Rule 10b-5.  By the 
time Central Bank had been decided, eleven U.S. Courts of Appeals—
every circuit to have addressed the issue—agreed that private damages 
claims for aiding and abetting were properly implied under Rule 10b-5.
122
 
While courts led the way in introducing aiding and abetting civil 
liability to the securities laws, Congress was quick to follow by 
establishing injunctive and administrative standards-based anti-complicity 
sanctions.  Indeed, one of the most striking aspects of congressional policy 
has been its consistent expansion of standards-based secondary liability.  
The SEC was first expressly empowered to seek administrative and 
injunctive sanctions where a person “aided [or] abetted” violations by 
another person through amendments to the Investment Advisers Act in 
1960.
123
  The amendments codified SEC practice in sanctioning persons 
associated with investment advisers in connection with violations of the 
Investment Advisers Act, thereby removing any doubts in this regard as to 
the SEC’s authority.
124
  The language was modeled after the general 
 
   119.  15 U.S.C. §78i (2006).  
   120.  15 U.S.C. §78r(2006).  
 121. See, e.g., SEC v. Gen. Refractories Co., 400 F.Supp. 1248, 1256–57 (D.D.C. 1975) 
(issuing an injunction in favor of the SEC in a case against a fire brick distributor); SEC v. 
Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 340 F. Supp. 913, 934 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (depicting an anti-fraud 
action brought by the SEC against a nursing home company), aff’d in part and rev’d in part 
on other grounds, 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC v. Scott Taylor & Co., 183 F. Supp. 
904, 910 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (enjoining defendants against using interstate commerce or 
mail to sell its corporation’s stock); SEC v. Timetrust, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 34, 43 (N.D. Cal. 
1939) (denying motions to dismiss by defendants in antifraud suit brought by SEC). 
 122. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 192 (Stevens, J. dissenting).  These developments are 
discussed in Section II.B. above. 
 123. Investment Advisers Act (IAA), Pub. L. No. 86-750, §§ 203(e), 209(e), 74 Stat. 
885, 886–87 (1960) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-3(e), 9(e) (2006)). 
 124. H.R. REP. NO. 86-2179, at 8 (1960) (“It is also designed to make it clear that 
persons associated with an investment adviser may be liable in civil and administrative 
proceedings for violation of the prohibitions which by their terms apply only to investment 
advisers.”); accord S. REP. NO. 86-1760, at 9 (1960) (amending the IAA to “prohibit fraud 
by those advisers exempt from registration” and to “extend criminal liability to include a 
willful violation of a rule or order of the Commission”).  Contemporaneously, similar 
amendments were proposed by the SEC for the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, but 
those amendments, which had engendered industry concerns regarding private litigation 
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criminal law provision for aiding and abetting.
125
  This approach was 
extended to administrative proceedings against broker-dealers and their 
associated persons three years later as part of the Securities Acts 
Amendment of 1964.
126 
 Although the scant legislative history relating to 
these administrative remedies does little to explicate the relevant content of 
the standards,
127
 the legislative intent parallels earlier broader amendments 
to the Investment Advisers Act
128 
that codified existing practice relating to 
the sanctioning of securities professionals.
129
  
In 1990, Congress again expanded the standards-based remedies for 
complicity under federal securities law by giving the SEC the ability to 
 
ramifications, died while awaiting a conference after a superseding legislative mandate 
directed the SEC to prepare a major study of U.S. securities markets that culminated in the 
Securities Act Amendments of 1964.  See Peter A.K. Reese, Securities Legislation of 1960 
(Part I), 17 BUS. LAW 412 n.4, 417 n.26 (1962) (exploring the implications of those 
amendments). 
 125. Compare Investment Advisers Act Section 209(d), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9(d) (2006) 
(stating “[w]henever it shall appear to the Commission that . . . any person has aided, 
abetted, counseled, commanded, induced or procured . . . ”), with the U.S. Criminal Code’s 
general aiding and abetting provision, 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2006) (stating “[w]hoever commits 
an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures 
its commission, is punishable as a principal”).  This connection was made explicit in the 
Senate Report accompanying the legislation: 
This section of the bill would also make it clear that the Commission may 
obtain an injunction against any person who is aiding, abetting, or inducing 
another person to violate the act.  The addition to the injunction section does not 
limit the application of the criminal aiding and abetting statute of the United 
States Code (18 U.S.C. [§] 2).  Rather the amendment borrows the concepts of 
aiding and abetting from the criminal law and seeks to insure that persons will 
be liable in administrative actions by the Commission, as well as in criminal 
actions. 
 S. REP. NO. 86-1760, at 8–9 (1960). 
 126. Pub. L. No. 88-467, § 6(b), 78 Stat. 565, 571 (1960) (amending Section 15(b) of the 
Exchange Act of 1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E) (2006)). 
 127. But see Ralph C. Ferrara & Diane Sanger, Derivative Liability in Securities Law:  
Controlling Person Liability, Respondeat Superior, and Aiding and Abetting, 40 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 1007, 1035–36 (1983) (indicating that Congress appeared to reject evolving 
case law in the civil damage actions as a model and appeared to endorse imposition of 
secondary liability on a showing of mere negligence). 
 128. See SEC, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS, H.R. DOC. NO. 88-
95, pt. 2, at 160 (1963) (showing intent of the Congress regarding the securities market 
under the Acts); see also Task Force on Broker-Dealer Supervision and Compliance of the 
Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, Broker-Dealer Supervision of Registered 
Representatives and Branch Office Operations, 44 BUS. LAW. 1361, 1364 (1989) 
(discussing the legislative history of Section 15(b)(4)(E)). 
 129. William H. Kuehnle, Secondary Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws—
Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, Controlling Person, and Agency:  Common-Law 
Principles and the Statutory Scheme, 14 J. CORP. L. 313, 321–22 n.45 (1989) (citing Nees v. 
SEC, 414 F.2d 211, 220–21 (9th Cir. 1969)). 
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institute administrative cease-and-desist proceedings.
130
  A cease-and-desist 
proceeding is administrative in nature, but unlike administrative aiding and 
abetting proceedings, the SEC may commence C&D proceedings against 
any person and not merely securities professionals (i.e., registrants and 
their associated persons).  Thus, the class of potential respondents in C&D 
proceedings is as broad as the potential class of defendants that can be sued 
in SEC enforcement actions.
131
 
The new C&D remedy also liberalized the substantive theories to 
establish complicity by requiring a lesser degree of culpability than in civil 
or administrative aiding and abetting proceedings.  A C&D order may be 
issued against any person “that is, was, or would be a cause of the 
violation, due to an act or omission the person knew or should have known 
would contribute to such violation . . . of the same provision, rule or 
regulation.”
132
  The relevant culpability standard encompasses negligent 
contributory conduct (at least in cases of non-scienter-based primary 
violations), a standard that is more encompassing than recklessness
133
—the 
prevailing culpability standard in administrative and civil proceedings.  In 
addition, the secondary actor’s offending conduct can stem from omissions 
as well as affirmative acts of assistance.
134
 
A C&D order is similar to a civil injunction, but not in cases where the 
person violates the order after it is entered.
135
  A civil injunction violation is 
punishable in a criminal or civil contempt proceeding, while a C&D order 
violation requires the SEC to seek a court order compelling adherence to 
 
 130. See Securities Act Section 8A, 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1 (2006) (granting the SEC the 
authority to issue C&D order preventing law violators from continuing to violate or 
violating in the future the same provision); Securities Exchange Act Section 21C, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78u-3 (2006) (providing the SEC with the authority to bring C&D proceedings as part of 
the Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990). 
 131. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3(a) (2006) (granting SEC’s authority to issue C&D 
orders), with 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (2006) (showing the language describing the jurisdictional 
scope as to “persons” who can be subject of  C&D proceedings substantially tracks language 
of the jurisdictional scope of “persons” who can be subject to an SEC investigation). 
 132. 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1(a) (2006); 15 U.S.C. §78u-3(a) (2006); see H.R. REP. NO. 101-
616, at 5 (1990) (showing the legislative history relating to creation of the C&D power 
emphasized that the new remedial authority would provide the SEC with a greater range of 
flexibility to bring about compliance without burdening courts). 
 133. See KPMG, LLP v. SEC, 289 F.3d 109, 118–20 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (upholding the 
SEC’s determination that the statutory culpability standard for C&D orders “invokes . . . 
classic negligence language”). 
 134. This is explicit from the statutory language which provides that an order may be 
entered against any person, in addition to a person violating the law, where that person “is, 
was, or would be a cause of the violation, due to an act or omission the person knew or 
should have known would contribute to such violation . . . .”  15 U.S.C. § 78u-3(a) (2006). 
 135. KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART, PRESTON GATES ELLIS LLP, THE SECURITIES 
ENFORCEMENT MANUAL:  TACTICS AND STRATEGIES 189–91 (2007). 
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the order.
136
  In addition, entry of a C&D against a respondent does not 
trigger the same disclosure requirements as a civil injunction.
137
  For these 
reasons, practitioners generally regard a C&D order as a less severe form of 
sanction.  In one respect, this perception has changed.  While penalties 
could not originally be obtained directly in a C&D proceeding (i.e., a 
parallel civil proceeding would need to be instituted) that limitation was 
overcome in the Dodd-Frank Act.
138
 
Finally, pursuant to Rule 102(e), the SEC has exercised administrative 
authority to censure, suspend, or disbar professionals such as attorneys and 
accountants from appearing or practicing before the SEC due to 
professional misconduct.
139
  The authority was not grounded originally in 
statute, but rather in the SEC’s general rulemaking authority and the 
agency’s inherent authority over its own processes.
140
  Nevertheless, 
Congress expressly ratified such agency authority as part of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002
141
 to resolve doubts raised in judicial decisions 
regarding the scope of the SEC’s authority.
142
  Rule 102(e) itself represents 
yet another standards-based mechanism for policing complicit conduct, in 
this case conduct of lawyers and accountants who act as gatekeepers.   
 Generally, the SEC has stayed its hand relating to the sanctions 
against attorneys, unless they are based on a separate adjudication such as 
adverse findings in a criminal or civil proceeding.
143
  Addressing the 
 
 136. Id. 
 137. 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(f) (2011). 
 138. See infra note202. 
 139. 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e) (2011); see Norman S. Johnson & Ross A. Albert, “Déjà Vu 
All Over Again”:  The Securities and Exchange Commission Once More Attempts to 
Regulate the Accounting Profession Through Rule 102(e) of Its Rules of Practice, 1999 
UTAH L. REV. 553, 553 n.2 (noting no fundamental  differences between current rule and its 
predecessor). 
   140.  See Amendment to Rule 102(e) of the Commission Rules of Practice, Securities Act 
Release No. 7,593, 63 Fed. Reg. 57,164 (Oct. 26, 1998) (noting Commission’s purpose in 
adopting Rule 102(e) was to protect the integrity and quality of its system of securities 
regulation and, by extension, the interests of the investing public).  Rule 102(e) exists as a 
means to ensure that those professionals on whom the Commission heavily relies act 
“diligently and with a reasonable degree of competence.”  Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 
F.2d 570, 582 (2d Cir. 1979). See also Johnson & Albert, supra note 139, at 559 (describing 
from a critical perspective bases for the SEC’s rule prior to its amendment in 1998 
   
141.  Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 602, 193 Stat. 745 (2002) [hereinafter 
SOX]  (codified at 15 U.S.C. §78d-3 (2006)).   
   142. See Checkovsky v. SEC, 23 F.3d 452 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Checkovsky v. SEC, 139 
F.3d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1998).    
   143. See Paul Gonson, The 1998 Amendment to SEC Rule 102(e) Will Withstand Judicial 
Scrutiny, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 609, 611 (describing the Commission’s use of “piggybacking” 
on previous forum’s findings of violation); see also, e.g., In re Copeland, Exchange Act 
Release No. 61,584, 2010 WL 675926 (Feb. 25, 2010) (issuing a suspension under Rule 
102(e) based on a conviction of wire fraud—a felony involving moral turpitude—and 
having been disbarred from the practice of law). 
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controversial application of the rule to accountants, the SEC amended Rule 
102(e) in 1998 to clarify the level of culpability required for an accountant 
to be disciplined under the rule.
144
  In addition to intentional, knowing, or 
reckless conduct that results in a violation of applicable professional 
standards, proceedings can also be based on either a single, highly 
unreasonable act under professional standards or a pattern of unreasonable 
professional conduct.
145
 
B.   The Pre-Central Bank Aiding and Abetting Standards Sinkhole 
In addition to the expansive administrative standards-based anti-
complicity regime that took root before Central Bank, there existed a 
substantial judicially-created body of law relating to aiding and abetting.  
The issue posed by aiding and abetting standards was not whether the cause 
of action was judicially cognizable, but rather the content of the relevant 
standards.  As discussed below, the law of aiding and abetting under the 
securities laws was in a chaotic state prior to Central Bank because the 
various federal courts of appeals articulated different substantive 
approaches in applying aiding and abetting standards.
146
  Indeed, as 
originally cast on certiorari, the Central Bank case was to be a vehicle for 
resolving circuit splits regarding controlling legal standards.  This 
subsection explores the lack of clarity and the inherent structural 
limitations in a standards-based approach to demonstrate fundamental 
weaknesses in exclusively relying on a standards-based regime under the 
securities laws.   
Before Central Bank, nearly all courts analyzing aiding and abetting 
claims applied a common three-part test:  first, that a primary violation of 
the Exchange Act had occurred; second, that the aider and abettor had 
awareness or knowledge of the violation and their assistance to the primary 
violator (the culpability prong); and third, that the aider and abettor 
substantially assisted in the primary violation.
147
 
 
 144. See supra note 140 (noting the purpose of the Amendment); see generally Johnson 
& Albert, supra note 136 (providing a comprehensive overview of Rule 102(e) amendments 
and the role of accountants under securities laws). 
 145. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e)(1)(iv) (2011) (stating that improper professional 
conduct requires more than “mere” or “simple” negligence); see also Gonson, supra note 
139, at 615 (discussing the negligence standard in the 1998 amendment). 
 146. Justice Stevens’ dissenting opinion in Central Bank noted that certain questions as 
to what types of conduct rose to a level of substantial assistance and what state of mind was 
required to generate aiding and abetting liability had “engendered genuine disagreement in 
the Courts of Appeals.” Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 
N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 194 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 147. Id.; see also David S. Ruder, The Future of Aiding and Abetting and Rule 10b-5 
after Central Bank of Denver, 49 BUS. LAW. 1479, 1479–80 (1994) (listing elements of 
aiding and abetting and citing appropriate cases).  Even after Central Bank, courts adhere to 
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The existence of a primary violation, the first of the three elements, 
has never been controversial.  Aiding and abetting, whether criminal or 
civil, presupposes a primary violation,  namely the improper conduct that 
the secondary participant aids and abets.
148
  However, this feature also 
embodies a common limitation in standards-based anti-complicity regimes:  
secondary liability is derivative in nature.  The third party’s conduct will 
result in liability only in conjunction with the primary liability of another 
and then only if the third party provides culpable assistance.  Despite the 
common law foundation of aiding and abetting liability in tort and criminal 
law,
149
 courts were sharply divided on what constitutes culpable 
assistance.
150
 
1.   The Assistance Component in Complicity 
Assistance, rather than agreement, is the nexus that connects an 
alleged aider and abettor to the primary violation.
151
  Assistance to the 
 
this formulation.  See, e.g., SEC v. Lybrand, 200 F. Supp. 2d 384, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) 
(listing the three pre-Central Bank factors for establishing aider and abettor liability). 
 148. See Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 20 (1980) (distinguishing between 
conviction of aider and abettor for a crime, notwithstanding the principal’s acquittal in a 
separate proceeding, and the requirement that commission of a crime is a predicate for 
convicting a person of aiding and abetting). 
 149. See Joel S. Feldman, The Breakdown of Securities Aiding and Abetting Liability:  
Can a Uniform Standard be Resurrected?, 19 SEC. REG. L.J. 45, 47–48 (1991) (arguing that 
early court decisions implying private rights of actions for damages against aider and 
abettors relied on both criminal law precedent and the common law principles); see also 
David S. Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, 
Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 597, 
620–27 (1972) (describing emergence of aiding and abetting concepts under the securities 
laws).  Compare SEC v. Timetrust, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 34, 43 (N.D. Cal. 1939) (showing 
criminal law antecedents), with Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 
673, 680 (N.D. Ind. 1966) (showing civil law antecedents). 
 150. See Int’l Inv. Trust v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 922 (2d Cir. 1980) (“Although this 
list of prerequisites has become commonplace, the exact content of the rather vague phrases, 
especially ‘knowledge’ and ‘substantial assistance,’ is still being delineated by the courts.”); 
see also Gregory E. Van Hoey, Note, Liability for “Causing” Violations of the Federal 
Securities Laws:  Defining the SEC’s Next Counterattack in the Battle of Central Bank, 60 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 249, 257 (2003) (discussing courts’ slightly different approaches to 
formulating aiding and abetting liability).  Though each  requirement can be  a source of 
confusion, they are sometimes even analyzed together. 
 151. See Richard C. Mason, Civil Liability for Aiding and Abetting, 61 BUS. LAW. 1136, 
1138 (2006) (“Aiding and abetting does not require any agreement, but rather assistance 
given to the principal wrongdoer.”); see also Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 477 (D.C. 
Cir. 1983) (discussing common law tort of aiding and abetting); Pinkerton v. United States, 
328 U.S. 640, 649 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (noting that under criminal law, “[t]he 
gist of conspiracy is the agreement; that of aiding, abetting or counseling is in consciously 
advising or assisting another to commit particular offenses, and thus becoming a party to 
them  . . . .”).  The assistance must not only be substantial, but also, as discussed infra 
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primary violator’s misconduct must be “substantial,” one of several 
limitations in traditional aiding and abetting standards designed to prevent 
secondary actor liability for conduct merely incidental to a primary 
violation.
152
  In determining whether assistance is “substantial,” it is 
necessary to consider the nature and quality of the assistance provided.  
Assistance that is essential or unusual is not required.  Assistance that is 
enormously significant to the accomplishment of a violation is obviously 
sufficient to meet this standard, whereas assistance of a seemingly 
ministerial or generic character may not rise to the level of substantial 
assistance.
153
  Because “substantial” is an inherently open-ended standard, 
courts lack determinate guidance as to what conduct rises to the level of 
substantial assistance.
154
 
Courts, both pre- and post-Central Bank, have indicated that 
substantial assistance should be viewed as a form of proximate causation.
155
  
 
Section III.B.3, culpable. 
 152. Although courts have insisted that a clear line exists between substantial and 
insubstantial assistance, the precise bounds are indefinite.  See Graham v. SEC, 222 F.3d 
994, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (rejecting defendant’s argument that her conduct was only 
ministerial in nature and thus could not rise to the necessary level of substantial assistance).  
Compare SEC v. Treadway, 430 F. Supp. 2d. 293, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“[M]ere awareness 
and approval of the primary violation is insufficient to make out a claim for substantial 
assistance.”), with J.P. Morgan Chase Bank v. Winnick, 406 F. Supp. 2d 247, 256 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005) (stating that “[a] defendant provides substantial assistance only if [she] affirmatively 
assists, helps conceal, or by virtue of failing to act when required to do so enables [the 
fraud] to proceed”). 
 153. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) cmt. d (1979) (“In determining this, the 
nature of the act encouraged, the amount of assistance given by the defendant, his presence 
or absence at the time of the tort, his relation to the other and his state of mind are all 
considered.”). 
 154. See Brief for Petitioner at 17, Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of 
Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994) (No. 92-854), 1993 WL 407327 (“Because substantial 
assistance of a primary violation is not the conduct prohibited by the statute, courts are 
entirely without guidance as to who may be subjected to liability.”). 
 155. Before Central Bank:  see, e.g., Bloor v. Carro, 754 F.2d 57, 62 (2d Cir. 1985) (“In 
alleging the requisite ‘substantial assistance’ by the aider and abettor, the complaint must 
allege that the acts of the aider and abettor proximately caused the harm to the corporation 
on which the primary liability is predicated.”); Armstrong v. McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79, 92 (2d 
Cir. 1983) (requiring the aider and abettor’s substantial assistance be a proximate cause of 
the primary harm); Edwards Hanly v. Wells Fargo Sec. Clearance Corp., 602 F.2d 478 (2d 
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1045 (1980) (adopting the proximate causation 
requirement); see also Carrie E. Goodwin, Note, Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank:  Not 
Just the End of Aiding and Abetting Under Section 10(b), 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1387, 
1395–96 (1995) (discussing further the implications of Central Bank).   
  After Central Bank:  see, e.g., SEC v. Apuzzo, 758 F. Supp. 2d 136, 150 (D. Conn. 
2010) (requiring proximate causation to determine substantial assistance); SEC v. 
Treadway, 430 F. Supp. 2d 293, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“The aider and abettor’s substantial 
assistance must be a proximate cause of the primary violation.”).  Despite the fact that 
causation language is rooted in pre-Central Bank case law, courts continue to regard it as 
“controlling and relevant” to actions currently brought by the SEC.  SEC v. DiBella, 587 
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But this analogy is more likely a source of confusion rather than guidance.  
As the Restatement of Torts makes clear in discussing civil liability 
predicated on aiding and abetting, substantial assistance is not a causation 
concept concerning initiation or direction of the acts that constitute the 
violation (indeed activity of the latter sort might be more relevant in 
showing primary liability).
156
  Rather, substantial assistance is conduct that 
contributes in some fashion to unlawful conduct committed by another.
157
  
As the Restatement (Second) explains, the assessment is driven by a facts 
and circumstances analysis.
158
  Naturally, when undertaking this fact-
intensive review, courts tend to focus on the specific acts of an alleged 
aider and abettor—a hair-splitting process that has forced adjudicators to 
focus on minuscule differences with somewhat arbitrary results.
159
  
Immediately prior to Central Bank, the Seventh Circuit adopted the most 
restrictive view of substantial assistance in private actions for damages:  the 
assistance prong could only be satisfied by acts that would by themselves 
constitute a primary violation.
160
  With such a restrictive approach, many 
 
F.3d 553, 566 n.9 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 156. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1979). 
 157. Id.  Accord Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793, 800 (3d Cir. 
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 930 (1978) (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS in a 
securities fraud aiding and abetting action).  For a philosophical discussion of causation 
principles surrounding criminal accomplice liability, see Michael S. Moore, Causing, 
Aiding, and the Superfluity of Accomplice Liability, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 395 (2007) 
(containing a philosophical discussion of causation principles surrounding criminal 
accomplice liability).  Professor Moore’s skepticism regarding the need for accomplice 
liability, however, is not ultimately persuasive. 
 158. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) cmt. d. (1979). 
 159. See SEC v. Patel, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 94,613, 2008 WL 782483 (D.N.H. 
Mar. 24, 2008) (providing examples of conduct rising to the level of substantial assistance). 
Comparing the facts before the court with another SEC action (SEC v. Druffner, 353 F. 
Supp. 2d 141 (D. Mass. 2005)), the Patel court focused on actions such as “approving,” 
“authorizing,” “failing to stop,” “provid[ing],” “propos[ing],” and “agreeing” amongst 
others.  Patel, 2008 WL 782483, at *11.  See also SEC v. Pimco Advisors Fund Mgmt., 341 
F. Supp. 2d 454, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (focusing on the defendants’ “facilitation” of the 
fraud).  After a court has determined that such acts do, by their nature, rise to a level of 
substantial assistance, the determination can seem somewhat conclusory.  See, e.g., SEC v. 
Graham, 222 F.3d 994, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (asserting that there was “no doubt” that the 
defendant, an associated person of a broker-dealer, “did play a role—and a substantial one” 
in assisting the fraud when executing trades on behalf of a principal). 
 160. See Schlifke v. Seafirst Corp., 866 F.2d 935, 947 (7th Cir. 1989) (discussing that a 
non-primary violator must have taken part in a manipulative or deceptive act for secondary 
liability to stick); LHLC Corp. v. Cluett, Peabody & Co., Inc., 842 F.2d 928, 932–33 (7th 
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 926 (1988) (requiring that if a primary violator carries out 
a fraud and defendant kept silent, plaintiff must prove the defendant “had a legal duty to 
speak”); Barker v. Henderson, 797 F.2d 490, 495 (7th Cir. 1986) (noting that “each person 
alleged to be an aider, abetter, or conspirator” must have “himself committed one of the 
‘manipulative or deceptive’ acts or otherwise met the standards of direct liability” for a 
primary violation). 
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forms of complicit conduct would evade sanction.
161
  In contrast, the SEC 
has applied a liberal standard in administrative proceedings to determine 
whether assistance is substantial.
162
 
Substantial assistance has received varying treatment in the context of 
a secondary actor’s inaction.  Inaction may facilitate unlawful conduct by 
failing to prevent or disrupt schemes that entail violations.
163
  Even after the 
enactment of PSLRA provisions designed to reaffirm the SEC’s ability to 
bring aiding and abetting actions, ambiguities about inaction as sufficient 
substantial assistance remained, largely because Congress failed to define 
the term in the Act.
164
  Substantial assistance generally has been viewed as 
implicitly requiring affirmative acts of assistance, reflecting concerns about 
indirectly imposing expansive new duties on secondary parties under the 
securities laws.
165
  But a secondary party’s failure to act may enable another 
to commit a securities violation, as reflected in the facts of Central Bank.
166
  
Prior to Central Bank, some courts of appeals flatly rejected the notion that 
a failure to act might be deemed substantial assistance, absent a duty to 
disclose.
167
  However, other circuits held that inaction, even absent a duty 
 
 161. See Feldman, supra note 149, at 70–71 (describing the Seventh Circuit’s restrictive 
approach as giving expression to the court’s underlying “skepticism” regarding aiding and 
abetting liability). 
 162. In re Performance Analytics, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 46,081, 2001 WL 
1148155 (June 17, 2002) (“The Commission need not show that the assistance rendered by 
the aider and abettor was ‘the sole cause or the principal cause; it need only be one of the 
causes.’”) (internal citations omitted); In re Russo Securities, Exchange Act Release No. 
39,181, 1997 WL 603786 (Oct. 1, 1997) (“[T]he harm must be a direct and foreseeable 
result of the alleged assistance.”). 
 163. See Feldman, supra note 149, at 59–66 (highlighting significant judicial 
disagreement regarding status of inaction as substantial assistance). 
 164. See Van Hoey, supra note 150, at 259–60 (citing Ruder, supra note 143, at 1484–
85) (encouraging Congress to act on the issue)).  Compare SEC v. Apuzzo, 758 F. Supp. 2d 
136, 152–53 (D. Conn. 2010) (agreeing to send but not actually sending false audit 
confirmation letter is not substantial assistance) and Patel, 2008 WL 782483, at *11–12 
(holding that a chief financial officer did not provide substantial assistance to misleading 
financial reporting because of his awareness of improprieties in preparing the financial 
statements, which he did nothing to correct because his conduct was not “affirmative” in 
nature), with SEC v. Druffner, 353 F. Supp. 2d 141, 151 (D. Mass. 2005) (finding that a 
branch office manager’s approval of additional account numbers, authorization of the 
processing of transactions, and failure to stop known fraudulent conduct by sales 
representative was sufficient to show affirmative conduct) and SEC v. Espuelas, 698 F. 
Supp. 2d 415, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding that knowledge and failure to record a 
transaction is sufficient for substantial assistance). 
 165. See cases cited supra note 152. 
 166. Central Bank, supra note 1,  at 167  (“Central Bank agreed to delay independent 
review of the [misleading] appraisal until the end of the year, six months after the June 1988 
closing on the bond issue.”). 
 167. See, e.g., Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 496–97 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that 
in the absence of a duty to disclose primary violator’s action, a defendant’s inaction cannot 
constitute substantial assistance); Int’l Inv. Trust v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 927 (2d Cir. 
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to disclose, might be sufficient if motivated by intent to facilitate a primary 
violation.
168
  The treatment of inaction illustrates one of the deficiencies of 
a standards-based approach to complicity.  An overly expansive approach 
does not provide secondary actors with sufficient notice of the 
circumstances in which inaction is prohibited.
169
  A restrictive approach, 
rather than encouraging secondary parties to act proactively or to 
disassociate from the primary actor’s scheme, insulates cooperative 
complicit behavior (behavior such as declining to react to red flags, 
avoiding awkward inquiries, or other forms of passive assistance) from 
liability. 
2.  The Culpability Component of Complicit Assistance 
Under the standards approach to complicity, assistance by a secondary 
party that has the effect of aiding a primary violator’s unlawful conduct, 
absent culpability by the secondary party, is not sufficient to trigger 
 
1980) (noting inaction can only create aiding and abetting liability with there is a conscious 
or reckless violation of an independent duty to act). 
 168. See, e.g., Schneberger v. Wheeler, 859 F.2d 1477, 1481 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. 
denied, 490 U.S. 1091 (1989) (holding that there must be a “mix of scienter and 
participation sufficient for aider and abettor liability under [S]ection 10b-5”); Moore v. 
Fenex, Inc., 809 F.2d 297, 303–04 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1006 (1987) (“The 
plaintiffs must show that the silence of the accused aider and abettor ‘was consciously 
intended to aid the securities law violation,’ and must prove either a culpable state of mind, 
or conduct from which a culpable state of mind can be inferred.”) (citing SEC v. 
Washington Cnty., 676 F.2d 218, 224 (6th Cir. 1982)); Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 625 
(8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1057 & 474 U.S. 1072 (1986) (noting that “inaction 
can be a proper basis for liability under the substantial assistance test”); Monsen v. Consol. 
Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793, 800 (3d Cir. 1978) (noting that inaction, however, may 
provide a predicate for liability where the plaintiff demonstrates that the aider-abettor 
consciously intended to assist in the perpetration of a wrongful act) (emphasis in original); 
Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 97 (5th Cir. 1975) (“When it is impossible to find 
any duty of disclosure, an alleged aider-abettor should be found liable only if scienter of the 
high ‘conscious intent’ variety can be proved.”). 
 169. For example, some argued in the pre-Central Bank era, that liability for inaction 
was particularly pernicious because secondary actors lacked reasonable notice regarding 
when they should or should not act, absent a well-recognized duty to act.  See Patrick J. 
McNulty & Daniel J. Hanson, Liability for Aiding and Abetting by Silence or Inaction:  An 
Unfounded Doctrine, 29 TORT & INS. L.J. 14, 17 (1993) (arguing that “the tort of aiding and 
abetting by silence should be abandoned in cases involving securities violations and 
economic loss, and that a rule based on breach of duty of disclosure should be substituted in 
its place”); see also Ruder, supra note 145, at 641–44 (expressing criticism of aiding and 
abetting by inaction).  While legal arguments against secondary actor liability for inaction 
generally rely on the absence of any independent duty or lack of fair notice to the secondary 
actor, an entirely different policy response might encourage bright-line rules that induce 
action by secondary actors in certain contexts where secondary actors otherwise might 
remain inactive.  Such an approach avoids potential concerns regarding fair notice to 
secondary parties. 
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liability.  Culpability in this sense stems not from the act of assistance 
itself, but from a voluntary decision to provide such assistance in a context 
where the secondary party should have recognized grounds for withholding 
such assistance.  Culpable complicity turns on two closely-related 
considerations relating to the secondary party’s mental state:  the nature of 
the knowledge that makes assistance potentially blameworthy (i.e., 
knowledge or awareness as to what facts), and the required degree of fault 
or blameworthiness by the secondary party. 
As to the nature of the knowledge, courts were notably unsuccessful 
prior to Central Bank in articulating a stable consensus regarding what 
subjective state of mind was required for aiding and abetting liability.  
Courts focused on two related aspects of the secondary participant’s mental 
state:  (a) awareness or knowledge regarding the wrongfulness of the 
primary violator’s conduct, and/or (b) awareness or knowledge of the 
relationship between the aider and abettor’s assistance and the primary 
violator’s misconduct.  Some read this two-tiered approach as a two-part 
mental state requirement, namely that the violator have knowledge or 
awareness of the wrongfulness of the primary violator’s conduct and 
knowledge of their role in assisting the primary violation.
170
 
Some courts suggested that it was knowledge of the specific primary 
violation,
171
 while others suggested awareness of unlawfulness alone might 
be sufficient.
172
  An actual knowledge standard potentially imposes a very 
high mental state standard.  For example, in cases of securities fraud where 
a primary violator’s misconduct is premised on recklessness, the actual 
knowledge standard (if applied literally) would require proof that the aider 
and abettor had even greater knowledge of the primary violation than the 
primary violator (where recklessness generally suffices
173
) in order for 
 
 170. While conventional formulations have typically blended the mental state 
requirements of assistance and culpability, mental state and assistance are treated as distinct 
elements for purposes of this discussion. 
 171. See, e.g., Rudolph v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 800 F.2d 1040, 1046 (11th Cir. 1986) 
(finding liability where aider abettor is aware of a violation); SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 
1316 (6th Cir. 1974) cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975) (noting liability where the aider or 
abettor is aware of the violation); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(c) 
(1979) (denoting general liability for third party assisting tortious acts).  While specific 
intent to aid the primary violator’s unlawful objectives is not required, such intent would 
undoubtedly satisfy virtually any court’s standard. 
 172. See, e.g., Investors Research Corp. v. SEC, 628 F.2d 168, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1980), 
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 919 (1980) (discussing aiding and abetting liability in an 
administrative action). 
 173. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319 n.3 (2007) (citing 
Ottmann v. Hanger Orthopedic Grp., Inc., 353 F.3d 338, 343 (4th Cir. 2003) and its 
collection of citations) (reserving the issue for future decision but noting “[e]very Court of 
Appeals that has considered the issue has held that a plaintiff may meet the scienter 
requirement by showing that the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly, though the 
Circuits differ on the degree of recklessness required”). 
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liability to attach.   
An alternative approach emphasized the need to inquire into whether 
the person aiding and abetting another appreciated his or her role in 
providing assistance to the primary violator.
174
  Such a standard is arguably 
a more demanding mental state requirement:  it requires more detailed 
knowledge of the relationship between the actor’s assistance and the 
primary violator’s unlawful or tortuous conduct that the primary violator 
might not share with the secondary party.  The stringency of this standard, 
as in the case of other mental state standards, varies depending on whether 
knowledge means actual knowledge or encompasses imputed mental states 
based on recklessness. 
A third approach looked to the aider and abettor’s intent or purpose in 
providing assistance.  Under criminal law standards, aiding and abetting 
frequently is viewed (under the so-called Peoni standard
175
) as requiring 
more than mere knowledge and something approaching intent.  Few courts 
have discussed the mental state for civil aiding and abetting as an intent 
requirement.  A notable exception is Judge Friendly’s opinion in IIT v. 
Cornfeld
176
 in which Judge Friendly expressly invoked Peoni as the guiding 
principle in civil actions.
177
  Judge Friendly’s position, if applied literally, 
could be viewed as requiring a quasi-criminal aiding and abetting intent 
standard, a standard that would constitute an unusually high hurdle in the 
civil or administrative context. 
The other aspect, namely the requisite degree of culpability, received 
enormous judicial attention before Central Bank and the history is closely 
intertwined with the establishment of scienter standards in fraud actions.
178
  
As previously noted, the prevailing view among the courts of appeals, both 
before and after the PSLRA, required some form of recklessness to 
establish the requisite scienter for fraud by a primary violator.
179
  Prior to 
Central Bank, the requisite degree of culpability for aiding and abetting 
liability frequently mimicked scienter standards applied in the securities 
fraud context, although, as discussed below, a number of courts of appeals 
 
 174. See, e.g., Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546, 554 (10th Cir. 1974) (noting that an 
aider or abettor must have knowledge of their role in furthering the primary violation). 
 175. United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938) (quoted in Nye & Nissen 
v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619 (1949)).  Even in the criminal realm the meaning of the 
Peoni standard and whether it actually reflects good law is itself subject to debate.  See 
generally Weiss, supra note 117, at 1375–76 (classifying cases into six categories along a 
spectrum of mental states). 
 176. 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 177. The Peoni formulation has neither been widely embraced nor even noticed by most 
courts, although it is echoed in isolated decisions.  See, e.g., Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & 
Co., 824 F.2d 27, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (expressing support for the Peoni formulation). 
 178. Indeed, the seminal Supreme Court precedent on fraud-based scienter is an aiding 
and abetting case.  Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193–94 n.12 (1976). 
 179. See supra note 173.  
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imposed even more demanding standards. 
Recklessness was accepted by all courts (as discussed below) in at 
least some circumstances as satisfying the requisite mental state for finding 
secondary culpability.  But within this broad consensus there appeared 
widely different approaches as to the circumstances in which recklessness 
might be deemed sufficient.  Some courts adhere to the view that 
recklessness was generally sufficient,
180
 while others held that recklessness 
was sufficient only in special circumstances.
181
 
In the Central Bank case, which was resolved on other grounds as 
noted, the SEC urged the Supreme Court to adopt a general standard of 
recklessness in all cases of affirmative assistance.
182
  Although the nature of 
recklessness for aiding and abetting may have a strong affinity to the type 
of recklessness required in cases of fraud, the purpose of the recklessness 
requirement in each context differs.
183
  For aiding and abetting, 
recklessness is used to establish the requisite degree of association between 
the aider and abettor’s assistance and the primary violation, while in the 
case of civil fraud, it establishes the requisite culpability for intent to 
defraud. 
Courts, however, have also embraced two other approaches, each of 
which depended on the presence of special facts.
184
  In one approach, courts 
 
 180. See, e.g., First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A. v. Pring, 969 F.2d 891, 903 (10th 
Cir. 1992), rev’d on other grounds, Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of 
Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994) (adopting the view that recklessness satisfies the scienter 
standard); Levine v. Diamanthust, Inc., 950 F.2d 1478, 1484–85 & nn. 4–5 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(noting that a third party’s reckless disregard of a violator’s action suffices for a cause of 
action for aiding and abetting the violator); Herm v. Stafford, 663 F.2d 669, 684 (6th Cir. 
1981) (explaining that reckless disregard suffices for a cause of action for aiding and 
abetting). 
 181. See infra note 186 (detailing situations in which courts held recklessness sufficient). 
 182. The SEC’s amicus curiae brief concluded as follows: 
In sum, the scienter standard for aiding and abetting liability under Rule 10b-5 
should be neither so low that liability exposure is excessive, nor so high that 
unlawful activity will escape deterrence and remediation.  The recklessness 
standard avoids both liability for good faith or merely negligent conduct, and 
the undue weakening of the securities laws that would result from insistence on 
often elusive proof of conscious intent. 
Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Respondents at 29–30, Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 
511 U.S. 164 (1994) (No. 92-854). 
 183. In some court opinions, there is perhaps an unconscious elision of these two scienter 
requirements, such that their formulations are treated as fungible.  Such a disagreement is 
evident in a recent case, Howard v. SEC, 376 F.2d 1136 (D.C. Cir. 2004), where the 
concurring opinion explicitly chided the majority for conflating the two different scienter 
standards.  Id. at 1150–52 (Henderson, J., concurring).  While I will argue that the two 
formulations need not be substantively different in practice, the respective mental state 
requirements stem from different underlying statutory policies. 
 184. In cases involving aiding and abetting by inaction (as opposed to affirmative 
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held that recklessness sufficed only if the defendant owed a duty to the 
plaintiff respecting the alleged violation.
185
  For example, under this so-
called duty theory, a party would be liable for aiding and abetting an 
issuer’s disclosure violation only if the aider and abettor owed investors a 
duty to disclose.  A third group of courts applied a slightly less stringent 
standard, the so-called sliding scale approach, ranging from recklessness to 
conscious intent.
186
  Under this approach, recklessness was sufficient if the 
aider and abettor was under an independent duty to disclose.  In addition, in 
the absence of any such duty, recklessness would suffice, but only if the 
assistance was unusually significant in scope or degree. 
The range of views regarding the mental state required for aiding and 
abetting liability prior to Central Bank underscores the challenges of a 
standards-based approach to complicity.  Built into the standards approach 
is an avowed narrowing of anti-complicity principles.  As the mental state 
standards are ratcheted up, secondary actors have less of an incentive to 
self-monitor their conduct or proactively engage the primary actor in the 
face of red flags.  In short, conventional culpability-based standards of 
aiding and abetting tended to give secondary actors wide berth in their 
dealings with primary violators. 
3. Administrative Aiding and Abetting—Same Problem, Different 
Venue   
The relevant administrative standard closely paralleled the 
development of implied theories of aiding and abetting liability in civil 
actions prior to Central Bank,
187
 but the interdependency among the civil 
 
assistance), courts have typically required a higher mental state, exceeding recklessness.  
The higher mental state is required to determine whether the actor’s inaction is an 
affirmative form of assistance or mere inattentiveness to circumstances. 
 185. See, e.g., Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 496 (4th Cir. 1991) (stating that 
without a fiduciary duty, the applicable scienter requirement is actual knowledge); Edwards 
& Hanley v. Wells Fargo Sec. Clearance Corp., 602 F.2d 478, 484 (2d Cir. 1979) (citing 
Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 47–48 (2d Cir. 1978)) (noting that 
recklessness suffices for aider and abettor liability where a fiduciary duty was owed). 
 186. See, e.g., Akin v. Q-L Inv., Inc., 959 F.2d 521, 531–32 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting that 
certain circumstances entailing a special independent fiduciary duty may lessen the scienter 
standard to recklessness); Schneberger v. Wheeler, 859 F.2d 1477, 1480–81 (11th Cir. 
1988) cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1091 (1989) (lessening the scienter standard to recklessness 
with regards to special independent fiduciary duty); Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 624–
25 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1057 (1986), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1072 (1986) 
(explaining that when some special duty of disclosure exists, liability correspond to a lesser 
degree of scienter); Woods v. Barnett Bank of Fort Lauderdale, 765 F.2d 1004, 1009–10 
(11th Cir. 1985) (applying a recklessness scienter requirement where the assistance deviated 
significantly from the standards of ordinary care). 
 187. Compare Investors Research Corp. v. SEC, 628 F.2d 168 (D.C. Cir 1980) (stating 
that awareness of unlawfulness alone might be sufficient to satisfy the scienter requirement), 
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and administrative law standard is noteworthy.  The pre-Central Bank 
judicially-created standard for aiding and abetting fraud (a standard 
subsequently swept aside by the Central Bank decision) was largely 
imported into the administrative realm to determine how to better formulate 
statutorily-created aiding and abetting standards.  On its face, such an 
approach was inappropriate to the extent that the civil law formulation was 
influenced by the fact that the civil law remedy had been implied, rather 
than statutorily mandated, for the obvious reason that the administrative 
standard was prescribed by statute rather than implied.
188
  Indeed, the 
administrative standard arguably should have been construed liberally 
given its administrative law origins.
189
  Nevertheless, in the critical case of 
Investors Research v. SEC,
190
 the court’s analysis of the administrative 
aiding and abetting standard was heavily influenced by the civil standard 
applied in private fraud actions without explicitly recognizing the 
fundamentally different contexts in which the standards were being 
applied.
191
  This result was particularly important in understanding the 
culpability standard applied in administrative proceedings. 
In Investors Research, the SEC sanctioned a broker for aiding and 
abetting an investment adviser’s violation of the affiliated compensation 
prohibitions of Section 17(e)(1) of the Investment Company Act.
192
  The 
provision strictly prohibits affiliates of registered investment companies 
(RICs), such as investment advisers or their employees, from receiving 
additional compensation from persons other than the RIC in acting as an 
agent on the RICs behalf.  In this case, the investment adviser directed 
trades on behalf of the RIC to broker-dealers that had other material 
 
with Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 97 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that the 
scienter requirement is predicated upon actual awareness), and SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 
1304, 1316, 1319 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975) (holding scienter 
requirement as predicated upon awareness in a SEC injunctive action).  During the 1970s, a 
period of rapid expansion in the use of aiding and abetting theories—both in SEC civil and 
administrative actions as well as private damages actions—the familiar three pronged 
analysis took shape.  The SEC now routinely incorporates this approach into its own 
decisions.  See, e.g., Sharon M. Graham, Exchange Act Release No. 40727 1998 WL 
34300386 (Nov. 30, 1998), aff’d, Graham v. SEC, 222 F.3d 994 (D.C. Cir. 2000).  In many 
cases, courts used civil and administrative standards interchangeably without any apparent 
recognition that the standards had different legal foundations (one statutory and the other 
implied) and could at least in theory diverge in some respects. 
 188. Thus, for example, the Seventh Circuit expressly stated that its civil law standard 
was intentionally restrictive because based on an implied remedy.  See supra note 161.  That 
consideration is not relevant in the case of the administrative law standard. 
 189. Cf. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2304 n.8 
(2011) (noting that the normal deference accorded to issues committed to agency’s 
administrative discretion is not applicable in private litigation). 
 190. 628 F.2d 168 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
 191. Id. at 178. 
 192. 15 U.S.C. §80a-18(e) (2006). 
FRANCO_FINALIZED_ONE (DO NOT DELETE)   
2011] OF COMPLICITY AND COMPLIANCE 49 
 
commercial relationships with the investment adviser.  The court vacated 
the SEC’s finding that the broker had aided and abetted the RICs violation 
because the SEC had not found that the broker was any more than negligent 
in failing to recognize the violation.  The court concluded that a finding of 
aiding and abetting claims required a relatively strong form of scienter, 
even when the primary violation itself had no scienter requirement, to 
ensure that innocent secondary parties were not unfairly sanctioned for 
negligence.
193
 
Even if the Investors Research court was correct as to the broker (a 
person who was not affiliated with the primary violator), the result seems 
problematic when applied to affiliated parties of the primary violator, such 
as employees.  Congress had already mandated in many contexts that 
primary liability may attach to corporate registrants without a showing of 
fault.  It is hard to see how it is unfair to impose liability on the employees 
who bore primary responsibility for the corporation’s violation if fairness 
considerations do not preclude imposing liability on a corporate entity 
whose fault is solely traceable to the employee.  In such a situation, the 
liability of both the corporation, the primary actor, and the employee, the 
secondary actor, arise from precisely the same conduct, namely that of the 
employee.  The D.C. Circuit’s approach, which is now firmly entrenched, 
leads to seeming nonsensical results where, for example, an investment 
company may be strictly liable for pricing its shares in a way directed by 
the president of the company, even though the president, who directed the 
pricing policy, cannot be found liable for the same violation as a secondary 
actor, absent a showing that he was aware that the conduct was unlawful.
194
  
The effect of this particular judicial policy is to eliminate liability for 
complicity for many types of violations entailing strict liability absent a 
 
 193. Although the Investors Research court rejected negligence as a basis for aiding and 
abetting liability, it seemed open to finding the requisite culpability from recklessness—an 
approach adopted by most courts both before and after Central Bank.  See, e.g., Monetta 
Fin. Servs. v. SEC, 390 F.3d 952, 956–57 (7th Cir. 2004) (explaining the awareness 
requirement of aider and abettor liability satisfied by recklessness); Geman v. SEC, 334 
F.3d 1183, 1195–96 (10th Cir. 2003) (finding an aider and abettor liable from a state of 
mind of recklessness).  Although in recent years judicial decisions have not challenged the 
use of a recklessness standard per se, some courts have challenged the proper formulation of 
the recklessness standard and the circumstances that support such a finding.  See, e.g., SEC 
v. Howard, 376 F.3d 1136, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (finding that the SEC had erroneously 
treated recklessness as a “should have known” standard without reference to awareness).  
Howard technically did not implicate an express aiding and abetting provision under the 
federal securities law, but rather a power to issue cease-and-desist orders against persons 
causing violations pursuant to Section 21C of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3 (2006).  
Aiding and abetting is encompassed by the broader concept of causing violations and the 
court of appeals specifically treated it as an aiding and abetting case because that was the 
theory advanced by the SEC in the administrative proceeding. 
 194. SEC v. Steadman, 967 F.2d 636, 647–48 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
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showing of scienter.  
C. Complicity Standards Post-Central Bank and the Dodd-Frank 
Palliative 
Following Central Bank, Congress has engaged in efforts to reform 
the standards-based anti-complicity policy.  As discussed below, although 
the legislative initiatives enacted have provided modest improvements, they 
fall far short of the robust anti-complicity initiative recommended in this 
article. 
Although Congress did not restore the implied private cause of action 
for aiding and abetting after Central Bank,
195
 it effectively repudiated 
Central Bank’s insinuation that the SEC lacked the power to bring civil 
aiding and abetting actions.  As part of the PSLRA, Congress expressly 
codified the SEC’s authority to bring civil enforcement actions against 
persons who “knowingly provide substantial assistance” to primary 
violators.
196
  In this way, Congress restored the ability of the SEC to seek 
civil sanctions for aiding and abetting securities law violations.  The 
congressional reaction to Central Bank is at least noteworthy as yet another 
example of the well-established legislative policy favoring standards to 
police complicity.
197
 
 
 195. As to Section 20(e) of the Exchange Act, the Senate Report is instructive.  The 
original House bill contained no such provision and the Conference Report accompanying 
the PSLRA as enacted did not elaborate on Section 20(e).  H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 37 
(1995) (presenting the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference).  See 
also H.R. 1058, 104th Cong. (1st Sess. 1995) (providing an example of proposed legislation 
failing to elaborate on Section 20(e)).  The language in the Senate Report explained the 
Committee’s decision to not restore actions for private damages because of the perceived 
potential to engender litigation abuses.  See S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 19–20 (1995) 
(accompanying the Senate bill, S. 240, 104th Cong. (1st Sess. 1995), which was the 
legislative source of the final provision).  Senator Bryan attempted to amend the Senate bill 
to restore aiding and abetting liability in private damage actions, but his attempt failed.  141 
CONG. REC. S9032 (daily ed. June 26, 1995) (statement of Sen. Bryan) (Amendment No. 
1474); 141 CONG. REC. 9073, 9109–12 (1995). 
 196. PSLRA, supra note 7  (codified  at 15 U.S.C. § 78(t)(e) (2006) and subsequently 
amended 15 U.S.C. § 78(t)(e) (Supp. IV 2010)). 
 197. Even apart from disagreements regarding the proper formulation of the aiding and 
abetting standard discussed below, there was also a parallel recognition that aiding and 
abetting standards alone would not always be effective in inducing the desired secondary 
actor behavior.  This realization was particularly pronounced in the case of attorneys.  In the 
wake of Enron, there was widespread criticism of the seeming lack of accountability on the 
part of lawyers for their role in clients’ misconduct.  See generally Susan P. Koniak, When 
the Hurlyburly’s Done:  The Bar’s Struggle with the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1280 (2002) 
(criticizing attorneys for indirectly aiding the securities law misconduct of clients).  
Congress shared this sentiment, which led to the enactment of Section 307 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002.  Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §7245 (2006)) (authorizing the SEC to establish professional standards for securities 
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The statutory restoration of the SEC’s civil enforcement authority to 
bring actions against aiders and abettors, however, also illustrates the 
inherent problem of interpretation triggered by standards.  The statutory 
language in Exchange Act Section 20(e) differs from the statutory language 
that serves as the basis for administrative proceedings directed at aiding 
and abetting; the SEC, as originally codified, could proceed civilly against 
persons who “knowingly provide substantial assistance”
198
 to primary 
violators as aiders and abettors, while it may sanction securities 
professionals administratively that “willfully aid and abet.”
199
  Not 
surprisingly, this discrepancy immediately resulted in conflicting judicial 
interpretations regarding whether the “knowingly” formulation 
encompassed recklessness,
200
 even though recklessness was sufficient to 
satisfy the requisite mental state in administrative aiding and abetting 
actions.
201
  The problem was ultimately resolved in the Dodd-Frank Act, 
which contained a provision amending Exchange Act Section 20(e) by 
statutorily permitting liability as to persons who “knowingly or recklessly 
provide substantial assistance.”
202
 
The recently enacted Dodd-Frank Act made three important changes 
to the prevailing standards-based anti-complicity regime.  As noted, the Act 
explicitly clarified the culpability standard in SEC civil enforcement of 
 
attorneys); see also 148 CONG. REC. S.6551-52 (statement of Sen. Edwards), S.6554-53 
(statement of Senator Enzi), S6556 (statement of Sen. Corzine) (daily ed. July 10, 2002) 
(expressing concerns regarding role of lawyers in securities scandals in the wake of Enron).  
For a discussion of the overlapping state and federal law obligations of attorneys following 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and SEC rulemaking, see Giovanni P. Prezioso, General Counsel, 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Remarks before the American Bar Association 
Section of Business Law 2004 Spring Meeting (April 3, 2004) (noting that a number of 
issues have triggered debate relating to the role of lawyers in avoiding complicity with client 
misconduct under the securities laws); see also supra notes 86, 141. 
 198. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2006). 
 199. 15 U.S.C. § 78(o)(b)(4)(E) (2006) (regarding associated persons of broker-dealers); 
15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(e)(6) (2006) (regarding associated persons of investment advisers). 
 200. See David S. Slovick, Scienter and Section 20(e):  A New Consensus on Aiding and 
Abetting Liability in SEC Enforcement Actions, 36 SEC. REG. L. J. 317, 324 (2008) 
(suggesting an emerging consensus for actual knowledge prior to passage of the Dodd-Frank 
Act).  Compare SEC v. KPMG LLP, 412 F. Supp. 2d 349, 382–83 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) 
(explaining that “the fact that the ‘knowingly’ was defined as actual knowledge in the very 
same bill that contained Section 20(e) weighs in favor of the . . . contention that the 
provision does not encompass recklessness”), with SEC v. Peretz, 317 F. Supp. 2d 58, 64 
(D. Mass. 2004) (holding that “[w]here the defendant has a duty to disclose the primary 
violations, . . . courts have been willing to impose liability on the basis of a recklessness 
standard”) (quoting Cleary v. Perfectune, Inc., 700 F.2d 774, 777 (1st Cir. 1983))). 
 201. See, e.g., Graham v. SEC, 22 F.3d 994, 994 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (sanctioning a 
brokerage firm owner for fraudulent trades, and holding that “elements for aiding and 
abetting liability were established” through using a recklessness standard). 
 202. Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 8,  § 929O, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78(t)(e) (Supp. IV 2010)). . 
FRANCO_FINALIZED_ONE (DO NOT DELETE)   
52 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 14:1 
 
aiding and abetting actions.
203
  The existing “knowing” assistance standard, 
which had sparked judicial conflict in its application, was expressly 
broadened to encompass recklessness.
204
  Secondly, it allowed penalties to 
be imposed administratively for causing violations in C&D proceedings.
205
  
Finally, the Act established a uniform aiding and abetting enforcement 
framework across all securities statutes (the Investment Advisers Act,
206
 the 
Securities Act,
207
 the Investment Company Act,
208
 in addition to the 
Exchange Act
209
).
210
  Congress separately considered the issue of allowing 
private civil suits against securities violators, but ultimately failed to 
include such provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act.
211
 
 
 203. Id.  
 204. Id.  See generally Slovick, supra note 200 (discussing the conflicted history of the 
knowledge standard for aiding and abetting liability under the securities laws). 
 205. Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 8 § 929P(a).  This expansion of authority permits the 
SEC to seek civil monetary penalties in cease-and-desist proceedings if the Commission 
determines, after notice and opportunity for hearing, a person violated or caused a violation 
of the securities laws.  Id. 
 206. Id. § 929N (adding new section 209(f) to the Advisers Act (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§80b-9(f) (Supp. IV 2010)).  The amendment provides authority for the SEC to seek 
monetary damages in a civil action against a person who aids or abets in a violation of the 
Advisers Act.  Id.  Prior to Dodd-Frank, the Advisers Act limited the SEC to seeking 
injunctive relief against aiders and abettors.  Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 209(d) 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §80b-9 (2006)).   It is important to note that new section 209(d) does 
not explicitly require “substantial assistance” as does the Exchange Act, relying instead on 
the traditional aid and abet formulation.  Compare 15 U.S.C. §§80b-9 (2006)) with 15 
U.S.C. § 78(t)(e) (Supp. IV 2010)). . 
 207.  Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 8, § 929M(a) (adding new section 15(b) to the 
Securities Act of 1933 codified at 15 U.S.C. §77o(b) (Supp. IV 2010)).  The amendment 
provides authority to seek penalties against those who “knowingly or recklessly provide 
substantial assistance to another” in violation of the Act.  Id.  The 1933 Act previously did 
not provide authority to penalize aiders and abettors. 
 208. Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 8, § 929M(b) (adding new section 47 to Investment 
Company Act of 1940 codified at 15 U.S.C. §80a-47(b) (Supp. IV 2010)).  The amendment 
brings the authority to penalize aiders and abettors under the Investment Company Act into 
conformity with the Exchange Act and the amended Securities Act where such authority did 
not previously exist.  Id. 
 209. See supra notes 202–04.  
 210. Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 8, § 929P (simultaneously amending the Securities 
Act, Investment Company Act, Exchange Act and Advisers Act to enable  the SEC to seek 
civil penalties in C&D proceedings).  
 211. See Elizabeth Skola, Aiding and Abetting Liability Provision Omitted from 
Financial Reform Bill, ALSTON BIRD SECURITIES LITIGATION BLOG (July 9, 2010, 3:58 PM), 
http://securities.litigation.alston.com/blog.aspx?entry=3738 (discussing the background of 
bills proposing private rights of action against aiders and abettors and also noting that 
compromise among conferees in House and Senate led to inclusion of study and ultimate 
rejection of private action provisions in Dodd-Frank).  In the United States House of 
Representatives and the Senate, respectively, Congresswoman Maxine Waters and Senator 
Arlen Specter introduced similar bills that would expressly allow for a private right of action 
against any person who provided substantial assistance in any violation of the Exchange 
Act.  Liability for Aiding and Abetting Securities Violations Act of 2009, S. 1551, 111th 
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These changes undoubtedly will be beneficial in shoring up the 
effectiveness of anti-complicity standards.  The SEC will have greater 
flexibility in proceeding against complicit parties both civilly and 
administratively.  The inherent structural complexity of the standards 
regime, however, remains.  More importantly, the revisions to the 
standards-based regime do not address its inherent deficiencies.  As 
discussed above, the manner in which standards are formulated is largely 
anchored in notions of personal culpability and accountability that do not 
address forms of complicity in which either the secondary participant does 
not recognize that he or she is assisting in the unlawful behavior of another 
or facilitates primary violations through inaction. 
D. In the Shadow of Central Bank 
The foregoing subsections show that anti-complicity standards entail a 
significant degree of uncertainty and address an incomplete range of 
complicit conduct.  What is the significance of the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Central Bank and subsequently in Stoneridge and Janus 
Capital (collectively, I refer to the three decisions as the Central Bank 
trilogy) in thinking about anti-complicity policy?  The answer surprisingly 
is:  not much and, to the extent they are relevant, they are surely 
problematic.  Indeed, the most problematic aspect of the Central Bank 
trilogy is not the much criticized holdings foreclosing liability for damages 
(though such criticism surely has some merit
212
), but rather the Court’s 
inability to articulate a principled distinction between primary and 
secondary liability (or even to recognize the possible relevance of anti-
complicity policies to the remedial purposes of the federal securities laws). 
Ironically, the Central Bank decision was supposed to have provided 
definitive guidance regarding the contours of liability for aiding and 
abetting violations under federal securities law.  As noted above, although a 
consensus existed among the federal courts of appeals recognizing aiding 
and abetting liability in private damages actions,
213
 the courts articulated a 
 
Cong. (1st Sess. 2009); Liability for Aiding and Abetting Securities Violations Act of 2010, 
H.R. 5042, 111th Cong. (2d. Sess. 2010).  While these damages provisions were omitted 
from the Dodd-Frank Act, the Act did provide for a study analyzing the “impact of 
authorizing a private right of action against any person who aids and abets another person in 
violation of the securities laws.”  Dodd-Frank Act , supra note 8, § 929Z. 
 212. On policy grounds, this article offers some justification for eliminating private 
damages action by arguing that a more robust anti-complicity regime could be effectuated 
through an expansive rules-based strategy.  Indeed, the article notes the potential tension, to 
some extent, between an approach that relies on damages for all forms of complicity and a 
more expansive anti-complicity regime.  Concerns regarding excessive damages only serve 
to encourage narrowly-crafted anti-complicity standards.  See discussion infra Section IV. 
 213. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
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variety of different substantive approaches.
214
  The Supreme Court’s 
response in Central Bank offered no guidance in that respect.
215
  Congress 
had not expressly created a private right of action for secondary liability 
under Section 10(b).  The Court concluded that, absent legislative action, 
one could not be implied based on its perception of an equivocal statutory 
record that would support such an implication.
216
  In effect, the Court’s 
decision rendered moot any discussion of the substance of such liability 
standards.
217
   
Had the Court merely concluded that it was not appropriate to imply a 
private right of action and no more, the decision’s consequences would 
have been more limited (though still dramatic in terms of limiting private 
actions).  But the decision’s reasoning went beyond this limited result, 
thereby setting the stage for subsequent analytical problems.  In the Court’s 
view, “§ 10(b) [did] not prohibit aiding and abetting.”
218
  The majority’s 
view could actually be restated in a way that is more relevant to this article:   
the expansive rulemaking authority under Section 10(b) conferred on the 
SEC does not extend to promulgating rules that would prohibit complicity 
in fraud.  The Court’s reasoning left little doubt that the SEC lacked 
authority to bring civil enforcement actions against persons complicit in 
securities fraud (or any other securities law violation).
219
  Congress quickly 
and decisively overruled that implication.
220
 
 
 214. See supra note  146 and accompanying text. 
 215. See also Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 508 U.S. 959 (1993) (mem.) 
(granting petition for writ of certiorari and raising issue of existence of private cause of 
action sua sponte). 
 216. Central Bank, supra note 1, at 178. 
 217. Id. at 177–78. 
 218. Id. at 199. 
 219. Justice Stevens’s dissenting opinion expressly averted to this implication.  Id. at 
200.  This conclusion became the prevailing wisdom among commentators.  See, e.g., 
Ruder, supra note 147, at 1486 (1994) (suggesting negative implications of the Supreme 
Court Central Bank decision on the interpretation of rule 10b-5); Joel Seligman, The 
Implications of Central Bank, 49 BUS. LAW. 1429, 1430, 1434–35 & n.36 (1994) (discussing 
the Central Bank decision and its detrimental effects on aiding and abetting claims).  In an 
entertaining exchange, two pieces envisioned draft Supreme Court opinions resolving the 
issue.  Edward C. Brewer III & John L. Latham, SEC v. Central Bank: A Draft Opinion for 
the Court’s Conference, 50 BUS. LAW. 19 (1994) (discussing a draft opinion extending 
Central Bank to SEC civil aiding and abetting actions); Simon M. Lorne, Central Bank of 
Denver v. SEC, 49 BUS. LAW. 1467 (1994) (incorporating draft opinion by the SEC’s then-
General Counsel holding that Central Bank did not preclude SEC civil actions for aiding 
and abetting). 
 220. PSLRA, supra note 7 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §78t(e) (2006) and subsequently 
amended (Supp IV 2010)) (providing that the SEC may bring civil actions against “any 
person that knowingly provides substantial assistance to another person in violation of a 
provision of [the securities laws], or of any rule or regulation issued” thereunder).  An 
attempt to amend the PSLRA by restoring private rights of action—the so-called Bryan 
Amendment—failed in the Senate and died, though this issue returned in connection with 
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The Court’s one-sided discussion of the policy implications of aiding 
and abetting liability is noteworthy for its crabbed view of the importance 
of anti-complicity policies.  The majority opinion gives short shrift to any 
perceived anti-complicity benefits from the statute’s long-recognized 
remedial purposes (especially arising from SEC enforcement actions), 
tersely acknowledging that “extending the 10b-5 cause of action to aiders 
and abettors no doubt makes the civil remedy more far-reaching . . . .”
221
  It 
mistakenly insinuated that Congress plausibly could have intended to 
foreclose secondary liability because its grant of rulemaking authority did 
not expressly enumerate such an objective,
222
 and that recognition of 
secondary liability might potentially conflict with the statute’s objectives.
223
  
As explained in the preceding subsection, Congress has consistently acted 
to expand liability for complicity in law enforcement actions under federal 
securities law.
224
 
Undoubtedly, countervailing concerns regarding excessive private 
litigation might offer some justification for not implying a private right of 
action, but the Court framed its holding in terms that encompassed both 
governmentally and privately enforced anti-complicity principles, rather 
than the narrower issue of an implied cause of action for private 
damages.
225
  Indeed, the failure to acknowledge potential differences in law 
enforcement actions and private damage actions
226
 makes the Court’s 
discussion of Congress’s broad recognition of criminal liability for aiding 
and abetting sound disingenuous.  Congress’s broad recognition of criminal 
aiding and abetting for securities law violations has a meaningful analogue 
in SEC law enforcement actions, an area directly implicated by the Court’s 
own reasoning, but the majority instead stressed the less germane 
inapplicability of criminal law policy in designing private litigation 
remedies.
227
 
The most problematic aspect of the Court’s reasoning, and its most 
enduring effect, however, has been its restrictive construction of language 
 
the Dodd-Frank Act.  See supra Section II.B.2. 
 221. Central Bank, supra note 1, at  188 . 
 222. Id. at 179–80. 
 223. Id. at 188 (“Extending the 10b-5 cause of action to aiders and abettors no doubt 
makes the civil remedy more far reaching, but it does not follow that the objectives of the 
statute are better served.”). 
 224. See supra Section II.A.  Indeed, as the majority itself acknowledged, the extant 
legislative materials seemed to support congressional acquiescence.  Central Bank, 511 U.S. 
at 185–87. 
 225. There is some irony in the Court’s observation that the “rules for determining aiding 
and abetting liability are unclear” as a policy factor weighing against aiding and abetting 
standards in view of the fact that the very purpose for granting certiorari was supposed to 
have caused the Court to resolve uncertainty in the area.  Id. at 188. 
 226. Id. at 190. 
 227. Id.  
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that seemed to suggest that a broad range of secondary actors might be 
subject to liability, provided that they “[made] a material misstatement (or 
omission) on which a purchaser or seller of securities relies . . . assuming 
all of the requirements for primary liability under Rule 10b-5 are met.”
228
  
The critical distinction between primary and secondary liability under the 
Court’s approach turned on who made the material misstatement.
229
 
Although Central Bank held out the possibility that many types of 
secondary actors might be liable under the “making” standard, this outcome 
has proven largely illusory as both the Stoneridge and Janus Capital cases 
demonstrate.  The two subsequent decisions each confronted the issue of 
who could be sued as a primary violator in connection with fraudulent 
disclosure.  In resolving this issue, the Court eschewed reliance on the 
relatively common sense approach of affixing primary liability in terms of 
relative responsibility among participants, instead relying upon a 
mechanical test for determining who “made” the alleged misrepresentation 
to investors. 
In Stoneridge, the Court analyzed the liability of two companies that 
supplied equipment to a public company whose financial statements 
contained material misrepresentations.
230
  The equipment suppliers entered 
into transactions with the public company that disguised the true nature of 
the suppliers’ transactions with the public company.
231
  As a result, the 
public company was able to create misleading financial statements without 
 
 228. Id. Justice Kennedy reinforced this point with his observation that recognition of 
actions for aiding and abetting generally would potentially undermine the well-established 
element of reliance in private Rule 10b-5 actions because defrauded investors rely, 
explicitly or implicitly, on the primary violators’ conduct rather than the unknown 
assistance of a secondary party.  Id. at 180. 
 229. As the Court subsequently explained in Janus Capital:  “[F]or Central Bank to have 
any meaning, there must be some distinction between those who are primarily liable (and 
thus may be pursued in private suits) and those who are secondarily liable (and thus may not 
be pursued in private suits).”  Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 
2296, 2302 n.6 (2011).  Because private litigants could no longer seek damage remedies 
against aiders and abettors in light of this, plaintiffs have to meet the challenge of Central 
Bank by expanding the scope of primary liability under Rule 10b-5 while defendants 
predictably have sought to narrow primary liability.  This led to a split in the circuits 
regarding the appropriate test for primary liability and generated conflicting commentary.  
See, e.g., Aegis J. Frumento, Misrepresentations of Secondary Actors in the Sale of 
Securities:  Does In re Enron Square with Central Bank?, 59 BUS. LAW. 976 (2004) 
(examining the need to explore further the concept of secondary actors post-Central Bank as 
a result of the case); Jill E. Fisch, The Scope of Private Securities Litigation:  In Search of 
Liability Standards for Secondary Defendants, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1293 (1999) (arguing 
against the Court’s literal textualism approach in Central Bank).  As discussed below, the 
Supreme Court’s recent holding in Janus Capital adopted the restrictive view of primary 
liability. 
 230. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
   231.   Id. at 154–55.  
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its outside auditor catching on to the misstatements.
232
  Under any theory of 
the case, the two secondary parties were complicit in the misrepresentations 
and, at a minimum, aided and abetted the public company’s fraudulent 
statements.
233
  Because the matter arose in a private action, however, the 
only viable securities fraud claim that could be asserted against the 
equipment suppliers was for primary liability.
234
  The plaintiffs alleged that 
the equipment suppliers were primarily liable as participants in a “scheme” 
to defraud because the two secondary actors themselves had specifically 
engaged in fraudulent conduct—i.e., following Central Bank, had actually 
“made” and subscribed to false statements in documenting the 
transactions.
235
 
A closely divided Court rejected the claim in reasoning that was 
ultimately more problematic than the result (though, once again, there is 
something obviously unappealing about a holding that allows highly 
culpable parties to escape liability).  While the holding necessarily 
evidences a restrictive view of Rule 10b-5, it is defensible at an intuitive 
level (assuming that Central Bank was correct) as drawing the line between 
conduct that constitutes the violation and conduct that is properly viewed as 
aiding and abetting the violation.  The Court reasonably could assert that 
the line between primary and secondary liability should be drawn in this 
case between the secondary actors and the primary actor because the actors 
were not equally responsible for the scheme and the suppliers had merely 
assisted the public company’s violations in connection with the scheme.
236
  
In other words, the Court could have concluded that the suppliers’ 
conduct—though part of a fraudulent scheme—was secondary in nature to 
the fraud perpetrated by the public company.
237
 
However, according to the Court’s much-criticized reasoning in 
Stoneridge,
238
 the plaintiffs’ cause of action as to the secondary parties was 
 
   232.   Id. at 154 & 161.  
   233.   Id. at 162–63.  
   234.  The perception that injured investors were in effect circumventing Central Bank’s 
prohibition on damages for secondary liability was very much at the fore of the majority’s 
resistance to petitioner’s theory.  See Id. at 162-63 (“Were we to adopt this construction of 
§10(b), it would revive in substance the implied cause of action against all aiders and 
abettors except those who committed no deceptive act in the process of facilitating fraud.”).  
   235.   Id. at 159–60.  
   236.   For a similar recognition of this deficiency in Stoneridge but with a different 
framework for resolving the issue, see Ronald J. Colombo, Cooperation with Securities 
Fraud, 61 ALA. L. REV. 61, 89 (2009) (noting that Stoneridge “provide[s] little guidance to 
courts and counsel struggling with the distinction between primary and merely secondary 
liability under § 10(b)” and suggesting a resolving framework based a cooperation analysis 
drawn from moral philosophy). 
   237.   Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 161 (2008). 
 238. See, e.g., Mark Klock, What Will It Take to Label Participation in a Deceptive 
Scheme to Defraud Buyers of Securities a Violation of Section 10(b)?  The Disastrous Result 
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fatally flawed because they could not “show reliance upon any of the 
[defendant secondary actors’] actions except in an indirect chain that we 
find too remote for liability.”
239
  This formulation of the holding is highly 
problematic because it suddenly ties the violation to investors’ perception 
of the misconduct, rather than the misconduct itself.  There is a difference 
between the less objectionable assertion that the only actionable securities 
fraud consisted of the misrepresentations contained in the financial 
statements issued by the public company and the untethered assertion that 
the secondary parties could not commit fraud because investors did not 
realize the role of the secondary parties in the fraudulent scheme, no matter 
how significant the secondary parties’ actual role in the fraud.  The former 
assertion is merely drawing a line between securities fraud and assisting (or 
complicity in) the fraud.  The latter assertion—that a person cannot commit 
securities fraud unless known to the injured party—is counterfactual in two 
respects.  First, persons can perpetrate a fraud on victims who are ignorant 
of the fraudster or the fraudster’s role in the fraud.  Indeed, that is the 
essence of fraud based on silence in market transactions such as insider 
trading.  Second, as the dissent makes clear, the fraud on the market theory 
is predicated on the assumption that persons are frequently injured even 
where they had no personal knowledge of the misrepresentation, let alone 
the party making the misrepresentation.
240
 
The perversity of Stoneridge becomes evident in the most recent 
decision of the Central Bank trilogy, Janus Capital.
241
  The asset manager, 
Janus Capital, and its subsidiary asset manager, were sued by Janus Capital 
shareholders for misrepresentations made by the asset manager in preparing 
 
and Reasoning of Stoneridge, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 309 (2010) (criticizing Stoneridge for 
both the Court’s reasoning and the actual result); Franklin A. Gevurtz, Law Upside Down:  
A Critical Essay on Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 103 
NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 448, 449 (2009) (suggesting that the case “illustrates how utterly 
irrational the law governing private securities fraud actions has become”); Robert A. 
Prentice, Scheme Liability:  Does It Have a Future After Stoneridge? 2009 WIS. L. REV. 
351, 352–53 (2009) (exploring the implications of Stoneridge on scheme liability, and 
arguing for a broad interpretation of the case); Robert A. Prentice, Stoneridge, Securities 
Fraud Litigation, and the Supreme Court, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 611, 611–12 (2008) (suggesting 
that in Stoneridge, “the Court committed an anachronistic error comparable to a cowboy 
movie showing John Wayne listening to an iPod as he rides his horse across the Old West”).  
For a critical, yet sympathetic reinterpretation of Stoneridge, see Donald C. Langevoort, 
Reading Stoneridge Carefully:  A Duty-Based Approach to Reliance and Third-Party 
Liability under Rule 10b-5, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2125, 2138–48 (2010) (examining the 
Stoneride decision, inquiring into the concepts of remoteness and disproportion, and 
suggesting ways to interpret the decision in more favorable light).  In light of the Supreme 
Court’s Janus Capital decision, it is clear that the Supreme Court declined to follow 
Professor Langevoort’s more palatable interpretive approach. 
 239.   Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 159. 
 240.  Id. at 170–71 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
   241.   See supra note 4.  
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disclosure for mutual funds managed by Janus.
242
  The facts relating to the 
plaintiff class involved a slight twist.  While undoubtedly the mutual fund 
shareholders were deceived by the false disclosure, this action was brought 
by Janus Capital’s shareholders on the theory that they were also allegedly 
injured by the false mutual fund disclosure issued by the Janus Funds.
243
  In 
Janus Capital, unlike Stoneridge, the offending disclosure that allegedly 
deceived Janus Capital’s shareholders had been prepared by Janus’s asset 
manager for Janus-advised funds and the asset manager appeared to have 
exclusive knowledge of the true facts which made the disclosure 
misleading.  In this situation, only the asset manager personnel had the 
requisite fraudulent intent.
244
   
The Court held that the asset manager could not be primarily liable for 
securities fraud in these circumstances.  The problem from the Court’s 
perspective was that the disclosure itself was never directly attributed to 
Janus Capital nor to the asset manager, but rather to the Janus Funds that 
nominally had issued the misleading disclosure.  The Court crafted a new 
“ultimate authority” test for primary liability under which only the maker 
of the false statement can be primarily liable, and “[f]or purposes of Rule 
10b-5, the maker of a statement is the person or entity with ultimate 
authority over the statement, including its content and whether and how to 
communicate it.”
245
  The Court’s holding, read literally, turns complicity on 
its head.  The line between primary liability and secondary liability has 
little to do with whether conduct is regarded as the source of the fraud or 
merely assistance.  Instead, it turns on an entirely formalistic distinction of 
the actor’s ultimate authority (in the legal sense) to make the statement.  
Thus, according to the majority, merely drafting a false disclosure with 
knowledge of its falsity and subsequently deceiving another into believing 
that the statement is accurate, does not alone make an individual primarily 
liable for fraud, so long as the other person disseminates the statement in its 
own name.  In trying to distinguish primary liability and aiding and 
abetting, the Court has actually crafted a rule insulating from liability those 
who in fact may be primarily responsible. 
The ultimate significance of the Central Bank trilogy in thinking about 
complicity is in illustrating how deficient the judicial standards scheme has 
become.  Not only did Central Bank not shed any light on the substance of 
 
   242.   Id. at 2300-01. 
   243.   Because this action was addressed at the pleading stage, it is unclear whether 
plaintiffs would have been able to demonstrate loss causation arising from false disclosure 
in Janus Funds’ disclosure on Janus Capital’s share price. 
   244.  Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2297–98 
(2011). 
 245. Id. at 2302.  Justice Breyer’s dissent branded this test as lacking support in 
“common” usage or “earlier cases.”  Id. at 2306. 
FRANCO_FINALIZED_ONE (DO NOT DELETE)   
60 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 14:1 
 
aiding and abetting standards but, ironically, it became the vehicle for 
artificially limiting the scope of primary liability.  An indirect and unhappy 
consequence of this approach may be that just as the floor on primary 
liability has been judicially raised, so too will the floor on complicity.  This 
is directly contrary to the reform proposal advanced here, which seeks to 
expand the reach of anti-complicity policies so as to discourage a broad 
range of different forms of assistance.  Given the Supreme Court’s failure 
to rationalize the law in this area, perhaps the best that can be done is to 
take the Court’s advice and seek a fix from non-judicial policy makers.
246
 
IV. A PRAGMATIC ASSESSMENT OF THE PROBLEM WITH STANDARDS 
In this section, considerations from preceding sections are marshaled 
to argue that exclusive reliance on a standards-based regime is unwise from 
a policy perspective.  The apparent lack of efficacy of the current 
standards-based regime may stem from the fact that aiding and abetting 
standards evolved in part from criminal law
247
 and are grounded in notions 
of moral culpability (or blameworthiness) and fair notice, so that third 
parties are not unwittingly subjected to sanction.  In the criminal context, 
notice derives from knowledge or from facts that are sufficiently notorious 
as to put third parties on notice of the potential for the primary violator’s 
misconduct.  Primary reliance on standards in the criminal context seems 
appropriate to bring about an alignment of criminal sanctions with moral 
culpability.  But if, as is the case in many regulatory contexts, there is no 
need to align regulatory policy with notions of moral culpability, 
instrumental considerations may well argue for a rules-based regime over a 
standards-based regime.
248
 
Certainty and predictability are instrumental considerations that may 
 
 246. Id. at 2304. 
 247. See Feldman, supra note 149 (suggesting that early decisions allowing implied 
private rights of action against such parties relied, in part, on criminal law precedent). 
 248. This article asserts (rather than providing an independent justification for the 
justification) that civil and criminal complicity should be viewed differently.  There is, of 
course, a deep and extensive literature that goes beyond the scope of this paper regarding 
culpability.  Indeed, the idea that there is a fundamental difference in the two different 
contexts when it comes to culpability and liability has received prominent attention from 
criminal law scholars.  Compare Michael S. Moore, Prima Facie Moral Culpability, 76 
B.U. L. REV. 319 (1996) (defending different concepts of culpability in two different 
contexts), with Claire Finkelstein, The Irrelevance of the Intended Prima Facie Culpability:  
Comment on Moore, 76 B.U. L. REV. 335 (1996) (distinguishing the two contexts as 
between culpability and accountability in the absence of culpability).  Even in the criminal 
law context, policy arguments have been made against exclusive reliance on intentional 
culpability standards as an element of criminal complicity in all contexts.  See Sanford H. 
Kadish, Reckless Complicity 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 369 (1997) (scrutinizing the 
requirement of intent in criminal complicity statutes). 
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outweigh the importance of moral blameworthiness in seeking to deter 
complicity in securities law violations.  A standards-based approach that 
relies heavily on a moral culpability component necessarily forestalls anti-
complicity strategies that impose proactive duties on secondary actors in 
dealing with potential securities law violators.
249
  Making secondary actors 
proactive agents for anti-complicity strategies may provide more efficient 
deterrence in some contexts than trying to identify morally culpable 
secondary actors after the fact.  Instrumental considerations, of course, 
could favor a standards-based regime.  Standards grounded in moral 
culpability and fair notice may be desirable as an instrumental matter in 
contexts where regulators are unable to formulate rules that identify, with 
sufficient precision, sanctionable conduct by secondary actors.  The 
ultimate policy determination regarding type of regime, however, should be 
based on instrumental considerations of effectiveness and efficiency, rather 
than an assumption that the locus of liability should be based on notions of 
moral culpability. 
The fundamental problem with standards in the securities law context 
is their inherent imprecision when clearer guidance to secondary parties 
might be more effective in bringing about compliance with the law.  As 
discussed in the previous sections, standards designed to limit complicity in 
the securities law context give rise to complexity in two respects.  First, as 
legal principles, the standards are open-ended and vague and therefore 
difficult to apply in a predictable and consistent fashion.  Frequently, 
complicity involves passive rather than active assistance and typically 
involves high culpability thresholds.  As a result, findings of liability are 
highly fact-specific and diminish the odds of making a finding of liability 
on such grounds. 
Standards have also proved complex to administer in practice.  The 
current system of sanctioning complicit secondary actors has, after Central 
Bank, been entrusted almost exclusively to the SEC
250
 and is built around 
 
 249. Cf. Assaf Hamdani, Mens Rea and the Cost of Ignorance, 93 VA. L. REV. 415, 415 
(2007) (arguing, in the criminal law context, strict liability offenses “induce genuinely 
ignorant offenders to acquire information” where the offender would otherwise prefer to 
remain ignorant and avoid criminal sanction). 
 250. Exceptions to the SEC’s largely exclusive role in the private litigation realm include 
manipulation under Section 9 of the Exchange Act, false filings with the SEC pursuant to 
Section 18 of the Exchange Act, and Section 11 of the Securities Act.  The principal law 
enforcement exception to the SEC’s exclusive role is criminal prosecutions for aiding and 
abetting by the Department of Justice.  The crime of aiding and abetting exists under the 
U.S. Criminal Code rather than the securities laws per se.  18 U.S.C. § 2.  While criminal 
aiding and abetting of securities law violations are brought, see, e.g., United States v. 
Faulkenberry, 614 F.3d 573, 583–84 (6th Cir. 2010) (sustaining CEO’s securities fraud 
conviction on grounds that his conduct at least satisfied elements of criminal aiding and 
abetting), such actions are far less frequent than SEC enforcement and administrative 
proceedings.  Although it is difficult to draw generalizations, courts have from time to time 
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numerous legal gradations encompassing a broad range of potentially 
complicit behavior.  As discussed in Section II.A., this panoply of 
overlapping standards may convey the sense that there is a robust web of 
tools at regulators’ disposal to police the complicity of secondary actors.  
For example, the standards governing aiding and abetting civil and 
administrative proceedings are very high, while those applied in C&D 
proceedings and in proceedings relating to professional practice are far 
more flexible. 
Nevertheless, the overlapping standards are also a source of problems.  
Like all standards, the fuzziness that inheres in each variant detracts from 
the deterrent effect of the relevant standards.  The resulting fact-bound 
collection of orders (based on settlements) is not well-designed to provide 
prospective guidance to other secondary actors.  While the availability of 
lesser sanctions under slightly watered-down standards may expedite 
disposition of SEC investigations, it may also lead to the impression that 
defendants have bargaining opportunities to blunt the imposition of 
sanctions.  Numerous C&D orders are settled with reporting companies, yet 
no individual employees are named as complicit parties.
251
  Aiding and 
abetting sanctions themselves may be underused and the lesser sanction of 
a C&D order (or professional bar) may be overused as a substitute for 
aiding and abetting sanctions. 
The complexity and nuanced nature of the determinations supporting 
findings of complicity undermine their effectiveness in deterring 
complicity.  In order to be effective, the scheme must put potential 
offenders on notice of what is required of them and be sufficiently 
 
evidenced some hostility to criminal prosecutions involving fraud in financial reporting.  In 
a recent opinion, Chief Judge Kozinski severely criticized government prosecution of the 
chief financial officer of Network Associates in connection with the company’s use of 
specific accounting methods in preparing its financial statements that allegedly inflated 
revenues (though, as the court found, the government had failed to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the resulting misstatements were material).  His concurring opinion 
states: 
This is just one of a string of recent cases in which courts have found that 
federal prosecutors overreached by trying to stretch criminal law beyond its 
proper bounds. . . . This is not the way criminal law is supposed to work.  Civil 
law often covers conduct that falls in a gray area of arguable legality.  But 
criminal law should clearly separate conduct that is criminal from conduct that 
is legal. 
United States v. Goyal, 629 F.3d 912, 922 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J., concurring) 
(citations omitted). 
 251. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.  The Delphi matter in Section I shows 
similar ad hoc (or possibly highly nuanced) resolutions in which third parties are not 
sanctioned even though the outside firm (such as the bank and the IT company) appeared to 
have provided assistance in accounting frauds with high awareness of the underlying 
circumstances. 
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predictable so secondary parties are able to conform their conduct to the 
desired standard.  The current system rests heavily on prosecutorial 
judgment and largely accidental features found in evidentiary records.  As 
noted in Section II.B., the recklessness standard for aiding and abetting is 
notoriously difficult to apply in a consistent fashion and is particularly 
difficult to apply in specific instances involving acts of omission rather 
than acts of commission.
252
  Moreover, it is difficult to apply to situations 
involving failure to adhere to affirmative regulatory commands where the 
party subject to sanction claims ignorance of the regulatory directive.
253
  
Finally, recklessness alone is not sufficient to establish liability for aiding 
and abetting.  It also requires substantial assistance, an element that has 
been a subject of inconsistent judicial application.
254
  The term “causing” in 
C&D proceedings is potentially broad and has been construed to establish 
negligence as the appropriate culpability standard (at least in non-scienter 
primary offenses), but “causing” is extremely amorphous and its bounds 
have not been rigorously explored in judicial settings.
255
  Lack of 
consistency regarding the application of particular elements undermines the 
utility of these anti-complicity standards in providing clear prospective 
guidance to secondary actors regarding activities potentially subject to 
sanction. 
Policy preferences for standards or rules may hinge in part on 
behavioral assumptions regarding the motivations of secondary parties to 
be complicit.  One possibility is that complicit participants are motivated 
 
 252. See supra Section II.A.1. 
 253. While doctrine generally has rejected ignorance of the law as a defense, some courts 
have suggested ignorance may preclude a finding of the requisite mental culpability required 
of aiders and abettors.  See Monetta Fin. Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 390 F.3d 952 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(vacating a finding of aiding and abetting liability because the SEC could not show that the 
broker was aware that disclosure of IPO allocations was required); Howard v. SEC, 376 
F.3d 1136 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (requiring recklessness for aiding and abetting but not holding 
the broker liable because the SEC could, at best, show that he had been negligent for not 
knowing the law and failing to comply).  Such a rule severely limits the ability of securities 
regulators to bring aiding and abetting actions (and hence to seek sanctions) against 
employees of broker-dealers and investment advisers where the statute or rule imposes 
affirmative obligations on firms rather than employees of the firms.  For commentary 
critical of these decisions, see Alexander P. Robbins, Comment, After Howard and Monetta:  
Is Ignorance of the Law a Defense to Administrative Liability for Aiding and Abetting 
Violations of the Federal Securities Law?, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 299 (2007) (attempting to 
reconcile the inter- and intra-circuit tension surrounding the issue of ignorance of law as a 
defense, sparked by the Howard and Monetta decisions). 
 254. See supra Section II.A.1. 
 255. See, e.g., KPMG, LLP v. SEC, 289 F.3d 109 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (affirming that 
negligence is the appropriate basis for violations underlying a C&D order).  But see 
Howard, 376 F.3d at 1136 (suggesting in dictum that SEC would have to use established 
aiding and abetting standards if it chose to predicate liability for causing violation on finding 
of aiding and abetting). 
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by the close alignment of their own self-interest and the unlawful interests 
of primary violators.  If the interests of the parties in the unlawful scheme 
are viewed as being closely aligned, that might well argue for relying 
primarily on a standards-based regime.  In such circumstances, it would be 
reasonable to believe that complicit secondary parties might be predisposed 
to engage in deliberate efforts to circumvent anti-complicity rules, and 
bright-line rules might be easier to circumvent than standards.  
Alternatively, however, if the majority of complicit secondary actors are 
viewed as weak-willed confederates—i.e., persons willing to accommodate 
the primary violator, as long as the secondary actor does not feel in 
imminent legal risk—then bright-line rules might prove a powerful 
deterrent by making not only the risk, but wrongfulness of complicit 
conduct more transparent to the secondary actor. 
In this respect, standards may play some role in any anti-complicity 
regime.  For example, vague standards may provide a means to sanction 
particularly blameworthy conduct after the fact (as a form of catchall), but 
vague standards alone, conditioned on a finding of blameworthiness, are 
not terribly effective deterrents when complicity comes in many shades and 
forms and the vagueness of the relevant standards makes their prospective 
application in many factual contexts uncertain.  In other words, the inherent 
vagueness of anti-complicity standards based on a high degree of 
culpability diminishes the ability of such standards to provide ex ante 
guidance in a way that alters the behavior of the vast majority of secondary 
actors prospectively. 
Vague standards, because of their potential for over-inclusiveness, 
however, may incorporate an unnecessarily high culpability bar (in contrast 
to context-specific rules) precisely to mitigate problems of over-
inclusiveness.  In other words, regulatory policy has set a high standards-
based bar to avoid triggering liability excessively.  Given this state of 
affairs, secondary actors have little incentive to internalize the standards’ 
objectives, provided that the secondary actor can at least disclaim overt 
knowledge of a primary actor’s violation.  If this gray zone around 
secondary actors’ conduct is sufficiently broad, standards will have only a 
limited deterrent effect relative to the full range of complicitous forms of 
behavior.  As a result, vague standards which are designed to be 
sufficiently flexible to capture egregious forms of complicit malfeasance 
may ironically tolerate a greater range of complicit conduct than necessary 
when using precise context-specific rules.  Needless to say, vague 
standards lacking culpability requirements do not satisfactorily solve the 
problem but merely create a different problem:  vague standards lacking 
culpability requirements risk imposing significant costs by creating 
potential chilling effects on many forms of legitimate commercial behavior. 
Standards are uniquely linked with the justification for secondary 
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liability in private damage actions.  The very nature of the standards-based 
inquiry, namely the blameworthiness of the secondary actor, historically 
provided the basis for recovery of damages from the secondary participant 
based on the actor’s fault.  Under this view, it is more equitable to impose 
the risk of loss on the complicit party rather than the injured party for 
damages arising from the primary violation where the primary violator 
cannot make the injured party whole.
256
  In contrast, a rules-based anti-
complicity approach is largely indifferent to the availability of private 
actions against secondary actors since culpable intent is not the basis of 
rules-based liability.
257
 
Central Bank, of course, directly addressed the availability of an 
implied private damages remedy for aiding and abetting securities fraud 
violations and rejected judicial implication of such a remedy.  Since then, 
there have been recurrent but unsuccessful legislative and academic 
proposals for legislatively overturning the result in Central Bank.
258
  If the 
Central Bank sensibility remains prevailing public policy, then that state of 
affairs should argue against exclusive reliance on standards-based 
strategies.  In this respect, rules-based anti-complicity strategies may reflect 
a policy approach that is more consistent with a post-Central Bank 
sensibility. 
Even if the private action remedy were restored,
259
 it does not follow 
 
 256. See, e.g., Central Bank, supra note 1, at  199 (Steven, J., dissenting) (“Allowing 
aider and abettor claims in private § 10(b) actions can hardly be said to impose unfair legal 
duties on those whom Congress has opted to leave unregulated . . . .”). 
 257. In some cases, private actions are expressly foreclosed for violations of rules-based 
obligations.  See 17  C.F.R. § 243.102 (2011) (noting that failure to comply with Regulation 
FD disclosure requirements shall not be deemed a violation of Rule 10b-5).  The absence of 
private remedies does not eliminate all prospects of compensation for investors, as the SEC 
may use the proceeds of disgorgement awards and civil penalties available to establish a 
Federal Account for Investor Restitution (FAIR Fund).  15 U.S.C. § 7246(a) (2006); see 
Verity Winship, Fair Funds and the SEC’s Compensation of Injured Investors, 60 FLA. L. 
REV. 1103, 1132–33 (2008) (arguing that Fair Funds are particularly appropriate against 
aiders and abettors of securities fraud).  But see Barbara Black, Should the SEC Be a 
Collection Agency for Defrauded Investors?, 63 BUS. LAW. 317, 337–41 (2008) 
(questioning whether SEC actions for the benefit of injured investors are a suitable 
substitute for private litigation). 
 258. See supra notes 211, 220 and accompanying text.  For an example of an academic 
proposal in this vein, see Mark Klock, Improving the Culture of Ethical Behavior in the 
Financial Sector:  Time to Expressly Provide for Private Enforcement Against Aiders and 
Abettors of Securities Fraud, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (proposing two 
suggestions for addressing the problems posed by Central Bank:  “supplement[ing] 
enforcement of anti-fraud rules . . . by expressly creating a private right of action for aiding 
and abetting violations of securities laws . . . [and] increas[ing] financial literacy in our law 
schools which supply the regulators of our markets”). 
 259. Several legislative changes since Central Bank relating to a private damages 
remedy arguably would constrain any litigation explosion upon the restoration of the private 
cause of action for aiding and abetting.  First, Congress enacted the Private Securities 
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that standards should be favored over rules-based anti-complicity strategies 
or some form of hybrid regime.  At best, restoration of private causes of 
action would only address complicity in the case of fraud.  Although an 
important category, fraud-only complicity remedies understate the potential 
scope of a truly robust anti-complicity strategy. 
Second, a damage remedy does not alter the fundamental problem of 
imprecision associated with an exclusively standards-based trigger for 
liability.  While damage remedies may have an equitable justification (i.e., 
as between innocent investors and culpable secondary actors, , losses 
should inure to the culpable parties),
260
 the computation of damages in 
practice is unlikely to be tightly correlated with any reliable measure of a 
particular secondary party’s fault or that party’s contribution to the 
resulting harm to investors—what Professor Langevoort refers to as the 
proportionality problem.
261
  To the extent that correlation between third-
party assistance and damages is weak, the deterrent effect of the damages 
award is diminished except in the strict liability sense of an inherent cost of 
doing business.
262
  These concerns are arguably greater in the third party 
 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, which significantly limited the ability of investors to bring 
actions for primary violations and the potential amount of recovery against all defendants in 
such actions.  Inability to recover from primary violators also reduces the liability exposure 
of secondary actors.  Second, as part of the PSLRA, Congress also enacted proportional 
damage liability provisions, which significantly limit the potential recovery against many 
secondary parties in cases even where a colorable claim can be pled against a primary 
violator. 
 260. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 175–80 
(2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that Congress intended that federal courts ought to 
respect the principle that every wrong would have a remedy). 
 261. See Langevoort, supra note 229, at 2138–48 (stating that recoveries do not closely 
approximate actual investor injuries, and that the prevailing approach to recovery 
assessment overcompensates fairly significantly). 
 262. Several commentators have criticized the deterrence value of securities class actions 
generally on the basis thatf the resulting scheme  entails welfare-diminishing compensatory 
payments between continuing shareholders and former shareholders and from diversified 
shareholders (or unlucky non-diversified shareholders) to lucky non-diversified 
shareholders.  See John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on 
Deterrence and its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534 (2006) (positing that the 
incidence of penalties in securities litigation in the secondary market context should be 
shifted from the shareholder to the culpable parties in order to achieve optimal deterrence); 
Richard A. Booth, The End of the Securities Fraud Class Action as We Know It, 4 
BERKELEY BUS. L. J. 1 (2007) (arguing that “SFCAs” should be treated as derivative 
actions to avoid the problems created by the way damages are measured under current law). 
But see Lawrence Mitchell, The “Innocent Shareholder”:  An Essay on Compensation and 
Deterrence in Securities Class-Action Lawsuits, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 243, 291 (2009) 
(outlining the circularity argument but suggesting it fails because “[t]he innocent 
shareholder is, in fact, the irresponsible shareholder”); Jill E. Fisch, Confronting the 
Circularity Problem in Private Securities Litigation, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 333 (2009) 
(arguing that damages as a remedy for securities fraud  economically rewards investors who 
are able to identify public companies  that have efficient governance mechanisms to avoid 
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context where the third party’s liability is based on recklessness rather than 
knowledge because of the attenuation between the third party’s 
recklessness and the occurrence of unlawful conduct by a primary violator.  
On average, awards may be accurate but there will be wide variance as to 
the legitimacy of the damages awarded or withheld in particular cases.  
These widely variant outcomes contribute to the perception of the arbitrary 
nature of damages in securities law cases, especially with respect to parties 
whose relationship to the fraud is secondary, which impose pressures for 
settlements that may not correspond to the underlying merits of any 
particular claims. 
While this section has collected many of the defects of a standards-
based approach, an advocate of standards-based anti-complicity approach 
might still argue for such an approach based on its comparative advantage 
relative to any alternative.  If a rules-based approach were not feasible, then 
a standards-based regime might be preferred from a policy perspective, 
notwithstanding clear deficiencies.  In other words, even if standards are 
not perfect, they may nevertheless provide the best approach.  The 
remainder of the article seeks to show that a rules-based approach is well-
suited to address complicity problems arising in the securities context 
because many violations are characterized by recurring patterns of conduct 
that could be disrupted with bright-line anti-complicity rules. 
V. THE EMERGENCE OF AN INCHOATE RULES-BASED REGIME 
While the use of aiding and abetting standards to deter complicit 
assistance directly is widely regarded as the principal model for anti-
complicity policies, rules-based strategies have begun to emerge as an 
alternative.  Like standards, rules-based strategies may seek to discourage 
and deter complicit behavior directly, but they may also be designed to 
deter or disrupt relatively passive forms of facilitation.  These latter types 
of anti-complicity policies may seek to prohibit certain types of conduct or 
 
securities fraud problems and this benefit will yield corresponding capital  market rewards 
for such efficient companies).  In the case of third-party liability for damages, circularity 
concerns are arguably attenuated because the third-party payments would not come from 
continuing shareholders of the public company indirectly compensating former 
shareholders.  However, circularity concerns would still remain since it would still be likely 
that a public company (and indirectly its shareholders) wind up compensating former 
shareholders of another public company.  More importantly, the relationship between the 
potential damages in particular cases and the third party’s precautionary conduct is far less 
correlated than in the case of primary liability.  As a result, the potential liability exposure of 
third parties may not provide useful price signals to third parties in selecting optimal levels 
of precaution.    See generally Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: 
Restructuring the Relationship between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 10b-5, 108 
COLUM. L. REV. 1301 (2008) (discussing conflicting policy considerations relating to private 
enforcement of the securities laws, encompassing both primary and secondary liability). 
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practices because of the potential of such conduct or practices to facilitate 
primary violations by others, or they may impose affirmative duties to 
monitor or create systems that deter or impede primary violations, and 
thereby enlist the assistance of third parties in preventing primary 
violations.  Such strategies have begun to take shape in federal securities 
law over the last generation, not as a coherent anti-complicity theory, but as 
independent initiatives aimed at plugging obvious regulatory weaknesses,  
principally in the area of financial reporting.  This section provides a brief 
survey of rules-based initiatives before and after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
for two purposes:  (1) to illustrate the effectiveness of such rule-based 
methods as anti-complicity strategies and (2) to document the emergence of 
such strategies as a trend precisely at a time when aiding and abetting 
standards have foundered.   
A.  Anti-Complicity Rules Pre-SOX 
1. Accounting Books and Records and Internal Controls 
The accounting books and records and internal controls provisions of 
the Exchange Act were enacted as part of the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act.
263
  While the Act is most famously regarded as prohibiting bribery of 
foreign officials, it included far-reaching provisions that mandated that 
reporting companies establish and maintain an internal accounting 
infrastructure.
264
  Reporting companies were required to have books and 
records that would permit the preparation of financial statements in 
accordance with GAAP, and a system of internal controls designed for that 
purpose.
265
  These provisions provide rules governing record-keeping and 
internal controls that were designed to operate within the existing 
disclosure and enforcement framework of the Exchange Act.
266
  While the 
provisions and the accompanying rules could be regarded as standards (in 
that they do not prescribe specific books and records and internal controls), 
 
 263. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified 
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), (d)(1), (g)–(h), 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78dd-3, 78ff (2006)). 
 264. See Stuart H. Deming, The Potent and Broad-Ranging Implications of the 
Accounting and Record-keeping Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 96 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 465, 468 (2006) (noting these provisions are far-reaching in that 
they are not limited to making improper payouts to foreign officials). 
 265. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(b)(2)(B)(ii) (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§78m(b)(2)(B)(ii)(2006)). 
 266. See generally Note, The Accounting Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act:  An Alternative Perspective on SEC Intervention in Corporate Governance, 89 YALE 
L.J. 1573, 1575 (1980) (“[T]hose [FCPA] provisions were intended only to reinforce the 
existing disclosure framework of the Exchange Act, and that further SEC involvement in 
corporate affairs beyond this framework is an unauthorized and unwarranted exercise of 
agency discretion.”). 
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they do impose rules-based mandates governing procedures and accounting 
infrastructure for public companies in the preparation of financial 
statements.  Although these provisions probably would not have been 
described as anti-complicity measures when adopted, they should 
nevertheless be viewed as such.  By forcing company personnel to observe 
certain procedures in preparing financial statements, the provisions make it 
difficult for rogue employees to avail themselves of passive or unconscious 
assistance from others in subverting the company’s financial reporting 
infrastructure.
267
  Imposing requirements for a more elaborate accounting 
infrastructure necessarily enlists a range of secondary participants, such as 
other employees and outside auditors, to become more pro-active in 
disrupting the unlawful activities of primary violators. 
2. Enhanced Gatekeeping by Auditors under Exchange Act Section 
10A 
Public companies are required to provide audited financials annually 
in the company’s Form 10K filing.  While public companies require the 
services of an independent accountant in connection with their own filing 
obligations, accountability rests with the public company unless and until 
the auditor signs the requisite audit opinion.
268
  As part of the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Congress expanded the 
gatekeeping role of outside auditors by imposing affirmative reporting 
obligations on the auditor with respect to the public company’s board, and 
if necessary, reporting obligations to the SEC.
269
  For the first time, auditors 
are required, in the course of their audits, to investigate potentially illegal 
acts and report immediately to management and the board, or audit 
company, those situations where an illegal act likely occurred.
270
  If the 
 
 267. Exchange Act § 13(b)(5) (“No person shall knowingly circumvent or knowingly fail 
to implement a system of internal accounting controls or knowingly falsify any book, 
record, or account . . . .”). 
 268. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817–18 (1984); see also 
Delphi Complaint, supra note 15, ¶ 57 (alleging liability for both Delphi and owner of the 
Consulting Company for intentionally misleading Delphi’s auditor by refusing to put 
repurchase order in writing).  For a discussion of auditors’ responsibilities prior to Sarbanes-
Oxley reforms, see Joseph I. Goldstein & Catherine Dixon, New Teeth for the Public’s 
Watchdog:  The Expanded Role of the Independent Accountant in Detecting, Preventing, 
and Reporting Financial Fraud, 44 BUS. LAW. 439 (1989) (tracing the history of auditing 
practices and progress of administrative response thereto). 
 269. PSLRA, supra note 7 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 778j-1(b)(1) & 
(3)(2006)) (Exchange Act § 10A(b)(1) & (3)). 
 270. Id.  While the scope and nature of an auditor’s duty to uncover fraud had been 
debatable, the enactment of the PSLRA expressly clarified this requirement.  See Larry Catá 
Backer, The Duty to Monitor:  Emerging Obligations of Outside Lawyers and Auditors to 
Detect and Report Corporate Wrongdoing Beyond the Federal Securities Laws, 77 ST. 
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company’s response proves inadequate, the auditor is required to report its 
conclusions and either resign, and report the same to the SEC, or furnish 
the SEC a copy of the auditor’s final report to the board.
271
  The SEC is 
specifically authorized to institute C&D proceedings and impose civil 
penalties against noncompliant accountants.
272
 
The affirmative reporting of accounting irregularities up within the 
organization, and if necessary, out to the SEC, represented a new type of 
anti-complicity provision.  The traditional gatekeeping role required that 
auditors not assist the client firm’s improper financial reporting, but did not 
require the auditor to take affirmative steps to reveal, and thereby disrupt, 
potentially unlawful conduct.  The statutory mandate found in Section 10A 
supplanted tacit regulatory permission for voluntary, and largely silent, 
withdrawals by auditors in the face of potential accounting improprieties.  
The directives embodied in Section 10A could be viewed as both standards 
and rules.  The standard component involves detection of illegal acts, 
whether material or not, while the rule component requires the auditor to 
take very specific steps to resolve whether the conduct was indeed unlawful 
and to evaluate the materiality of the conduct.  The obvious intent of this 
provision was to require third parties to become more proactive in 
revealing potential securities law violations. 
3. Securities Professionals 
The SEC has long placed far more comprehensive restrictions on 
securities professionals.  Because of the demands for integrity within the 
brokerage industry in order to have smoothly functioning markets, the 
SEC’s oversight is far more comprehensive.  Securities firms must 
maintain records that are subject to examination and inspection without 
notice.
273
  Aside from making primary violations less likely in the first 
place, these compliance devices reduce complicity in several respects.  
Preservation of books, records, and exams make it more difficult to obscure 
the trail of irregularities associated with primary violations.  In a market 
environment where parties must rely on the financial integrity of 
counterparties to clear and settle trades, firms have significant incentives to 
detect improprieties for business and regulatory reasons.  The incentive for 
proactive engagement is therefore perhaps more urgent than in the case of 
financial reporting by conventional reporting companies.  The maintenance 
of books and records and the obligation to undergo examinations and 
inspections are rules-based measures that do not themselves prohibit 
 
JOHN’S L. REV. 919, 951 (2003) (discussing auditors’ monitoring obligations). 
 271. 15 U.S.C. §§ 778j-1(b) (2006). 
 272. 15 U.S.C. §§ 778j-1(d) (2006). 
 273. 15 U.S.C. §78(q)(a) & (b) (2006). 
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complicity, but nevertheless, raise the likelihood of detection of both 
primary violators and confederates.  In addition, these measures spur firms 
and personnel within a firm to identify irregularities and ferret out 
wrongdoing.  Such rules create an infrastructure that deters primary and 
secondary violations by causing other participants to maintain an 
infrastructure that facilitates detection. 
The securities laws also impose a variety of requirements relating to 
supervision of securities professionals.  Firms and supervisors are charged 
with responsibility for maintaining reasonable supervisory procedures and 
systems and enforcing those procedures.  Broker-dealers and investment 
advisers are subject to sanction when they fail to reasonably supervise 
employees who commit securities law violations.
274
  Such provisions are 
standards-based anti-complicity measures rather than rules-based, but like 
rules-based measures, such as books and records provisions, they are 
focused on forcing participant bystanders to become more proactive in 
ferreting out misconduct within their organization. 
B. Anti-Complicity Rules Post-SOX 
When enacted, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) represented the most 
sweeping reforms to the federal securities laws in over a generation, and 
the most significant revisions to financial reporting regulation since 
enactment of the securities laws in the Depression.
275
  A number of the 
SOX provisions ultimately effect rules-based requirements that are directed 
at making reporting companies and the many participants in the reporting 
process accountable for the integrity of, and the systems for, financial 
reporting. 
1. Audit Committee Initiatives 
The audit committee provisions in Section 301 of SOX were rules-
based initiatives that reallocated responsibility for the selection and 
retention of the outside auditor to the public company’s audit committee or 
equivalent governing body.
276
  This change required the audit committees 
of public companies to engage proactively in oversight of the company’s 
 
 274. 15 U.S.C. §78o(b)(4)(E) (2006) (imposing supervisory requirements on broker-
dealers under the Exchange Act), . 15 U.S.C. §80b-3(e)(6), (f) (2006) (imposing supervisory 
requirements on investment advisers under the Investment Advisers Act).  
 275. SOX, supra note 141    (“An Act [t]o protect investors by improving the accuracy 
and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to securities law . . . .”); see also 
S.E.C. Moves Quickly on Corporate Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2002, at C12 (noting 
passage of the Act was “biggest overhaul of securities law since the 1930’s”). 
 276. SOX, supra note 141, t § 301 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §78j-1(m) (2006)). 
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audit process.
277
  The rules mandated changes that altered the composition 
of audit committees in terms of board members and spurred inclusion of 
persons of greater expertise.
278
  It also changed the dynamics of the way in 
which audit committees and outside auditors interact.  Whereas 
management and outside auditors were typically regarded as jointly making 
reports to the audit committee to enable it to discharge an oversight 
function, SOX changed this dynamic.  After SOX, although the outside 
auditor undoubtedly continued to work with management in auditing the 
financial statements prepared by management, the auditor reports to the 
audit committee, which now holds the power to hire and fire the auditor.
279
  
Separate meetings with auditors and the audit committee are routine.  
Finally, the audit committee has access to more unfiltered information on 
internal complaints regarding the reliability and integrity of company 
accounting systems.
280
  Collectively these rules-based process initiatives 
create bright-line mandates for the audit committee’s authority.  In this 
way, the audit committee is compelled to take a more proactive role as a 
secondary participant in overseeing management’s preparation of the 
reporting company’s financial statements. 
2. Audit Independence and Rotation 
The audit independence and rotation provisions preclude certain forms 
of commercial arrangements between a public company and its 
independent auditor that would introduce conflicts of interest for the 
outside auditor.
281
  In other circumstances, audit committee involvement 
and approval of a waiver is required, thereby ensuring knowledge and 
specific deliberations relating to the conflict.
282
  Finally, audit partner 
rotation provisions create a bright-line rule that ensures that the audit 
partner for the outside auditor is changed at least every five years.
283
  These 
provisions are properly viewed as anti-complicity provisions.  The 
enhanced independence requirements are designed to remove incentives 
that might otherwise lead auditors to be complicit in reporting violations or 
less willing to challenge management accounting judgments.  The partner 
rotation provision is designed to disrupt complicit patterns of behavior that 
might be more likely to develop over time. 
 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id.  
 279. Id.  
 280. Id.  
 281. SOX, supra note 141, §§ 201, 206 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j-1(g),  (l) (2006)). 
 282. SOX, supra note 141, § 202 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(h) (2006)). 
 283. SOX, supra note 141, § 202 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(j) (2006)). 
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3. Certification and Internal Controls 
SOX-mandated certification requirements make senior managers 
assume a higher degree of accountability for financial reporting based on 
information that is in their possession, and based on a statutorily-imposed 
obligation to assess their own company’s internal controls over financial 
reporting.
284
  By making senior managers attest to the absence of 
knowledge that calls into question the truthfulness and reliability of the 
company’s disclosure or its internal controls underlying its financial 
reporting, the rules-based certification requirement makes potentially 
passive participants in the disclosure process active participants who can no 
longer take a passive role in the company’s public disclosure. 
This form of anti-complicity measure forces senior managers to take a 
proactive role in financial reporting and thereby reduces the likelihood of 
primary violations by others.  The relevant provisions make senior 
managers directly accountable for what they do know, or in some cases, for 
information that should elicit suspicion.  In a sense, the measure forces 
senior managers to be affirmatively non-complicit, even in situations where 
their conduct would not entail sanctionable complicity under existing 
aiding and abetting and causing standards. 
* * * 
These rules-based examples are not meant to comprehensively list the 
provisions that have anti-complicity implications, but rather to illustrate 
two different points.  First, they show that anti-complicity measures do not 
necessarily focus on merely addressing complicity in the narrow sense (i.e., 
in the sense of standards that prohibit affirmative assistance in the 
commission of a securities law violation).  Instead, anti-complicity 
provisions are more usefully thought of as prophylactic measures designed 
to deprive or disrupt primary violators’ expectations in being able to avail 
themselves of either knowing or unintentional passive assistance from 
secondary actors.  Second, these examples demonstrate that rules-based 
measures have begun to appear in the law on a scattered and ad hoc basis.  
Although these measures evidence a promising alternative to a standards-
based regime, they also raise the question of whether rules-based initiatives 
could be introduced more pervasively as a more effective means of limiting 
complicity in its many guises.  That issue is addressed in the next section. 
VI. A RULES-BASED APPROACH TO COMPLICITY 
The preceding sections laid the groundwork for the proposal presented 
 
 284. SOX, supra note 141, § 302(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a) (2006));  SOX, 
supra note 141, § 906(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1350(a) (2006)). (providing criminal 
penalties for failure to certify required financial reports as required by Section 302(a)). 
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in this section of the article.  The existing standards-based regime is 
seriously flawed as an anti-complicity strategy.  Although, as discussed in 
the preceding section, an inchoate rules-based anti-complicity regime has 
begun to take shape on an ad hoc basis, that regime is less than 
comprehensive.  In order to overcome this deficiency, the SEC needs 
broader rulemaking discretion in crafting a robust rules-based anti-
complicity regime.  This section discusses the benefits of a more robust 
rules-based regime and formulates a legislative proposal that would move 
regulatory policy in that direction. 
A. The Virtues of a Rules-Based Approach 
While the preceding section offered examples of anti-complicity 
measures currently found in federal securities law, it left unstated why, as a 
formal matter, a rules-based strategy is likely to be effective in the 
securities law context.
285
  As discussed below, there are three 
considerations that drive the argument:  first, a rules-based approach, if 
feasible, is likely to provide greater deterrence by providing greater 
guidance to secondary actors (especially third parties) regarding their 
conduct prospectively.
286
  Second, many securities law violations arise from 
recurring patterns of misconduct.  Because of the recurring nature of the 
patterns of conduct, it may be possible to formulate bright-line anti-
complicity rules to disrupt recurring forms of problematic collaborative 
behavior.
287
  Finally, the motivation of complicit secondary actors in many 
enforcement matters stems from a failure to either heed warning signs or a 
failure to act affirmatively in preventing assistance from being used for an 
 
 285. Approaching the issue of gatekeeper liability from a theoretical perspective, 
Professor Hamdani has suggested generally that regulatory rules in the securities fraud 
context might be a plausible policy alternative to civil damage liability for gatekeepers.  
Hamdani, Gatekeeper Liability, supra note 62, at 116.  This result is consistent with the 
more detailed policy prescriptions below.  Professor Hamdani also suggests  selectively 
expanding liability in targeted areas (which he uses in the sense of liability for damages in 
contrast to regulatory sanctions resulting from rules).  He identifies two significant 
conditions:  (i) “a narrowly defined activity” (i.e., something that provides the gatekeeper 
with a high degree of clarity regarding their responsibility) and (ii) liability directed at “a 
party that is expected to be relatively successful in detecting issuer fraud.”  Id. at 117–18.  
While undoubtedly these kinds of conditions tend to minimize extraneous compliance costs 
arising from liability standards, these same factors are also applicable in the context of rules 
that result only in regulatory sanctions.  Rules are particularly useful in contextually 
targeting regulatory obligations, and thus, the very same considerations that lead Professor 
Hamdani to recommend a selective expansion of civil liability would apply with equal force 
in arguing for a more robust rules-based regime. 
 286. See supra Section II.A (discussing the economic and behavioral factors that support 
regulation of complicity). 
 287. See supra Section II.B (identifying the patterns and foundations of complicity in 
securities law violations). 
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improper purpose.
288
  As a result, rules may overcome secondary party 
inertia where there is at best only a weak motivation to prevent assistance 
from being used for an improper purpose. 
The great advantage of rules is the specific prospective guidance they 
offer to the persons to whom they are directed.  Bright lines make it easier 
for the affected person to align his or her conduct to the desired regulatory 
norm.  The great disadvantage arises when persons wish to circumvent 
such rules.  Bright-line rules are more easily circumvented because of their 
specificity.  A regulated person who seeks to avoid the effect of applicable 
rules may seek out loopholes that may violate the spirit of the rule even if it 
does not violate its letter.  If a rule is easily circumvented and persons are 
inclined to do so, then a rules-based regime may lead to pervasive 
regulatory evasion. 
Standards, in contrast, are less successful in providing guidance, but 
tend to be more immune to circumvention.  Because standards are 
formulated in terms of general guidance, they involve a higher degree of 
uncertainty as applied to specific situations and therefore may provide a 
less effective level of regulation.  Standards may lead to uncertainty for the 
regulated party in at least two respects.  First, the regulated persons may 
not appreciate that their conduct is governed by a standard because the 
connection between the conduct and the standard is too attenuated.  
Second, even where the regulated person is clear as to the potential 
applicability of the standard in governing his or her conduct, the party may 
reach the wrong conclusion as to its application in the particular factual 
context.  These sources of uncertainty detract from the deterrent effect of 
standards.  One need only think of the underlying facts in Central Bank to 
see why standards are frequently not very helpful prospectively.  In that 
case, an indenture trustee failed to recognize that its decision not to seek an 
independent assessment of an inflated land appraisal would assist the 
fraudulent bond offering of a land developer.
289
  At the same time, the 
inherent imprecision of standards make them difficult to evade by making 
superficial adjustments to behavior.  Invariably, standards seek to 
characterize the substance of the behavior regardless of its putative 
technical compliance with narrowly drawn rules. 
Thus, the key issues in evaluating the efficacy of a rules-based anti-
complicity regime is the degree to which anti-complicity rules are easily 
circumvented and the degree to which parties are inclined to engage in 
circumvention strategies.  On both fronts, there are compelling reasons for 
concluding that anti-complicity rules in the securities law context are both 
 
 288. See supra Section II.C (examining the differences and relative merits of standard-
based versus rule-based anti-complicity approaches). 
 289. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 
168–69 (1994). 
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feasible and effective. 
Financial reporting, while involving many individual judgment calls, 
involves a high degree of standardized procedures requiring the assistance 
of many different persons.
290
  Enforcement actions reveal recurrent patterns 
of conduct by third parties that enable materially misleading disclosure to 
occur.  Rules directed at the role played by third parties in these recurrent 
patterns of misconduct would undermine the capacity of primary violators 
to succeed in unlawful actions, or at the very least, make success more 
costly or inject a higher degree of uncertainty regarding the primary 
violator’s likelihood of success. 
To have anti-complicity rules that are not easily circumvented in this 
context it is necessary to identify specific conduct by secondary actors that 
might prevent or deter recurrent violations in a broad array of situations 
relating, for example, to financial reporting.  Secondary actors may 
facilitate, or at least enable, material and misleading disclosure in two 
respects.  Secondary parties may mislead other third parties charged with 
verifying the reliability of the primary actor’s disclosure, such as auditors 
and lawyers, in the audit verification letter context.  In addition, secondary 
actors may be less than candid in sharing information with others, or 
withhold suspicions rather than making appropriate inquiries themselves or 
alerting others.  Rules designed to enhance the reliability of information 
obtained from secondary actors and to force more sharing of candid 
information among secondary actors would be obvious countervailing anti-
complicity strategies. 
As discussed below, such rules could generate sharing among 
secondary actors of more company-specific information in a context 
beyond the control of corporate managers and provide greater prospective 
guidance to secondary actors regarding their legal responsibilities to act in 
either resolving doubts and questions or sharing reservation and concerns 
with others, such as gatekeepers.  The rules would discourage evasive 
behavior, absent a higher level of deliberate cooperation from secondary 
actors, in the primary actor’s unlawful scheme.  The question is whether 
secondary actors are likely to want to help the primary violator when doing 
so would entail violating bright-line rules.  The answer entails a 
fundamental intuition about the motivation of secondary parties.  Are the 
secondary actors complicit by affirmative choice or as a result of 
behavioral circumstances?  If the latter is true, bright-line rules may 
provide a powerful antidote.  By forcing secondary actors to confront, and 
not to ignore, the reality of how their conduct might be enabling others to 
violate the securities laws, bright-line rules are a powerful and largely self-
effectuating means of discouraging complicity and making primary 
 
 290. See supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text. 
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violations more difficult.  Of course, bright-line rules will have a lesser 
impact on those who are affirmatively complicit by choice.  Even in those 
situations, bright-line rules may make detection and punishment of such 
secondary participants easier, for example, if deviation from a bright-line 
rule is readily observable.  As a result, a bright-line rule may serve as a 
deterrent for those who might otherwise be deliberately and unreservedly 
complicit. 
B.   A Legislative Proposal for Enabling Development of a Rules-Based 
Regime 
Assuming at this juncture that rules have advantages over a purely 
standards-based regime, there remains the pragmatic issue of how such a 
system might be implemented.  In order to fashion effective anti-complicity 
rules, there would need to be both considerable knowledge relating to 
underlying patterns of conduct and expertise in formulating rules that 
would disrupt the observed patterns of conduct.  Such rules are more suited 
for design and implementation by the SEC, an administrative agency with 
the requisite expertise, rather than through statutory provision.
291
  
Nevertheless, Congress would necessarily need to be involved in 
fashioning an appropriate grant of rulemaking authority to the SEC. 
The grant of rulemaking authority should give the SEC the role of 
fashioning whatever rules are reasonably designed to prevent complicit 
assistance, including the imposition of affirmative duties on third parties 
that reasonably assist in preventing violations by others and the prohibition 
of conduct that may facilitate others in violating the securities law.  A 
broad grant of rulemaking authority would allow the SEC significant 
latitude in tailoring rules to prevent patterns of contributing conduct that 
emerge from their own investigations.  The resulting rules should be 
designed to provide third parties with clear guidance to govern their 
conduct in specifically targeted situations.  In addition, the rulemaking 
power should also encompass the power to fashion exemptive safe-harbors 
to give third parties greater certainty as to conduct that would not subject 
the person to aiding and abetting or causing liability.  In this way, rules 
could be used to bring greater clarity to third parties’ regulatory 
expectations.  The accompanying text box proposes a model statutory grant 
 
 291. Cf. Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 284 (2007) 
(finding that a grant of broad and extensive rulemaking authority to regulate securities 
markets impliedly repealed broad statutory antitrust prohibition); Chamber of Commerce v. 
SEC, 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (rejecting in part an APA challenge to the SEC’s 
decision to condition eligibility for exemptions, pursuant to its broad regulatory power, in 
order to prevent abuses of exemptive transactions). 
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of rulemaking authority.
292
 
 
MODEL ANTI-COMPLICITY RULEMAKING AUTHORITY ―  
 
Proposed Section 20(e)(2) of the Securities and Exchange Act 
 
2. The Commissions Rulemaking Authority to Discourage Complicity 
in Securities Law Violations by Third Parties 
(a) IN GENRAL.―The Commission [SEC] shall, by rules and 
regulations, define and prescribe means reasonably designed to 
prevent conduct, practices, or inaction by any person that may assist, 
facilitate, or enable another person to violate any provisions of the 
Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 or the Investment Company Act of 
1940 or any rules or regulations thereunder.  Such rulemaking 
authority shall also include the power by rule or regulation to exempt 
certain conduct, practices, or inaction by third parties that might 
otherwise constitute violations of rules and regulations adopted 
pursuant to this section or subject such persons to sanction pursuant to 
Section 20(e)(1) [current Section 20 (e) as renumbered] and Section 
21C of this title and related provisions pursuant to statutes 
administered by the Commission. 
(b) STANDARDS FOR RULEMAKING.―In prescribing a rule 
under this provision― 
(1) the SEC shall consider the potential benefits from enhanced 
compliance with the securities laws and the resulting benefits to 
investors, capital markets and the public from enhanced compliance, 
and the costs to persons subject to the rules or regulations in terms of 
additional out-of-pocket costs of compliance; and 
(2) the SEC shall consult with other Federal agencies, as appropriate, 
prior to proposing a rule, and during the comment process regarding 
consistency with the objectives and policies undertaken by such 
agencies where any rule or regulation might affect the conduct or 
practices of persons already subject to regulation of such other 
Federal agencies. 
(c) EXEMPTIVE SAFE HARBORS― 
(1) IN GENRAL.―The SEC, by rule, may conditionally or 
 
 292. The language is based on rulemaking authority extended to Bureau of Consumer 
Affairs in the Dodd-Frank Act and existing rulemaking authority of the SEC regarding 
prevention of fraud.  Unlike the Bureau of Affairs grant of rulemaking authority, however, 
this model provision requires only that the SEC consult other agencies if regulations might 
affect persons regulated by the other agency.  The other agency’s objection would not 
prevent the SEC final rule from taking effect. 
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unconditionally exempt any persons or class of persons covered by 
any rule adopted by the SEC pursuant to this provision, that the SEC 
determines necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes and 
objectives of the federal securities laws, taking into consideration the 
factors in subparagraph (2). 
(2) FACTORS.―In issuing an exemption, as permitted under 
subparagraph (a), the SEC shall, as appropriate, take into 
consideration― 
(1) business hardships that would be encountered by the class of 
covered persons; 
(2) the volume of transactions or services in which the class of 
covered persons engages; and 
(3) existing provisions of law which are applicable to the conduct or 
practice.  
 
A few comments regarding this provision should be noted.  First, the 
proposed rulemaking authority would greatly expand the power of the SEC 
to regulate the conduct of third parties where that conduct touches on 
potentially violative conduct of regulated persons, such as issuers and 
reporting companies.  It would enable the SEC to adopt rules that directly 
regulate the conduct of a wide range of third parties that deal with issuers 
and reporting companies.  Moreover, the SEC could regulate a wide range 
of conduct, and even impose affirmative duties on such third parties.  
Finally, the SEC would be able to establish the appropriate culpability 
standard, and if appropriate, eliminate any mental state culpability 
requirement. 
The rulemaking authority also contains broad exemptive powers.  The 
exemptive authority would enable the SEC to target specific conduct with 
greater precision without burdening third parties in an unintended fashion.  
Precision offers both greater clarity for those subject to regulation and 
reduced compliance costs for those third parties where exempt third parties 
would otherwise incur uneconomic compliance costs.  As noted below, 
exemptions would not be available for knowingly providing substantial 
information in evading securities law requirements.
293
 
How might this authority translate into express rules?  Consider some 
of the examples in Section I.  A recurrent pattern of misconduct by third 
parties concerns their willingness to mislead auditors in audit confirmation 
letters at the behest of the reporting company.  Rules mandating more 
information and a higher degree of reliability embodied in some form of 
 
 293. Cf. 17 C.F.R. §230.144, Preliminary Note (2011) (establishing that “safe harbor is 
not available to any person with respect to any transaction or series of transactions that, 
although in technical compliance with Rule 144, is part of a plan or scheme to evade the 
registration requirements of the Act”). 
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certification rule would not be easily circumvented.  The certification could 
require different levels and kinds of information.  The certification could 
take the form of a negative assurance that the person providing the 
certification has no knowledge of certain types of facts.  The certification 
could seek new information, such as the most knowledgeable individuals at 
the third party company regarding the transaction and require a certification 
from that person.  The certification could require summary disclosure of 
communications between the third party and the reporting company 
relating to the accounting treatment of the transaction.  Finally, the 
certification could be required to contain a legend alerting each signatory 
that material misstatements in the certification will subject the signatory to 
sanction under federal securities law. 
Another area of recurrent problems has been end-of-quarter 
transactions.  A firm could be forced to identify certain end-of-quarter 
transactions based on timing, size, or unusual nature (i.e., transactions not 
in the ordinary course of business).  In some contexts, certification 
requirements could be imposed, while in others, auditors or outside counsel 
could be required to conduct additional verification by means of an 
independent interview with the reporting company’s counterparty regarding 
the purpose and underlying facts of the transactions. 
In the Delphi matter,
294
 such a requirement would have subjected the 
bank to potential liability, assuming it still went through with the 
transaction and signed the requisite certification without reservation.  The 
independent auditors would have been required to review the certification 
and might have focused on the end-of-quarter transactions more carefully.  
Another rule might establish a safe harbor for companies providing 
counterparty certifications to public companies.  The safe harbor would 
require internal procedures to detect anomalous transactions; absent such 
procedures, companies such as the IT company or the bank could be 
sanctioned for the complicit conduct of their employees.  Even if outside 
auditors were not required to review the certifications, a false certification 
would subject the certifying party to sanctions.  Obviously, the result 
obtained in the Apuzzo matter would likely be different; Apuzzo would 
have been required to provide a letter and the execution of a false 
certification alone would be sufficient to subject the certifying party to 
sanctions.
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Anti-complicity rules could be used to regulate derivative transactions 
of derivative dealers to prevent apparent sham transactions.  In the 
aftermath of Enron, something along these lines was actually suggested, 
but never implemented.  Following the conclusion of SEC enforcement 
 
 294. See supra notes 15–38 and accompanying text. 
 295. See supra notes 48–52 and accompanying text. 
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proceedings brought against several investment banks,
296
 an interagency 
report urged financial institutions to adopt internal procedures providing 
greater scrutiny and review of complex structured finance transactions 
designed primarily “to achieve financial reporting or complex tax 
objectives . . . .”
297
  While the Interagency Policy Statement merely sought 
to provide guidance regarding best practices, the statement could have 
served as the blueprint for prescriptive rules to shape institutional behavior.  
Of course, this is not what transpired.  Instead, in the face of intense 
industry criticism, the thrust of the original statement was significantly 
weakened in a revised proposal and subsequent final statement that veered 
away from bright-line rules designed to foster pro-active anti-complicity 
responses in favor of vague self-enforced standards.
298
  The final advisory 
statement, by merely suggesting adoption of modest prudential procedures 
and not requiring pro-active anti-complicity procedures, illustrates the 
failure of regulators to embrace rules-based strategies that could otherwise 
prove extremely effective. 
 
 296. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
 297. Interagency Statement on Sound Practices Concerning Complex Structured Finance 
Activities, 69 Fed. Reg. 28,980, 28,988 (May 19, 2004).  While the specific guidelines 
identified circumstances to consider to determine whether “additional scrutiny” was needed, 
the Statement’s final sentence left little doubt regarding the agencies’ aspirations for 
affirmative action by financial institutions:  “The regulatory agencies expect financial 
institutions involved in structured finance transactions to build and implement enhanced risk 
management and internal controls systems that effectively ensure compliance with the law 
and control the risks associated with complex structured finance transactions.”  Id. at 
28,990. 
 298. Interagency Statement on Sound Practices Concerning Elevated Risk Complex 
Structured Finance Activities, 71 Fed. Reg. 28,326 (May 16, 2006) (presenting a revised 
proposed interagency statement); Interagency Statement on Sound Practices Concerning 
Elevated Risk Complex Structured Finance Activities, 72 Fed. Reg. 1372 (Jan. 11, 2007) 
(providing its final statement).  The revised proposal and final statement replaced assertive 
language in the proposed statement with extensive qualifications.  For example, the 
revisions carefully noted that the statement did not “alter or expand legal duties and 
obligations” of financial institutions, and explicitly disclaimed compelling any specific 
response on the part of financial institutions when elevated legal risks were detected.  In a 
key paragraph of the Final Statement, financial institutions are urged to “take appropriate 
steps” only if the financial institution “determines that its participation” in the transaction 
“would create significant legal . . . risk for the institution” and such appropriate steps did not 
require “declining to participate in the transaction” but could merely require conditioning 
participation on the receipt of reasonable “representations or assurances from the customer.”  
72 Fed. Reg. 1372, 1374.  The Statement does concede that institutions “should decline to 
participate in elevated risk” transactions, but such a norm is operative only if after taking 
steps such as obtaining representations or assurances from the client, “the institution 
determines that the transaction . . . would result in a violation of applicable laws, regulations 
or accounting principles.”  Id. at 1375.  In other words, only if it affirmatively determines 
there would be a violation of law—a very generous threshold in tolerating a significant 
degree of complicity. 
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C. The Continued Importance of Standards 
While this article has argued that a rules-based regime would lead to 
more efficient anti-complicity policies, it does not recommend eliminating 
anti-complicity standards, such as aiding and abetting principles or causing 
liability.  Such standards provide a powerful and necessary backstop to the 
inevitable gaps and interstices of a rules-based regime.  As noted, the 
potential weakness of rules is the risk of circumvention.  Backstop 
standards are useful in defeating deliberate efforts to circumvent anti-
complicity rules and anti-complicity coverage where no rule can be readily 
fashioned to address the problematic conduct or practice. 
Backstop standards have another useful purpose because they provide 
assurance to regulators in fashioning exemptive rules that prevent third 
parties from exploiting regulatory gaps.  The SEC commonly uses 
conditions prohibiting use of an exemptive rule to commit fraud or a 
knowing evasion of regulatory policy to curb misuse of an exemption, 
conditions that are admittedly inherently standards-based.  Backstop 
standards in this context actually encourage agencies like the SEC to be 
more willing in granting exemptions, knowing that the agency will still 
have the ability to police egregious misconduct. 
A potentially constructive by-product of specific anti-complicity rules 
is that they may make existing anti-complicity standards more effective.  
As noted, a significant purpose of anti-complicity rules would be to 
increase the flow of reliable information among third parties.  If secondary 
parties have access to more information, then their ability to disclaim 
knowledge of how their conduct may be assisting in unlawful conduct is 
diminished.
299
  In short, rules that require greater direct sharing of 
information among secondary parties may either discourage some conduct 
and practices currently performed by secondary parties, or make it easier to 
challenge those activities under existing anti-complicity standards. 
CONCLUSION 
Many types of securities law violations depend on the assistance 
secondary participants provide to primary violators.  Effective anti-
 
 299. This point is illustrated by a recent enforcement action brought by the SEC 
(although the matter itself has not been adjudicated) in which the SEC alleged that the 
outside directors who served on the reporting company’s audit committee facilitated 
egregious accounting and reporting improprieties by turning a blind eye to numerous red 
flags.  DHB Indus., Litigation Release No. 21867, 2011 WL 700536 (Feb. 28, 2011); 
Complaint, SEC v. Krantz et al., Civil Action No.0:11-cv-60432-WPD (S.D.Fla. 2011).  
This matter  was subsequently settled with the defendant independent directors agreeing to 
pay monetary sanctions amounting to $1.6 million.  See SEC v. Jerome Krantz, et al., SEC 
Litigation Release No. 22154 (Nov. 15, 2011). 
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complicity policies present a powerful means to enhance securities law 
compliance by depriving primary actors of the assistance that they need in 
order to commit more serious securities law violations.  Currently, aiding 
and abetting standards serve as the primary means for regulating culpable 
assistance by secondary actors, but these standards are imprecise and their 
meanings turn heavily on fact-bound applications of the standards.  As 
such, although the standards may adequately address extreme forms of 
misconduct, they do not provide significant prospective guidance to 
secondary actors or deal effectively with recurrent factual scenarios where 
preventing assistance would significantly enhance compliance.  Legislators 
and regulators have overlooked the benefits of rules-based regimes as an 
alternative means of advancing anti-complicity policies.  Such a rules-
based regime could be implemented through a grant of broad rulemaking 
authority to the SEC to craft anti-complicity rules.  These rules would not 
entirely displace existing standards, but rather would allow regulators to 
target secondary actors and the conduct that contributes to violations.  
Rules would enable regulators in some cases to discourage problematic 
conduct and, in other cases, to enlist the assistance of secondary actors in 
preventing securities law violations.  In either case, they would provide 
secondary actors with prospective guidance regarding their assistance to 
others.  Anti-complicity standards would continue to perform an important 
supplementary purpose, namely to address instances of knowing or reckless 
complicity, egregious efforts to circumvent anti-complicity rules, or to 
provide a backstop in circumstances not addressed by rules. 
 
